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Abstract
The research reported here investigated the nature of young children’s 
understanding of a novel symbol—a scale model. Children witnessed the hiding of a 
small toy in a scale model of a room and were then required to search for an analogous 
larger toy that had been surreptitiously hidden in the actual room. At issue was whether 
children succeed by attending to the target location (object strategy), to the spatial 
location of the target location (spatial strategy), or to both types of information. It has 
been suggested that at three years of age (the age at which children first succeed on the 
task) children succeed by recognizing the correspondence between analogous objects in 
the two spaces (Bence & Presson, 1997; Blades & Cooke, 1994; Perner, 1991; Lillard, 
1993) but that an understanding of the model as a whole as a representation of the room 
necessitates also attending to the spatial relations between the objects (Perner, 1991; 
Lillard, 1993). In five Experiments, children participated in versions of the model task 
that varied in the type of information (object and/or spatial) available to solve the task. 
The results revealed that although, in general, children rely primarily on the identity of 
the individual objects to find the hidden toy, the spatial relations between the objects 
may also influence task success. Furthermore, there was strong evidence of individual 
differences in children’s strategies which appeared to be linked to sex, with girls 
attending primarily to the identity of the objects and boys demonstrating a fledgling 
ability to approach the model spatially. Some children also appeared to label the target 
object but the labeling strategy could not account for girls’ tendency to attend to the 
objects more than boys. It is suggested that characterizations of an abrupt shift between 
three and four years of age in the ability to interpret the model as a whole as a 
representation of the room may be misleading. There may be multiple developmental 
routes to the gradual acquisition of an explicit understanding of a scale model as a 
symbol for the space it is intended to represent.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A hallmark of mature human cognition is the ability to understand symbols. In 
western civilization, symbols are ubiquitous in everyday life; calendars, clocks and 
watches denote the passage of time and are thus essential for planning activities, 
computer icons indicate the type of software accessible for manipulating information 
and in many countries, the well-known airplane silhouette appearing on road signage is 
essential for directing visitors to the local airport. As these examples demonstrate, the 
type of symbols one regularly encounters varies widely. Some symbols are highly 
iconic or perceptually similar to their referents such as photographs, real-life videos and 
the scale model replicas used by architects to depict future real-estate developments.
The referents for other symbols are more abstract; as when a dove or laurel branch 
denotes peace or a skull and cross bones is used to indicate danger. Still other symbols 
derive their meaning, at least in part, through their combination with symbols belonging 
to the same symbol system such as letters and words, numbers, hieroglyphs, braille and 
the symbols used in computer programming languages. So numerous and ubiquitous are 
the symbols encountered in everyday life that mastering them can be considered 
essential for fijll participation in western culture (DeLoache, de Mendoza & Anderson, 
1999; DeLoache & Smith, 1999).
The critical advantage of acquiring the ability to think about and reason in terms 
of symbols is that cognition becomes de-contextualized or freed from the here-and-now 
(DeLoache, 2000; Werner & Kaplan, 1963). As entities in and of themselves, 
independent of their referents, symbols permit thinking about that which is beyond 
current sensory input. Thus, for example, one can think about the location of Portugal 
relative to the Mediterranean and Atlantic oceans by inspecting a globe or world atlas 
and without ever visiting the country itself. And complex mathematical expressions, for
the few that understand them, can be solved by the ability to think in terms of the four 
or more dimensions they represent— clearly well beyond what can be perceived directly. 
It is this capacity for abstract thinking afforded by symbols that make them essential 
tools for reasoning and problem-solving (Vygotsky, 1978). Given the prevalence of 
symbols in western culture and the implications of symbolization for cognition more 
generally, it is perhaps unsurprising that investigating the origins and early development 
of the ability to understand symbols is a topic of great interest to cognitive 
developmental researchers.
This dissertation is concerned with young children’s ability to understand the 
relation between a particular symbol—a scale model—and its referent, the room the 
model stands for. As children are unlikely to have had experience with a scale model 
depicting a specific, unfamiliar environment, scale models afford the opportunity to 
investigate how children first come to understand symbol-referent relations as well as 
the factors that influence that understanding. The research reported in this thesis 
attempts to elucidate the nature of that understanding and its development during the 
pre-school years. This introductory chapter is organized as follows; First, to help place 
the work in context, the definition of a symbol adopted throughout the thesis is 
presented. This is followed by a description of the standard scale model task (see 
DeLoache, 1987b; Uttal, Schreiber & DeLoache, 1995; Marzolf, 1996) and the “Dual 
Orientation Hypothesis”, a theory of the cognitive processes thought to underlie success 
on the task (see e.g. DeLoache, 1987b; 1995). The next section contains a summary of 
the research investigating the factors that influence young children’s understanding of 
scale models and the conclusions drawn from that work. An alternative interpretation of 
these findings and its implications for our understanding of early symbolization and 
representation more generally is then delineated and the chapter concludes with an
overview of the experiments carried out to address this possibility and their organization 
in the remaining chapters of the thesis.
Definition of a Svmbol
The definition of a symbol adopted in this thesis is any external representation 
that the user intends to stand for something other than itself. Symbols are cultural 
artifacts created for the express purpose of communication (Tomasello, 1999). They are 
physical entities or objects in the real world and are therefore external representations of 
their referents, distinct from internal, mental representations of the world such as 
cognitive maps (Liben, 1997; Mandler, 1983). Furthermore, what makes something a 
symbol is the communicator’s intention that it is interpreted in terms of something other 
than itself (Tomasello, 1999; Sharon, 1999a; 1999b). Thus, even something that does 
not resemble its referent in any way can serve as a symbol; e.g. two hands held together 
at right angles can serve as the intersection of roads when giving directions. What is 
essential is that the user intends the gesture to be interpreted in terms of the environment 
it represents (and of course, that the receiver interprets it in this way). As Dalke puts it, 
“the representational relation [between symbol and referent] resides in the mind, not in 
the objects that are used as representations.” (Dalke, 1998, page 67). Although grasping 
the relation that holds between a symbol and its referent is typically straightforward for 
a normally functioning adult, as the following summary of the literature on young 
children’s understanding of scale models will reveal, this is not the case for very young 
children.
The Scale Model Task
Much of the work on young children’s understanding of scale models has been 
carried out by Judy DeLoache and her colleagues (see DeLoache, 1989b; 1990b; 1995; 
DeLoache, Miller & Pierrotsakos, 1998). On the standard task, children are introduced
to a room and a scale model replica of the room containing the same (except for size) 
objects. Children are also shown a small toy and a matching larger toy and are told that 
both toys always do the same thing in their respective spaces (e.g. they are told that 
wherever the little toy hides in the little room, that’s where the big toy also hides in his 
big room). On the experimental trials, children watch as the experimenter hides the 
small toy in the model and are then required to search for the analogous larger toy that 
has been surreptitiously hidden in the corresponding location in the room. The idea is 
that only if children interpret the model as a symbol for the room, will they succeed in 
transferring knowledge from one to the other. To ensure that any difficulties 
experienced in the room are not due simply to a decayed memory for the target location, 
children are also taken back to the model and required to retrieve the original toy. A 
different hiding location is used on each trial.
The Dual Orientation Hvpothesis
The results from the original study using the scale model paradigm (DeLoache, 
1987b) revealed that, whereas 3.0-year-old children are highly successful at retrieving 
the analogous toy (searching correctly on at least 75% of the trials), children just six 
months younger perform very poorly (-17%), searching randomly as though they have 
no basis for knowing the whereabouts of the large toy in the room (DeLoache, 1987b;
1995). The abrupt improvement in performance occurring in children only six months 
older is especially striking as both groups of children are highly successful at retrieving 
the original toy in the model; differences in memory for the target location therefore 
cannot account for the younger children’s difficulty retrieving the analogous toy in the 
room. So why do the younger children have such trouble transferring their knowledge 
of the target location from the model to the room? DeLoache’s theory, known as the 
Dual Orientation Hypothesis, is that the younger children’s difficulty stems from their
inability to take a dual stance to the model or to interpret it, not only as an object in-and- 
of-itself, but also as a representation of the room. So compelling is the model as an 
object in its own right, that the younger children are unable to see through it to the space 
it represents. Consequently, knowledge of the target location in the model is not brought 
to bear in searching for the analogous toy in the room (DeLoache, 1987b; 1991; 1995; 
DeLoache & Marzolf, 1992).
Support for the Dual Orientation Hypothesis comes from a number of 
experiments using diverse methodologies. In one set of experiments, instead of 
witnessing the hiding event in the scale model, the target location was pointed out on a 
photograph or line drawing of the room (e.g. DeLoache & Burns, 1994; DeLoache, 
1987b; DeLoache, 1991; DeLoache & Marzolf, 1992; Dow & Pick, 1992) or by 
showing children a videotape of the hiding event in the room (Troseth & DeLoache, 
1998; 1999; DeLoache et al, 1998). In contrast to their poor performance with the scale 
model, 2.5-year-olds were highly successful with the picture and video versions of the 
task, searching successfully on 72%-79% of the trials. According to the authors, the 
advantage of pictures and video is that they are of little interest as objects, serving 
primarily as representations of something else. They point out that in most western 
homes even very young children have experience with picture book reading in which 
the depicted object, and not the medium, is the primary focus (DeLoache, 1987b; 1995 
DeLoache & Burns, 1993; 1994). In a sense then, pictures and video do not pose the 
challenge of dual interpretation as children interpret them primarily (if not exclusively) 
in terms of what they represent.
A similar rationale was used in a second set of experiments (DeLoache, 1990a; 
1993; 1995; 2000). The reasoning in one study was that if interpreting the model as an 
object precluded 2.5-year-olds from appreciating its symbolic function, then decreasing
its salience as an object should lead to improved performance. To test this notion, the 
model was housed within a puppet theatre framework and a clear window was placed in 
front so that children could not come into contact with the model or its contents. The 
experimenter stood behind the set-up and simply pointed out the hiding location. The 
idea was to create psychological distance between children and the model by distancing 
them from the model physically. Another study tested the converse — that increasing the 
salience of the model as an object would prove deleterious to the normally successful
3.0-year-olds. To this end, children were allowed to play with the contents of the model 
for ten minutes prior to administering the standard task. The results were consistent with 
the predictions generated by the Dual Orientation Hypothesis; improved performance 
by the younger children in the former study (54 % vs. 28%, DeLoache, 2000, 
Experiment 2a; 48% vs. 13%, DeLoache, 2000, Experiment 2b, for the window and no 
window groups respectively) and decreased performance by the older children in the 
latter study (44% vs. 75% for the playing experience with the model and the standard 
task respectively, DeLoache, 2000, Experiment 3; see also DeLoache, 1990a; 1993; 
1995; DeLoache & Burns, 1993).
A different manipulation was used in another experiment where an attempt was 
made to eliminate the need for a dual representation of the model by duping 2.5-year- 
old children into believing that the model and the room were one and the same.
Children were introduced to a miniature troll doll and its little room (the model). They 
were then told of a device that could “magically” enlarge or shrink the room and the 
doll. A demonstration followed during which they waited behind a curtain, listened to 
pre-recorded mechanical-sounding noises and saw flashing lights emanating from 
beyond the waiting area. A few minutes later children emerged and were surprised to 
find an identical but full-sized room in place of the model. On the experimental trials
that followed, children watched as the experimenter hid the small doll in the scale 
model, waited while the “machine” enlarged the model and the doll, then searched for 
the larger doll in the emergent room (on subsequent trials the hiding space alternated 
between the room and model so that only one “shrinking” or “enlargement” was 
needed). The results were dramatic; 2.5-year-old children searched successfully for the 
analogous toy on 76% of the trials (DeLoache, 1995; DeLoache, Miller & Rosengren, 
1997; DeLoache & Smith, 1999; Marzolf, 1996). Although children searched in the 
analogous space, just as they would on the standard task, believing it to be the same 
object as the original space (only transformed in size) effectively eliminated the need to 
interpret the model symbolically and thus led to searching successfully.
Taken together, the results of the above experiments provide support for the 
Dual Orientation Hypothesis. Manipulating the salience of the concrete properties of the 
model influenced the ability to interpret it in terms of the room; whereas increasing the 
level of salience proved deleterious to the performance of the normally successful 3.0- 
year-olds, decreasing the level of salience led to improved performance by 2.5-year- 
olds. The younger children’s performance also improved substantially when the need to 
represent the model as a symbol was effectively removed i.e. by convincing them that 
the model and room were the same thing. The results therefore provide support for the 
notion that successful performance on the standard model task requires that children 
respond not only to the concrete attributes of the model, but also to its abstract, 
representational function.
Factors that Influence Task Performance
Numerous subsequent studies have shown that even when children achieve 
“representational insight” or the realization of the relation that holds between the model 
and the room, their knowledge is still relatively fragile. For one thing, representing the
relation between the model and the room is subject to rapid decay. Uttal, Schreiber & 
DeLoache (1995) administered the model task to 3.0-year-old children using the 
standard procedure with one exception—after witnessing the hiding event in the model, 
children were required to wait 20 seconds, 1 minute or 5 minutes before they were 
permitted to search in the room. All children received the three delays in one of three 
orders (20 seconds, 1 minute or 5 minutes first). The results revealed a dramatic effect 
of order. Children who received the 5 minute delay first performed extremely poorly on 
subsequent trials even after a delay of only 20 seconds. In contrast, children who 
received the 20 second delay first continued to outperform the children in the other 
groups after the 2 minute and 5 minute delays (although in this group as well there was 
a negative correlation between performance and delay time). The performance of 
children who received the 2 minute delay first was similar to the 5 minute delay first 
group suggesting that, after the longer delays, children appeared to forget about the 
relevance of the model for guiding their search in the room (Uttal et al., 1995, 
Experiment 1). This interpretation derives support from the finding that children 
benefited from receiving a reminder of the target location in the model (e.g. by being 
allowed to retrieve the original toy first or simply to see the model again) prior to 
searching in the room (Uttal et al, 1995, Experiments 2 and 3). Thus, although 3.0- 
year-olds can achieve “representational insight”, they have difficulty maintaining that 
knowledge, unaided, over even a fairly short period of time.
Performance on the model task is also highly dependent on “iconicity” or the 
degree of perceptual similarity between the model and the room. For example, 
compared to when the model, room and their contents are identical (i.e. except for size 
as on the standard task), 3.0-year-olds’ performance declines markedly when the 
individual objects in the two spaces are perceptually dissimilar (e.g. when the chair is
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covered with blue print fabric in the room but solid brown fabric in the model etc.). 
Varying the appearance of the surrounds, however, by having white fabric walls on the 
room and white cardboard walls on the model, appears to have little effect on 
performance (DeLoache, 1989b; DeLoache, 1990b; DeLoache, Kolstad & Anderson, 
1991). However, as DeLoache points out, it could be that the degree of dissimilarity in 
that study was simply too subtle to detect the importance of the similarity of the overall 
space (DeLoache, 1990b). Other researchers have shown that the orientation of the 
experimental spaces is also critical to success on the task with performance declining 
significantly when e.g. the orientation of the model is misaligned by 180° with the room 
(Blades & Cooke, 1994; Bremner & Andreasen, 1998).^^
Perhaps the most compelling demonstration of the role of perceptual similarity 
is the finding that reducing the physical size ratio of the experimental spaces leads to a 
dramatic improvement in 2.5-year-olds ability to appreciate the model-room relation. 
Compared to the standard task involving a model and life-sized room (ratio 1:16, 
different-scale condition) in which their performance was extremely poor (41%, 
DeLoache et al., 1991), 2.5-year-olds were highly successful (-75%, DeLoache et al., 
1991) at finding the analogous toy when the scale difference was reduced and two 
different-sized models were used (ratio 1:2, similar-scale condition). Although it 
remains unclear whether the observed effect is due specifically to the reduction of the 
discrepancy in size, or to other changes inherent in reducing the size ratio— e.g. the 
advantage of transferring knowledge between two surveyable spaces (similar scale 
condition) vs. transferring knowledge from a surveyable space to a surrounding space
The role of the similarity of the configuration of objects in the model and the room 
has also been investigated. However, as the relevant studies are central to the main 
question addressed by the research reported in this dissertation, they are reviewed in 
depth in the introduction to Experiment 1 which is reported in following chapter.
11
(different-scale condition) or transferring knowledge between things that belong to the 
same category (two models in the similar scale condition) vs. things that do not belong 
to the same category (a model and a room in the different-scale condition, DeLoache et 
al., 1991), the effect is compelling particularly as 2.5-year-olds who first receive the 
similar-scale condition are subsequently able to pass the standard model task (Marzolf 
& DeLoache, 1994). Taking the results from the physical similarity studies together, it 
seems clear that the more a novel symbol resembles its referent, the more likely children 
will be to recognize that they are related and thus transfer knowledge between them.
The younger children’s improved performance on the standard model task 
following success on the similar-scale task raises another important factor influencing 
the ability to achieve “representational insight”—experience. A number of studies have 
shown that previous experience with a relatively easy version of the model task leads to 
greater success with a more difficult version than would otherwise be obtained. In the 
research by Uttal and his colleagues described above, 3.0-year-old children who 
received the short delay of 20 seconds between the hiding and searching events 
performed significantly better after the 2 minute and 5 minute delays than those children 
who received the longer delays first (Uttal et al., 1995). Three-year-olds’ performance 
when the objects in the model and room are perceptually dissimilar (a task they usually 
find challenging, see above) also improves significantly following experience with the 
standard task in which the objects in the two spaces are perceptually similar (Marzolf & 
DeLoache, 1994, Experiment 2). And children aged two and a half years who receive 
the picture or video versions of the task subsequently succeed on the standard version of 
the model task which they typically find very difficult (DeLoache, 1991, Experiments 2
1.2 ‘Physical size ratio” refers to the ratio of the area of the two spaces.
■ 5
12
and 3; Marzolf & DeLoache, 1996, Experiment 2; Troseth & DeLoache, 1998, 
Experiment la).
As mentioned above, experience with the model task in the similar-scale 
condition facilitates 2.5-year-olds’ ability to succeed on the standard (different-scale) 
task (Marzolf & DeLoache, 1994). This effect has proven extremely robust lasting one 
day and even one week later even when the different-scale task was administered in a 
different location, using different materials and different experimenters. These results 
have been interpreted to suggest that the observed transfer effects are not context- 
dependent but rather are more generalized and therefore reflect an abstract 
understanding of symbol-referent relations (Marzolf, Pacha & DeLoache, 1996). 
Experience with symbols thus appears to contribute to a predisposition to interpret a 
novel object or event in terms of what it stands for (see for e.g. DeLoache, 1995 for a 
discussion of this point). Although the possibility of transfer occurring across different 
symbols (i.e. symbols that do not share the same referent as in the picture, video and 
model studies) or symbol systems has yet to be explored empirically, the results from 
the transfer studies with scale models suggest that experience with symbols may be a 
powerful developmental mechanism for symbolization more generally.
Another variable that appears important for early symbolization is the amount of 
instruction children receive about the relation between a symbol and its referent. 
Previous work has shown that three year old children require explicit instruction as to 
the parallel between the model and the room to succeed on the task. This involves a 
lengthy introduction to the experimental materials including taking the individual, 
miniature objects from the model, holding them up beside their larger counterparts in 
the room and pointing out their correspondence (see DeLoache et al., 1991; Marzolf,
1996). Omitting these explicit instructions proved extremely deleterious to the ability of
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3.0- and even 3.5-year olds to appreciate and exploit the model-room relation 
(DeLoache, 1989a, Experiment 4; DeLoache et al.. Experiment 1, 1999). Although 4.0- 
year-old children appear to succeed in spite of these reduced instructions (DeLoache et 
al.. Experiment 1, 1999), it is not until at least five years of age that children achieve a 
spontaneous, verbalizable appreciation of the relevance of the objects and events in the 
model for guiding their search in the room in the absence of any instruction whatsoever 
about their relatedness (DeLoache et al., Experiment 2, 1999). Thus, even when a novel 
symbol and its referent are highly perceptually similar, children younger than five years 
of age still require some degree of explicit instructional support to interpret one in terms 
of the other.
Empirical efforts to improve 2.5-year-olds’ performance on the model task by 
providing enriched instructions have yielded mixed results. Labeling the individual 
hiding locations on the experimental trials, even repeated labeling in addition to asking 
children to indicate the target object immediately after the hiding event on each trial (to 
reinforce the target location), effected little improvement (DeLoache, 1989, Experiment 
3; Solomon, 1997a). However, there is some indication that the nature of the 
instructions might be critical for 2.5-year-olds as children who were told explicitly that 
the model was constructed expressly for the purpose of showing them where to find the 
hidden toy in the room performed significantly better (although still not especially well) 
than a control group who received the standard instructions (mean performance for the 
former and latter groups was 42% and 15% respectively; Sharon, 1999a, 1999b). Very 
young children therefore benefit from instructions that assist in conveying the intended 
function of the model; when this is explained explicitly, even 2.5-year-olds begin to 
catch on to the importance of the hiding event in the model for guiding their search in 
the room. Note that this finding underscores the importance of perceiving the
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communicator’s intention that the model be interpreted in terms of its representational 
function included in the definition of a symbol provided above. The main point to be 
made regarding the role of instructions on the model task, however, is that the general 
developmental pattern points to an age-related decrease in the amount of explicit 
instructions required to interpret an object symbolically.
It is worth noting that the various factors described in the above summary of 
previous research—iconicity, experience, instructions—interact to influence children’s 
success on the model task. Thus, high levels of one factor can bolster children’s 
performance against the deleterious effects of low levels of another factor. For example, 
increasing the iconicity between the model and the room (by reducing the size ratio to 
1:2) helps 3.0-year-olds to achieve “representational insight” even when the explicit 
matching of corresponding items is omitted from the instructions. Children in the 
similar-scale condition performed significantly better (63%) than a control group who 
also received the reduced instructions but participated in the different-scale condition 
(19%, DeLoache et al., 1999, Experiments 1 and 3). And the observed age-related 
decrease in the amount of instruction required to transfer knowledge from the model to 
the room also suggests that gains in experience with symbolic materials during the 
preschool years helps to buffer performance against the adverse effects of minimal 
instructions (DeLoache et al., 1998, Experiment 2). Multiple factors, in combination, 
therefore influence whether or not young children will achieve “representational 
insight” on the model task (see DeLoache, 1995; DeLoache et al., 1999).
Two further points regarding the implications of the research on young 
children’s understanding of scale models are worth mentioning here. The first, is that 
although children succeed on the model task by three years of age, this initial 
understanding of the symbolic function of the model is likely to be restricted to an
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implicit understanding of the relatedness between the two spaces. Thus, rather than a 
conscious, verbalizable awareness, the notion of “representational insight” refers to the 
sudden, tacit realization that an object such as a scale model could stand for something 
other than itself (DeLoache, 1989a; 2000). It is only with age and cognitive maturity 
that children develop a more explicit understanding of symbol-referent relations 
(DeLoache et al., 1999). The second point concerns the broader implications of the 
scale model research for symbolization more generally. Given the wide variety of 
symbols and symbols systems to be mastered in a given culture, it is unlikely that 
acquiring the ability to understand and reason in terms of symbols is a one-time, 
across-the-board achievement (see e.g. DeLoache, 2000). Instead, each symbol or 
symbol system is likely to be mastered independently according to the requisite 
cognitive demands and subject to the influence of a variety of factors that influence 
achieving “representational insight” (though there is likely to be some overlap in these 
factors across symbols e.g. iconicity is likely to influence understanding pictures and 
maps as well as models). The developmental time course of acquiring new symbols 
should therefore be expected to vary with the nature of the particular symbol or symbol 
system.
In sum, the research on preschoolers’ understanding of scale models suggests 
that, unlike adults, the relation that holds between a symbol and its referent is far from 
transparent to young children; it must be learned, requires explicit instruction at the 
outset, remains relatively fragile early in development and develops to an explicit, full­
blown understanding only over a protracted period of time. And although the age of 
acquisition of various symbols is thought to vary with the associated cognitive demands, 
previous experience with symbolic media may render the novice cognizer sensitive to 
perceiving novel symbol-referent relations.
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An Alternative Interpretation of Success on the Task
The results from the body of work on pre-schoolers’ understanding of scale 
models have important implications not only for the development of symbolization but 
for the development of representation more generally. Findings from the scale model 
research have been linked to children’s understanding of pretense (Harris & Kavanagh 
& Dowson, 1997), to the development of a Theory of Mind (Charman & Baron-Cohen, 
1995), the role of inhibition in cognitive development (O’Sullivan, Mitchell & Daehler, 
1999; in press), children’s understanding of intention (Dalke, 1998; Tomasello, Call & 
Gluckman, 1997; Sharon, 1999a, 1999b), and the development of spatial (Bence & 
Presson, 1997; Blades & Cooke, 1994; Liben, 1998) and analogical (Lowenstein & 
Gentner, 1998; Lowenstein & Gentner, 2001) reasoning abilities. The scale model 
studies and the conclusions emerging from that work have thus been highly influential 
in current thinking about children’s representational capacities.
But precisely what does the model task measure? Recall that according to the 
Dual Orientation Hypothesis, success on the task depends critically on the ability to 
think about the model as an object in and of itself and also, simultaneously, as a symbol 
for something other than itself (i.e. for the room). It is the latter representation that 
facilitates the transfer of knowledge between the two spaces. This rationale has lead to 
interpreting 3.0-year-olds’ success on the task as evidence that the ability to interpret 
the model as a symbol or representation is present by the end of the third year (e.g. 
DeLoache, 1987b, page 1556; DeLoache, 1989, page 123; DeLoache, 1990, page 114; 
DeLoache & Marzolf, 1992, page 318). Further consideration of the task demands, 
however, suggests that this may not be the case.
Indeed, researchers working in two different, but related, lines of research have 
suggested that the notion that 3.0-year-olds interpret the model as a symbol might over­
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estimate their representational abilities. The crux of the issue, for both views, concerns 
whether success on the task necessitates understanding the model as a whole as a 
representation of the room. The first line of reasoning, proposed by Perner (1991) and 
supported in a subsequent paper by Lillard (1993), involves distinguishing between 
correspondence and representation. Whereas correspondence refers to recognizing the 
similarity between the components of a symbol and its referent, representation (or what 
Perner calls “meta-representation”) refers to the understanding that the symbol as a 
whole is intended to be interpreted in terms of what it stands for. Thus, Perner’s (1991) 
notion of correspondence refers to the similarity of the objects in the two spaces. 
Establishing object correspondence, or reference for the elements of a symbol, is 
thought to occur automatically. In contrast, representation requires explicitly 
representing the higher-order symbol-referent relation (Perner, 1991, pages 78-92). 
Both Perner (1991) and Lillard (1993) have argued that children could succeed on the 
model task via the simpler strategy of object correspondence; they could infer the 
location of the analogous toy by noting the smaller target object in the model (e.g. the 
small chair), then searching at the matching larger object in the room (e.g. at the large 
chair). The main point here is that the object correspondence strategy does not 
necessitate interpreting the model as a whole as a representation of the room. Indeed, 
Perner is not alone in noting this defining feature of representation. For example, based 
on research on children’s understanding of spatial symbols such as maps and aerial 
photographs. Downs (see also Liben & Downs, 1989) has argued that:
Successful understanding of any representation requires a simultaneous 
appreciation of the holistic “stand for” relationship (the representation as a 
whole standing for something else) and the componential “stand for” 
relationship (elements of the representation standing for elements of the
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referent). (Downs, 1989, p. 79, italics his).
The second line of reasoning, put forth by Blades and Cooke (1994) and Bence 
and Presson (1997), focuses on the spatial aspect of scale models. A critical feature of 
models, as with maps and aerial photographs, is that they communicate spatial 
information. It is the isomorphism between the configuration of items in the model and 
the configuration of items in the referent space that render scale models useful tools for 
navigating in the actual space (e.g Liben, 1998; Lowenstein & Gentner, 2001). These 
researchers point out that to be credited with understanding the model as a spatial 
representation, children would have to demonstrate awareness of the similarity of the 
objects (object correspondence) as well as the similarity of the spatial relations between 
the objects (termed “spatial correspondence”) in the two spaces. Previous research 
suggests that the latter ability does not emerge before four years of age (Bence & 
Presson, 1997; Blades & Cooke, 1994). The question common to both lines of 
reasoning therefore is whether 3.0-year-olds’ understanding of scale models extends 
beyond a simple appreciation of the one-to-one mapping of the objects in the model and 
the room. This possibility gains even further support from work on children’s 
understanding of analogy.
Gentner and her colleagues (Gentner & Ratterman, 1991; 1998; Lowenstein & 
Gentner, 1998; 2001) have proposed that a “relational shift” occurs in the development 
of analogical-reasoning. Whereas very young children are only able to detect the 
similarity between the components of the base and target problems (and their features) 
in an analogy (e.g. grapefruit and sun), older children become sensitive to the 
correspondence of the relations between the components (e.g. dog, puppies and cat, 
kittens). In one study (Gentner & Ratterman, 1991), children were shown a set of 
objects (base set) and another set of objects (target set) in which two of the objects in
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the two sets were identical but occupied different relational positions e.g. A, B, C (base) 
and B, C, D (target). The experimenter then hid a sticker under one of the objects in the 
base set and children were required to find a matching sticker in the target set. At issue 
was whether children searched according to the corresponding object (e.g. B in set 1 
and B in set 2) or the corresponding relational position (e.g. B in set 1 and C in set 2). 
The results revealed that, whereas 3.0-year-olds attended to the objects, 4.0-year-olds 
searched at the corresponding relational position. Thus, a “relational shift” occurred at 
four years of age.
Like the Gentner and Ratterman (1991) task, the model task is also presented as 
a spatial analogy; children are introduced to the two spaces and their contents, then 
required to reason from the base—the model—to the target—the room. Although on the 
standard task, the objects in the two spaces occupied the same spatial positions, the 
cognitive demands of the two tasks are the same; children can use object and/or spatial 
correspondence to find the hidden sticker or toy. The finding that the 3.0-year-olds in 
the Gentner and Ratterman (1991) study relied primarily on object matches lends 
further weight to the claim that they may use the same strategy on the model task.
Taking these findings together with the conceptual argument outlined by Perner (1991) 
and Lillard (1993), and the evidence from the work on children’s understanding of 
spatial symbols (Bence & Presson, 1997; Blades & Cooke, 1994), suggests that the 
claim that children represent the model as a whole by three years of age warrants fiirther 
investigation.
Overview of Dissertation Experiments
The primary goal of the experiments carried out and reported in the remaining 
chapters in this dissertation was to investigate the nature of young children’s 
understanding of scale models. Of particular interest were children’s strategies for
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solving the task or, more specifically, the extent to which children rely on object and 
spatial information to find the hidden toy. The vast majority of this work involved 3.0- 
year-old children, the age at which children first pass the model task, in an effort to 
elucidate the nature of children’s knowledge of the relation that holds between a symbol 
and its referent when it is first acquired. Older children were included in one study to 
explore the developmental consequences of that understanding. To be sure, the 
experiments reported in the following chapters do not represent the first attempts to 
explore children’s strategies on the model task empirically (as will be seen in the review 
of the relevant studies in the introduction to Experiment 1). In the present research, 
however, an attempt was made to go beyond previous findings, introducing innovations 
to the model task methodology to shed further light on children’s strategies and some of 
the factors that might influence them.
Five experiments were carried out. Experiment 1 focussed on the extent to 
which children rely on object and spatial information, independently or in concert, to 
retrieve the hidden toy in the room. To investigate further two key findings from 
Experiment 1, two follow-up experiments (Experiments 2 and 3) were then carried out. 
Experiment 4 examined aged-related changes in the nature of children’s understanding 
of the task and included an initial exploration into the role of language in reasoning 
between the two spaces. A more rigorous attempt was made in Experiment 5 to explore 
the possibility that language may mediate task success. The thesis concludes with a 
General Discussion chapter addressing the implications of this research for early 
symbolization and for cognitive development more generally.
Chapter 2
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Experiment 1; The Role of Object and Spatial Information
As mentioned in the previous chapter, questions regarding the validity of the 
scale model task have centred on whether success on the task necessitates representing 
the model as a symbol. At issue is whether 3.0-year-old’s understanding is limited to 
recognizing the correspondence between the objects in the two spaces or whether it 
extends to appreciating the relation that holds between the model as a whole and the 
room. To address this issue, researchers have investigated the extent to which children 
rely on the identity of the objects (object information) and their spatial position (spatial 
information) to find the analogous toy.
To date, the role of object and spatial information on the scale model task has 
been considered empirically in five published papers. The results of these studies are 
summarized in Table 2.1. The general idea has been to compare performance on the 
standard task (both object and spatial information available) to performance in 
conditions in which either object or spatial information were available in isolation. The 
rationale here was that if object correspondence is sufficient to succeed on the task, then 
children should perform well in conditions in which object information is available and 
poorly in conditions in which they must rely solely on spatial information to find the 
analogous toy. The three conditions shown in Table 2.1 were formed by varying the 
hiding locations and their arrangement in the model and the room (but note that not all 
studies included all three conditions). In the Control condition, distinctive objects were 
arranged in the same way in the model and the room. In the Object condition, 
distinctive containers occupied different spatial positions in the two spaces (e.g. the 
chair was placed in the front right corner of the model but in the back left corner of the 
room) and the toys were hidden with the corresponding objects. And finally, there were 
two versions of the Spatial condition: 1). The model and room contained matching sets
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Table 2.1
Object and Spatial Information
Condition
Reference Experiment n Chance Control Object Spatial
(standard task)
a. Blades & Cooke, Experiment 1
1994 Within Subjects 20 50* 88 - 57^
Experiment 2
Within Subjects 14 50* 93 - 55^
b. Bence & Presson Study 1
1997 Within Subjects 16 17 58 - 17^
Study 2 24 17 - - 24^
c. DeLoache, Experiment 1
1990 Within Subjects by Day
Between Subjects by Condition on Day 2
Day 1 ? 20 -78’’ - -
Day 2 ?/2 20 - -70 -3^
Experiment 2
Between Subjects 8 20 -81 -35 -
d. Myers & Marzolf, Between Subjects 12 25 65 23 25^1999^
e. Marzolf, Experiment 1 8 14 75
DeLoache & Experiment 2
Kolstad, Between Subjects 8 14 81^ 33^ _1999^
The three conditions were formed as follows: Control—distinctive objects occupied 
corresponding positions in the model and the room; Object—distinctive objects 
occupied non-corresponding positions in the model and the room, toys hidden with the 
corresponding objects ; Spatial— 1. identical objects or 2. set-up as in Object 
condition, toys hidden in the corresponding spatial position. Chance level is based on 
the number of possible hiding locations. * Based on choosing one of either two 
distinctive or two identical hiding locations. ? Sample size not given. » Averaged across 
two groups who participated in different conditions on Day 2. { Instructions as to the 
similarity between the model and the room were less explicit than on the standard task, 
t  Published after the completion of Experiments 1-4 of this thesis.
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of identical objects (Blades & Cooke, 1994; Bence & Presson) or 2). distinctive objects 
occupied different spatial positions and the toys were hidden in the corresponding 
spatial position (DeLoache, 1990; Myers & Marzolf, 1999; Marzolf, DeLoache & 
Kolstad, 1999).
A preliminary note of caution is warranted in comparing the results summarized 
in the table. These studies were conducted in different laboratories, by different 
experimenters, using experimental designs and methodologies tailored to suit the 
specific hypotheses. The sources of variation in performance across studies are thus 
myriad. However, as all studies share a common rationale, basic paradigm and involve 
children of the same age (3.0-year-olds), the results are presented to provide an 
overview of the patterns and consistency of performance in previous research. To 
facilitate interpretation of the results, comparisons across studies and conditions are 
primarily discussed in terms of deviation from chance. Chance level performance was 
calculated for each study based on the authors’ reports of the number of objects or 
possible hiding locations in the model and the room. The resulting figures are included 
in Table 2.1. Thus for example, in the study by Myers and Marzolf (1999) in which 
children were required to select the correct one of four distinct containers, chance is 
25%.
Looking across experiments, performance in the Control condition is reliably 
above chance. Consistent with the findings from numerous previous studies using the 
model task (e.g.DeLoache, 1987b; DeLoache, 1989a; Marzolf & DeLoache, 1994; Uttal 
et al., 1995), when both types of information are available 3.0-year-olds are generally 
successful at using the model to locate the toy in the room. In contrast, when a strictly 
spatial solution is required (far right column), performance is similar to chance. Thus, in 
the absence of object information, children appear to search randomly, as though they
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have no basis for determining the location of the hidden toy. At first consideration, the 
results from the Control and Spatial conditions appear to support the notion that 
children are solving the model task primarily on the basis of object correspondence. 
Note, however, that in the primary studies where these results have obtained (Blades & 
Cooke, 1994; Bence & Presson, 1997), only two conditions were included; performance 
when both object and spatial information were available was contrasted with 
performance in a condition with only spatial information. Consequently, the role of 
object information was only investigated indirectly (by removing it from the task). An 
important limitation of this approach is that it does not allow for an important 
alternative possibility—that object and spatial information may contribute jointly to 
success on the standard task.
This hypothesis has proven difficult to test in part because when Object 
conditions have been included in the experiments (DeLoache, 1990b; Myers & Marzolf, 
1999; Marzolf et al., 1999), the results have been inconsistent. Recall that if children are 
relying primarily on object correspondence to solve the standard task, then performance 
in the Object condition should be comparable to performance in the Control condition. 
This pattern of results obtained in two studies (DeLoache, 1990b, Experiment 2; 
Marzolf et al, 1999, Experiment 1), however, methodological concerns raise questions 
as to the validity of those experiments. In one study (DeLoache, 1990, Experiment 2), 
children first experienced the standard task then, one day later, they participated in the 
Object condition. Although they were highly successful on the second day (-70%), 
given that previous research has found substantial evidence of transfer from easy 
versions to more challenging versions of the model task (e.g. Marzolf & DeLoache, 
1994), it seems likely that performance in the Object condition was inflated by prior 
experience with the standard task. Good performance (75%) obtained in a second study.
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in which children did not have experience with the standard task (Marzolf et al., 1999, 
Experiment 1), however, the absence of Control or Spatial conditions in that experiment 
precludes adequate comparison groups for interpreting the results. Further cause for 
caution in drawing conclusions from these findings comes from the results of three 
additional experiments.
In striking contrast to the above studies, DeLoache (1990b, Experiment 2), 
Myers & Marzolf (1999) and Marzolf et al. (1999, Experiment 2) found markedly poor 
performance in the Object condition compared to the Control condition (-35% vs.
-81%, 23% vs. 65% and 33% vs. 81% for the three experiments respectively). Recall 
that in the Object conditions in these studies, the arrangement of the objects in the 
model was different from that in the room. Whereas in the Control condition the objects 
occupied corresponding spatial positions in the two spaces, in the Object condition, they 
occupied different spatial positions. It could be argued, therefore, that an important 
consequence of using different layouts in the latter condition was that the model no 
longer represented the room. This may have created a confiasing, indeed unsolvable, 
situation — children were asked to use as a symbol something that did not faithfully 
represent its referent. Their apparent difficulty in transferring knowledge from one 
space to the other in the Object conditions is therefore unsurprising.
Myers and Marzolf (1999) also conflated condition and veridicality of the model 
as a representation of the room in a recent study in which all three conditions were 
included. In that study, the configuration of the objects was identical in the model and 
the room in the Control condition, but not in either the Object or the Spatial conditions. 
The toy was always hidden with the corresponding object in the Object condition and in 
the corresponding spatial position in the Spatial condition. Whereas performance was 
above chance in the Control condition (65%), it was no different from chance in either
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of the experimental conditions (23% and 25% for the Object and Spatial conditions). 
The authors interpreted these findings to indicate that children attend to both types of 
information to succeed on the standard task. An equally plausible explanation, however, 
is that the different configurations of objects in the two spaces may have precluded any 
possibility of interpreting the model as a symbol for the room. Indeed, even if children 
had succeeded in the Object and Spatial conditions, it remains unclear precisely what 
good performance in these conditions would have been measuring.
Taken together, the results from the research summarized in Table 2.1 are 
inconclusive with respect to the nature of 3.0-year-old children’s understanding of scale 
models. In general, children perform well when both kinds of information are available 
and there is evidence that solving the task with only spatial information is particularly 
difficult. The extent to which children rely on object information, however, remains 
unclear. Methodological issues in the available studies cast doubt on the validity of 
some of the object conditions which might account, at least in part, for the highly 
variable results. Consequently, it is not possible to determine the extent to which object 
and spatial information are taken into account on the standard task. Clearly, further 
experiments including all three conditions and in which the methodological concerns 
mentioned above were overcome was needed adequately to assess the role of object and 
spatial information. This was the aim of Experiment 1.
Overview of Experiment 1
The basic design of Experiment 1 was to compare performance in a Control 
condition (standard task, spatial and object information available) to two conditions in 
which either object or spatial information were available in isolation. The Control and 
Spatial conditions were formed as in previous experiments; in the Control condition, 
distinctive objects occupied corresponding positions in the model and the room and in
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the Spatial condition, identical objects occupied the two spaces (similar to the Spatial 
conditions in Blades & Cooke, 1994 and Bence & Presson, 1997). The main difference 
between Experiment 1 and previous studies was in the formation of the Object 
condition. In contrast to previous studies, the layout of the experimental spaces in the 
Object condition was identical to that in the Control condition at the outset of the 
experiment and during the extensive orientation to the experimental spaces. Then, on 
the experimental trials only, the items in the room were rearranged immediately before 
children entered the room to search for the analogous toy. Thus, in all conditions the 
arrangement of items in the two spaces was identical during the familiarization and 
imitation phases (see below) such that all groups first encountered a scale model that 
was an exact replica of the room. In this way, the opportunity to interpret the model as a 
symbol for the room, before administering the experimental trials, was equated across 
the groups. Furthermore, by including all three conditions in the same experiment, it 
was possible to determine the extent to which children relied on object, spatial or both 
types of information to solve the standard task.
Predictions. It was predicted that, if children rely primarily on object 
correspondence to succeed on the standard task, their performance should be relatively 
good and similar in the Object and Control conditions and relatively poorer in the 
Spatial condition. However, if children attend to both object and spatial information, 
then performance should be poorer in the two experimental conditions compared to the 
Control condition. Note that in the latter case the means in the two experimental 
conditions might also differ; if the ability to map spatial relations emerges 
developmentally later than the ability to map corresponding objects between the two 
spaces, then performance could be somewhat better in the Object condition.
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Method
Participants
In all the experiments reported in this thesis, the participants were normally- 
developing preschoolers recruited through private and council nursery schools and 
playgroups in Scotland. The samples were predominantly middle class and white 
although these data were not systematically collected. Written parental consent was 
obtained prior to participation.
Ninety-six 3.0-year-olds (M = 38.4 months, range = 35.2 - 42.6 months) were 
tested in Experiment 1. Thirty-two children were randomly assigned to each of three 
conditions: Control (M -  38.6 months, range = 35.2 -  41.8 months); Object (M -38.3  
months, range = 35.5-42.1 months) and Spatial (M = 38.5 months, range = 35.3 -42 .6  
months). Each condition comprised equal numbers of boys and girls. In addition, half 
the children in each condition witnessed the experimenter hide the original toy in the 
model and searched for the analogous toy in the room and half received the reverse 
order of spaces (hide in room, search in model). For ease of communication, only the 
first order will be described here.
Apparatus and Materials
The layout of the experimental space on the standard task is shown in Figure
2. la with photographs of the actual scale model used presented in Figure 2. lb. The 
experimental set-up comprised a portable room (2.43 x 1.52 x 1.88 m) and a scale 
model replica of the room (.60 x .39 x .38 m, approximately 1/16 the size of the room), 
constructed of a white polyvinylchloride pipe framework, supporting four opaque, dark- 
blue fabric walls. A curtain doorway (.54m and .21m wide in the room and model 
respectively) was created in the centre of the front wall. The curtain door to the room 
was kept closed during the hiding event such that children were unable to see into the
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Figure 2,1a Layout of the experimental spaces on the standard task (Control 
condition). Items in the model were identical (except for size) to those in the room. The 
drawing is not to scale.
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Figure 2.1b Photographs of the Scale Model. The configuration of the hiding 
containers on the standard task (Control condition) is shown. Children had an aerial 
view of the model as pictured in the top photograph. A front view of the model is 
presented in the bottom photograph to provide a sense of the nature of the hiding 
containers.
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model and the room simultaneously. Patterned blue fabric covered the floor area of the 
two spaces. The model was placed to the right of the doorway, immediately in front of, 
and in the same orientation as the room. A child-sized chair was located to the left of 
the doorway facing away from the model.
A hiding container (a “gift bag” constructed of laminated paper and sealed 
across the top with velcro) was placed in each of the four corners of the room.
Miniature replicas of the containers (identical except for size) were located in the 
corners of the model (see Figure 2.1). Four different types of containers varying in 
colour, size, shape and type of handle were used. The 4 types of containers were; gold 
(large: 17 x 10 x 46 cm, small: 6 x 7 x 14 cm), green (large: 33 x 10 x 23 cm, small: 11 
X 7 X 7 cm), red (large: 33 x 11 x 46 cm, small: 1 1 x 7 x 1 4  cm) and silver (large: 16 
x ll  X 33 cm, small: 8 x 7 x 1 0  cm).
Three conditions were formed by varying the type of hiding containers and their 
configuration in the model and the room. Figure 2.2 depicts the layout of the two spaces 
on the first experimental trial by condition. In the Control condition, four visually 
distinct containers (Green, Red, Silver, and Gold) occupied corresponding corners in the 
model and the room. In the Object condition, visually distinct containers occupied 
non-corresponding corners in the two spaces. Thus, on the first experimental trial the 
gold container occupied the front, left corner in the model and the back, right corner in 
the room. Furthermore, whereas the configuration of containers in the model was 
identical to that in the Control condition and remained constant across the four trials, 
the configuration in the room varied from trial to trial (see below). Finally in the Spatial 
Condition, identical containers occupied the four corners. The stimuli in the Spatial 
condition comprised a set of four of one of the types of containers (Green, Red, Silver 
or Gold) used in the other two conditions with each type being used equally often. Thus,
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four children experienced the Spatial condition with the green containers, four with the 
red containers, four with the silver and four with the gold. The hiding toys were two 
plastic ducks measuring 12cm x 15cm and 5cm x 6cm,
Procedure
Overview. All of the participants in the experiments reported in this thesis were 
tested by the same female experimenter. Children were tested individually at their 
nursery school or playgroup venue, in a quiet, well-lit room separate from the children’s 
main play area. The experimenter began by engaging children in casual conversation in 
the nursery until they appeared comfortable in her presence. She then invited them to 
accompany her to “a special room to play some games with ducks”. To help set children 
at ease, a member of the nursery staff was permitted to accompany them to the 
experimental area. The accompanying adult was instructed to stand aside from the 
experimental setup and to remain silent throughout the test session. The experimenter 
then administered the testing procedure which comprised three phases; Familiarization, 
Placement Imitation and Experimental. During the Familiarization Phase, the 
experimenter introduced children to the two toys and to the experimental spaces and 
their contents. In the Placement Imitation Phase, the experimenter placed the small toy 
at a given location in the model and children were required to place the large toy at the 
corresponding location in the room. Finally in the Experimental Phase, children 
witnessed the hiding of the small toy in the model and were then required to find the 
large toy which was hidden at the analogous location in the room. As the procedure 
forms the basis for all the experiments in this thesis, it is described in detail below and 
summarized for ease of reference in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2
Summary of the Three Phases of the Procedure
1. Familiarization Phase
Children were introduced to the two toys, to the model and the room and to 
their contents. Each smaller object in the model was held up beside its 
matching counterpart in the room and their correspondence was explicitly 
pointed out.
2. Placement Imitation Phase*
Children watched the experimenter place the small toy in front of one of the 
containers in the model and were then invited to place the large toy in the 
analogous location in the room. The procedure was repeated for two to four 
trials using a different location on each trial.
3. Experimental Phase*
Children watched the experimenter hide the small toy inside a container in 
the model fhiding eventV Next, they waited on the chair while the experimenter 
hid the analogous larger toy in the corresponding location in the room. They 
were then invited to enter the room to search for the analogous toy f Symbolic 
Retrievals Finally, they were taken back to the model to find the original toy 
(Memory Retrievals  Only children’s first search attempts were scored although 
they were allowed to continue searching until they retrieved the hidden toy.
The procedure was repeated for four trials using a different location on each 
trial.
*In all the experiments reported in this thesis, half the children made inferences from 
the model to the room, i.e. they witnessed the experimenter place (Placement Imitation 
Phase) or hide (Experimental Phase) the small toy in the model and were then invited to 
place or search for the large toy in the room, and half received the reverse order of 
spaces. Only the first order is described in the table for clarity.
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Familiarization Phase. The session began with an extensive orientation during 
which the experimenter introduced children to “Little Duck” (LD) and “Big Duck”
(BD), the model (referred to as “Little Duck’s Room”) and the room (referred to as 
“Big Duck’s Room”). The experimenter pointed out that both ducks had “some 
interesting things” in their rooms. She then held up each item in the model in turn, 
handed it to children and encouraged them to open it. Assistance was provided if 
necessary. The procedure was then repeated for the items in the room. This was done to 
demonstrate that the items were containers and to ensure that children were efficient at 
unsealing the velcro closures. To underscore the correspondence between the model and 
the room, she then took the items from the model into the room, held them up 
individually beside their matching counterparts and pointed out the similarity between 
the pairs of items. At no time did the experimenter label the containers (e.g. by colour 
or size).
Placement Imitation Phase. Next, the experimenter led children back to the 
model and briefly outlined the procedure for the placement imitation trials. She began 
by holding up the two ducks together and explaining, “These two ducks always do the 
same thing. Whatever LD does in LD’s room, that’s what BD also does in BD’s room”. 
She continued, “I’m going to put LD somewhere in LD’s room and then you can put 
BD in the same place in BD’s room. Remember they always do the same thing”. On 
each imitation trial the experimenter said, “LD’s going to sit right here (placing LD in 
front of one of the containers). Can you help BD do the same thing in BD’s room?”.
She opened the door to the room and encouraged children to enter. If they failed to 
place BD correctly, they were taken back to the model and reminded of LD’s location. 
The reminder was repeated a second time if necessary after which the experimenter 
helped children to place BD at the correct location in the room. Children were scored as
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correct only if they placed BD at the target location on their first attempt. The imitation 
trials were administered to a criterion of two-in-a-row correct or to a maximum of four 
trials. The placement locations were randomly selected and different on each trial. The 
purpose of the Placement Imitation trials was to emphasize the correspondence between 
the two spaces and between the actions of the toys in their respective rooms.
Experimental Phase. Four experimental trials followed immediately. Each trial 
comprised three parts: a hiding event, Symbolic Retrieval and Memory Retrieval. Once 
again, the experimenter explained the procedure for the upcoming trials. She began by 
reminding children that both ducks always do the same thing. She then explained, “I’m 
going to hide LD somewhere in LD’s room. Then while you wait on that chair (pointing 
to the chair). I’m going to put BD in the same place in BD’s room. Then you can find 
BD. Are you ready to play?”.
Each trial began with children witnessing the experimenter hide LD inside one 
of the bags saying, “LD is going to hide right here”. Next, she directed children to sit 
on the chair, facing away from the model.^^ Once again she reminded children that 
both ducks always do the same thing. The experimenter took care to hide BD in the 
target container while standing in the centre of the room such that children could not 
use the sound cue produced by opening and closing the velcro closure to locate BD in 
the room. Children were then invited to find BD (Symbolic Retrieval). If they were 
unsuccessful on their first search attempt, they were permitted to continue searching 
until they eventually found BD. This was done to maintain children’s motivation to
Recall that half the children in each condition witnessed the hiding event in the room. 
For these children, the experimenter hid the small toy in the model while they waited on 
the chair. To ensure that children could not observe the events in the model, the 
experimenter kneeled at the left side of the model with her back towards the chair 
(occluding children’s view of the model) and kept her hands inside the model while 
hiding the small toy. Thus, even if children turned around while seated on the chair, it 
was not possible for them to witness the hiding of the analogous toy.
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search for BD on subsequent trials and to encourage successful and unsuccessful 
children alike. Finally, to ensure that poor performance on the Symbolic Retrievals was 
not due to simply forgetting the location of the original toy, children were returned to 
the model and required to retrieve LD (Memory Retrieval). Once again if they did not 
succeed on their first search attempt, they were encouraged to continue (as above) until 
they eventually retrieved LD. The procedure was repeated for four trials using a 
different hiding location (selected randomly, without replacement) on each trial.
The same procedure was used for all three conditions with the exception that, in 
the Object condition, after hiding BD in the appropriate container and before permitting 
children to enter, the experimenter re-arranged the objects in the room. The 
arrangement of items (starting from the black left corner and rotating clockwise) in the 
room on trials 1-4 were: 1) Red, Gold, Silver, Green; 2) Silver, Green, Gold, Red; 3) 
Gold, Silver, Green, Red and 4) Silver, Gold, Red, Green. Thus in the Object 
condition, the arrangement of objects in the model and the room was the same during 
the Familiarization and Imitation Phases but different during the Experimental Phase.
The procedure was videotaped. Performance was scored live and checked 
against the videotapes for accuracy.
Results
The data from five children (all boys) were excluded from the analyses; four due 
to experimenter error and one for looking into the room while the experimenter hid the 
analogous toy (seen on videotape). The results are therefore based on 91 children; 30 in
^■^ Note that on each trial the relative positions of the containers were different in the two 
spaces. This was done to rule out the possibility that children might succeed by forming 
and a “cognitive map” of the layout in the model and re-aligning it with the layout of 
the room.
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the Control condition (16 girls, 14 boys), 29 in the Object condition (16 girls, 13 boys) 
and 32 in the Spatial condition (16 girls, 16 boys). On each trial, children were awarded 
one point if they searched correctly on their first attempt.^^ The same scoring system 
was used for the Symbolic Retrieval and Memory Retrieval trials to yield two scores 
ranging between zero and four for each child. Mean scores for each task and condition 
were tabulated then converted to percentages to illustrate the results more clearly and to 
facilitate comparison to previous studies.
Figure 2.3 shows the results for each task by condition. Overall, performance on 
the Symbolic Retrievals was more impaired by removing object information (Spatial 
condition) than by disrupting the symmetry of the spatial relations in the model and the 
room (Object condition). The means for the Symbolic Retrievals were 57% (SD =
38.2), 47% (SD = 31.6) and 36% (SD = 27.6) for the Control, Object and Spatial groups 
respectively. All of the group means were significantly different from chance (25%, for 
selecting the correct one of four hiding locations), t (29) = 4.54 p < .0001 for the 
Control group, t (28) = 3.82, p < .001 for the Object group and t (31) = 2.24 p < .03 
for the Spatial group. Importantly, across conditions, children were very good at finding 
the original toy. Mean performance on the Memory Retrievals was 80% (SD = 24.91) 
for the Control group, 78% (SD = 28.62) for the Object group and 70% (SD = 30.28) 
for the Spatial group. Thus, any differences between conditions on the Symbolic 
Retrievals could not be attributed to differences in memory for the target location.
Searching was defined as opening a container for inspection. However, several 
children were observed to pick up and shake a container, only sometimes choosing 
subsequently to open it. Since children could make judgements as to the presence of the 
toy on the basis of the weight of the container, a conservative approach was taken and 
instances of shaking a container, whether or not children then proceeded to open it, 
were scored as searching. It is interesting to note that children often held the container 
up to their ear while shaking it as though to listen for any sound made by the hidden 
toy. However, as no sound was emitted by the toy, the strategy of “weighing” the 
container, though cleverly employed, was not itself acknowledged as useful.
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The data were subjected to a 2 (Task; symbolic retrieval, memory retrieval) x 3 
(Condition; control, object, spatial) x 2 (Sex ) x 2 (Hiding Space; model or room) 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). The results revealed main effects of Task, F (1, 79) = 
61.61, p < .0001, and Condition, F (2, 79) = 3.27, p < .04 which were consistent with 
the above interpretation of the results in Figure 2.3. Performance was significantly 
better on the Memory Retrievals compared to the Symbolic Retrievals and post hoc 
analyses on the Symbolic Retrieval means revealed that compared to the Control 
condition, children performed significantly worse in the Spatial condition (p < .04, 
Scheffé) but not in the Object condition (p > .64). These findings indicate that object 
information was essential to task success. Note, however, that the difference between 
the means in the Control and Spatial conditions was also non-significant (p > .28) 
suggesting that removing either type of information resulted in statistically similar 
levels of performance. Although the difference between the means in the Control and 
Object conditions did not reach statistical significance, the lack of statistical 
significance between the means in the Object and Spatial groups suggests that 
neutralizing spatial information may have had some impact on children’s ability to find 
the analogous toy.^ "^ The suggestion here is that while object information may be 
essential, spatial information may also contribute (to some extent) to success on the 
standard task. The remaining significant effects in the ANOVA, helped to clarify the 
basis for this intriguing finding.
The data were also analyzed on the basis of individual performance. Children were 
classified as “passing” or “failing” according to whether they had successfully retrieved 
the analogous toy on their first attempt on at least three out of four trials. The number of 
“passing” children was 16 (53%), 10 (34%) and 5 (16%) for the Control, Object and 
Spatial conditions respectively. Comparing the number of successful children across 
conditions revealed the same pattern of results as in the ANOVA; compared to the 
Control condition, significantly fewer children succeeded in the Spatial condition (p = 
.01) but not in the Object condition (p =.19), however, the difference between the 
Object and Spatial conditions was also non-significant (p = .14, Fisher’s exact tests).
42
The ANOVA also revealed a main effect of Sex, F (1, 79) = 3.82, p < .05, 
favouring girls, and interactions of Task, Condition and Hiding Space, F (2, 79) = 3.35, 
p < .04, and Task, Sex and Hiding Space (approaching significance), F (1, 79) = 3.62, p 
< .06, which were subsumed by a four-way interaction of Task, Condition, Sex and 
Hiding Space, F (2, 79) = 3.86, p < .03. To elucidate the nature of the four-way 
interaction, the means for each condition are shown by Sex and Hiding Space for the 
Symbolic Retrievals in Figure 2.4 and for the Memory Retrievals in Figure 2.5. The 
results for each task are discussed in turn.
Symbolic Retrievals. Separate 2 (Sex) x 2 (Hiding Space; model, room) follow- 
up ANOVA’s were carried out for the Symbolic Retrieval data in each condition. In 
addition, each sex by hiding space sub-group mean was compared to chance (25%, as 
children were required to select the correct one of four containers). For the Control 
condition (top plot in Figure 2.4), there were no statistically significant effects in the 
ANOVA; boys and girls performed similarly and performance was unaffected by 
whether the hiding event occurred in the model or the room. Note, however, that 
although the ANOVA did not reveal an interaction between sex and hiding space, 
comparing the means to chance revealed that boys’ performance was above chance 
when they witnessed the hiding event in the model (M= 63%; t (5) = 2.67, p < .05), but 
not in the room (M = 47%; t (7) = 1.99, p < .09) and that for girls this effect was 
reversed (M = 47%, t (7) = 1.51, p > .18, for the model; M = 72%, t (7) = 2.93, p < .02 
for the room). Although the overall Control group mean of 57% is significantly better 
than chance (t (29) = 4.54, p < .0001), it is worth noting that it is somewhat lower than 
expected for 3.0-year-olds’ who typically achieve at least 75% on the standard task (e.g. 
DeLoache, 1987; DeLoache, 1991; DeLoache et al., 1991; see also DeLoache, 1995). 
One reason for the relatively lower group mean could be the distribution of the ages of
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the children in the present sample. Recognizing the model-room relation has been 
thought to be an all-or-none affair with success on the task emerging abruptly around 
the third birthday (DeLoache, 1989, Experiment 2). While the mean age of children in 
Experiment 1 (38.5 months) was highly similar to that of previous studies (38.0 months 
on average), it is possible that a substantial proportion of children in Experiment 1 may 
have been below the “threshold” age for achieving “representational insight” (to use 
DeLoache’s terminology). Indeed, 17% were between 35.0 - 36.0 months and 33% 
were between 35.0-37.0 months of age. A preponderance of very young children in 
the sample might therefore account for the relatively low group mean. This notion was 
not supported by the data, however, as the mean ages of children classified as “failing” 
and “passing” were identical (38.5 months) for the two groups. Furthermore, 
correlation analyses indicated that Symbolic Retrieval performance was not 
significantly correlated with age (Pearson’s r = .02, p > .93) indicating that, within the 
age group tested in Experiment 1, performance did not improve with age. The relatively 
low group mean in the Control condition thus could not have resulted from the 
inclusion of a number of very young 3.0-year-olds in the sample.
Examination of the number of children categorized as “failing” or “passing” the 
Memory and Symbolic Retrievals revealed that sixteen children passed both tasks, 5 
failed both tasks and 9 children (approximately 33% of the sample) passed the Memory 
task but not the Symbolic Retrieval task. No child conformed to the reverse pattern of 
passing the Symbolic task but failing the Memory task. Thus, in contrast to previous 
studies in which a very high proportion of 3.0-year-olds performed well on both tasks 
(e.g. DeLoache, 1987; 1991), a substantial number of children in the present study 
remembered the target location but failed to utilize that knowledge to guide their search
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in the room. Further consideration of the relatively low group mean in the Control 
condition is taken up in Experiment 2.
In the Object condition, the ANOVA revealed a significant effect of Sex, F (1, 
25) = 5.65, p < .03. Looking at the middle plot in Figure 2.4, it is clear that girls 
outperformed boys (59% vs. 33%) regardless of where the hiding event took place. 
Comparing the sub-group means to chance revealed that whereas girls’ performance 
was above chance in the model (M = 66%; t (7) = 4.33, p < .003) and also in the room 
(M = 53%; t ( 7) = 3.21, p < .02), boys performed poorly in both spaces (M = 29%; t (6) 
= .26, p > .81 for the model and M = 38%; t (5)= 1.0, p >  .36 for the room). There were 
no other significant effects in the ANOVA for the Object condition.
Recall that on the experimental trials in the Object condition, the containers in 
the room were re-arranged immediately before children searched for the analogous toy 
so that they occupied non-corresponding corners in the two spaces. For example, on 
trial 2, the gold container occupied the front, left corner of the model but the back, right 
corner of the room. As the toy was always hidden in the corresponding container, 
children who searched in the corresponding spatial position would have been scored as 
incorrect. To determine if children who performed poorly in the Object condition (i.e. 
boys) had attempted to use the spatial strategy, the locations of children’s first searches 
were examined. The results revealed that searching in the corresponding spatial position 
occurred on only 12% of the trials; 14 children searched in the corresponding position 
on 1 of the 4 trials. Furthermore, a chi-square analysis indicated that boys and girls 
were equally likely to employ this strategy, (1, N = 29) =.04, p > .84. Thus, the 
erroneous use of spatial information is unlikely to account for the difficulty boys 
experienced in the Object condition.
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Finally, for the Spatial condition (bottom plot in Figure 2.4), the ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of Hiding Space, F (1,28) = 12.46, p < .001, which was 
subsumed by a Sex by Hiding Space interaction, F(l, 28) = 5.54, p < .03. In general, 
performance was better when the hiding event occurred in the model (M = 50%) 
compared to the room (M = 22%), however, the magnitude of this effect was greater for 
boys compared to girls (difference between means = 47% for boys vs. 10% for girls). 
Whereas performance was above chance when boys witnessed the hiding event in the 
model (M = 63%; t (7) = 3.97, p < .01), but not in the room (M =16%; t (7) = -1.43, p > 
.20), girls’ performance did not differ from chance in either space (M = 38%; t (7) = 
1.87, p > .10 for the model and M = 28%; t (7) = .36, p > .73 for the room). The only 
successful children in the Spatial condition then were those boys who saw the small toy 
hidden in the model and searched for the larger toy in the room (n = 8). The remaining 
twenty-four children performed as expected (based on previous experiments e.g. Bence 
& Presson, 1997; Blades & Cooke, 1994) searching randomly in one of the four 
containers.
Taken together, the analyses of the Symbolic Retrieval data indicate that the 
notion that children also encode spatial information may be related to a sex-linked 
difference in the way they approached the task. Whereas girls attended mostly to the 
identity of the objects, boys appeared to attend more to their spatial location. 
Furthermore, the object strategy was more robust; girls performed well regardless of the 
nature of the hiding space, however, boys’ were only successful with the spatial strategy 
when the hiding event occurred in the model. The overall main effect of condition in the 
initial mixed ANOVA therefore appears to reflect the fact that a larger proportion of 
children (mostly girls) succeeded in the object condition compared to the spatial 
condition.
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The data were also analyzed to determine whether children showed any 
improvement over trials. Performance was averaged over Trials 1 and 2 (Block 1) and 
Trials 3 and 4 (Block 2) separately and a 3 (Condition; Control, Object, Spatial) x 2 
(Trial Blocks; 1 and 2) ANOVA was carried out. The results revealed no effect of Trial 
Blocks and no interaction between Trial Blocks and Condition. The only significant 
result was a main effect of condition, F (2, 88) = 3.37, p < .04, consistent with the effect 
of Condition in the initial mixed ANOVA reported at the start of the results section. The 
main point here is that in all conditions, children performed consistently across trials.
Memory Retrievals. The data were analyzed by a series of 2 (Sex) x 2 (Hiding 
Space) ANOVAs analogous to those conducted for the Symbolic Retrieval data. As 
performance was significantly better on the Memory Retrievals compared to the 
Symbolic Retrievals (see the results from the initial ANOVA for the combined data 
from the two tasks), comparisons of the sub-group means to chance were not carried 
out. For consistency, however, the axes in the plots in Figure 2.5 were also made to 
intersect at chance (25%).
As is apparent in the figure, children performed very well on the Memory 
Retrievals. Indeed, there were no significant effects from the Sex by Hiding Space 
ANOVAs for the Control and Spatial conditions (see the top and bottom plots in Figure 
2.5). Thus, in two of the three conditions, boys and girls performed similarly regardless 
of the nature of the hiding space. The exception to this pattern occurred in the Object 
condition (middle plot) where the ANOVA revealed a trend toward superior 
performance by girls, F (1, 25) = 3.90, p < .06 (M = 86% vs. 67%). Note, however, that 
although boys performed significantly worse than girls on the Memory Retrievals, that 
their memory for the target location was still relatively good and outstripped their 
ability to find the analogous toy (M = 67% for the Memory Retrievals but only 33% for
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the Symbolic Retrievals, t (12) = -2.64, p < .02). Their relatively poorer memory for the 
original hiding location thus could not account entirely for the difficulty they 
experienced with the Symbolic Retrievals when the arrangement of the objects in the 
model was different from those in the room. The ANOVA also revealed a main effect of 
hiding space indicating superior memory for the target object when the hiding event 
occurred in the model compared to the room, F (1, 25) = 4.08, p < .05 (M = 87% for the 
model and 66% for the room). The Sex by Hiding Space interaction was not significant.
Discussion
In general, the results suggest that children rely primarily on object information 
to find the analogous toy. Provided the objects were distinctive (as in the Control and 
Object conditions) children were fairly good at using their knowledge of the target 
location in the model to guide their search in the room. In contrast, when the objects 
were identical and a strictly spatial solution was required most children (fully 75%) 
found the task very difficult.
It is important to note that in all three conditions children were very good at 
remembering the location of the original toy. This finding is critical for interpreting 
performance on the Symbolic Retrieval task as it indicates that they represented the 
target location and maintained that representation in memory for the duration of the trial 
(recall that the Memory Retrieval was administered after completion of the Symbolic 
Retrieval on each trial ). Their difficulty in the Spatial condition therefore could not be 
attributed to a failure to encode or remember the target location. Instead, the challenge 
lay specifically in the need to use the spatial information, and only the spatial 
information, in the model to locate the hidden toy in the room.
The finding that performance was markedly poor when an explicitly spatial 
solution is required is consistent with previous findings (Bence & Presson, 1997; Blades
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& Cooke, 1994) and supports the suggestion that children’s understanding of the modei- 
room relation is based primarily on recognizing the similarity between corresponding 
objects (Bence & Presson, 1997; Blades & Cooke, 1994). There is, however, some 
indication that spatial information may also contribute to appreciating the parallel 
between the two spaces. Although the difference between the means in the Control and 
Object conditions did not reach significance, the decrease in performance in the latter 
condition was sufficient to render performance in the two experimental conditions 
(Object and Spatial) not significantly different. That disruption to either type of 
information yielded statistically similar levels of performance suggests that, at least to 
some extent, children may also take spatial information into account. The overall 
pattern of results thus provides the most support for the second prediction for the group 
means; the identity of the individual objects appears to be essential, however, there is 
some evidence their spatial position may also facilitate success on the standard task.
Perhaps the most intriguing finding in Experiment 1 was the suggestion that 
there may be sex-related differences in the way in which children approached the task. 
The pattern for girls was clear; they performed well in the two conditions in which 
object information was available (Control and Object conditions) and poorly when it 
was absent and the task had to be solved spatially (Spatial condition). This suggests that 
object information was critical to girls’ ability to retrieve the large toy in the room. In 
contrast, although boys performed as well as girls in the Control condition, when spatial 
information was neutralized and the task had to be solved on the basis of only object 
information (Object condition), their performance was no different from chance.
Indeed, the absence of reliable spatial information even appeared to disrupt boys (but 
not girls’) ability to remember the location of the original toy as they performed worse 
than girls on the Memory task (a difference that approached significance). Note,
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however, that boys’ relatively poorer memory for the target location can not account 
entirely for the difficulty they experienced when searching in the referent space as their 
memory for the target location in the model was still significantly better than their 
ability to find the hidden toy in the room. When only spatial information was available 
(Spatial condition), fully half of the boys performed as well as on the standard task. 
Taken together, these results suggest that whereas having distinctive objects was 
important for girls, the availability of useful spatial information was more important for 
boys’ ability to reason between the model and the room.
It is noteworthy that the boys who performed best were those in the Control and 
Spatial conditions (the two conditions in which spatial information was available) who 
witnessed the hiding event in the model. In both conditions, their performance was 
above chance when the hiding event occurred in the model but not when it occurred in 
the room. One reason for this advantage could be their perspective on the experimental 
spaces. Even the smallest children were taller than the model which was open at the top 
and placed on the floor and therefore had an aerial view of the entire space. This may 
have helped children to place the target location within the spatial context. In effect, the 
aerial view of the model may have rendered spatial information more salient to children. 
Placing the target in context would have been more difficult when the hiding event 
occurred in the room as children stood beside the target location and thus had only a 
partial view of the layout of the room.
Previous research has shown that experience with an aerial view of a space 
results in an improved ability subsequently to navigate within the space (Reiser,
Droxey, McCarrel & Brooks, 1982; Uttal & Wellman, 1989). Indeed, it has recently 
been argued that experience with spatial representations such as maps, that typically 
provide oblique or overhead views, actually facilitates the ability to represent and
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reason about space per se (Uttal, 2000). The finding that boys, but not girls, capitalized 
on this advantage suggests that they may have been predisposed to thinking about the 
model in terms of its spatial features. In contrast, close proximity to the target location 
in the room may have underscored girls’ attention to the individual objects; their 
performance in the Control condition was above chance when the hiding event occurred 
in the room but not when it occurred in the model. Children’s perspective on the 
experimental spaces (an aerial view of the model vs. a front view of the room) thus 
appeared to underscore different sources of information with different consequences for 
boys and girls. These results provide fiirther evidence that boys and girls rely on 
different strategies to solve the task.
In sum, comparing performance across conditions indicates that the nature of 
3.0-year-olds’ understanding of scale models is based primarily on recognizing the one- 
to-one correspondence between the individual objects in the model and their matching 
counterparts in the actual room. The spatial relations between the objects appears to 
play a relatively minor (but not absent) role in helping children, as a group, to draw 
inferences from the model about the room. As such, the results are generally consistent 
with the findings of previous studies (e.g. Bence & Presson, 1997; Blades & Cooke, 
1994; DeLoache, 1990b, Experiment 1; Marzolf et al, 1999, Experiment 1). The novel 
contribution of the results of Experiment 1, however, is the suggestion that the group 
means may mask individual differences in how children approached the task. More 
specifically, the results indicate that the extent to which children rely on object and 
spatial information may be linked to their sex, with girls attending primarily to the 
contents of the model and boys demonstrating a fledgling ability to interpret the model 
spatially. As the notion that boys and girls may use different strategies to solve the 
model task represents a somewhat unusual finding for this line of research, two fiirther
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experiments were carried out to clarify the results in Experiment 1. These experiments 
(Experiments 2 and 3) are presented in the following chapter followed by a general 
discussion of the broader significance of the combined results from Experiments 1-3.
Chapter 3
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Experiment 2: Investigating the Validity and Reliability of the Standard Task
One potential challenge for interpreting the results in Experiment 1 was that the 
mean percentage of Symbolic Retrievals in the Control condition (57%) was somewhat 
lower than the typical mean for 3.0-year-olds’ on the standard task (usually at least 
75%, see DeLoache, 1987b; DeLoache, 1991; DeLoache et al., 1991; DeLoache, 1995; 
Marzolf & DeLoache, 1997). Establishing a valid baseline for performance on the 
standard task was essential for interpreting performance in the experimental groups in 
Experiment 1 and also for comparing those results to previous findings. In seemed 
prudent, therefore, to ensure that the relatively lower level of performance in 
Experiment 1 accurately reflected children’s ability to reason between the model and 
the room rather than procedural differences between the present research and previous 
studies in which the relatively higher means had obtained (e.g. DeLoache et al., 1991; 
DeLoache, 2000; Marzolf & DeLoache, 1994; Marzolf, 1996; Marzolf et al, 1999). In 
Experiment 2, an additional group of children was tested with a version of the Control 
task modified to minimize the differences between procedures; two major changes and 
one minor change were implemented.
The two major changes were aimed at reducing the length of the test sessions. 
Recall that in Experiment 1 children received up to four Imitation Placement trials and 
were taken back to the model and reminded up to two times on each trial of the location 
of the original toy. In addition, they were provided with an overview of the procedure 
prior to commencing the Imitation Placement and Experimental Phases (in the 
DeLoache studies, children received only one imitation trial and were not provided with 
overviews of the procedures). These additional measures were designed to assist 
children in recognizing the model-room relation; however, it is possible that the added 
demands on children’s attention left insufficient cognitive resources for the
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experimental trials that followed. Accordingly, in Experiment 2, the number of 
Imitation Placement trials was reduced to one and only the standard instructions were 
provided (see below). The minor change was that, whereas in Experiment 1 the model 
was open only at the top, in Experiment 2 it was open at the top and the front (as in the 
DeLoache studies, see DeLoache et al., 1991; Marzolf & DeLoache, 1994 for example) 
to minimize the physical effort required to place or retrieve the small toy.
Method
Participants. The participants in Experiment 2 were 8 girls and 8 boys (M =
38.4 months, range = 35.3.-41.2 months) with no prior experience with the scale model 
task. As in Experiment 1, half the children experienced the hiding event in the model 
and searched in the room and half received the reversed order of spaces.
Apparatus and Materials. The scale model, room and hiding containers were the 
same as those used in the Control condition in Experiment 1. The only difference to the 
apparatus was that in Experiment 2, the front wall of the model was removed.
Procedure. The procedure in Experiment 2 was the same as that for the Control 
condition in Experiment 1 with two exceptions: 1). Children were given only one 
imitation trial. If they were not correct on their first attempt at placing the analogous 
toy, the experimenter provided assistance in placing BD correctly and explained that 
“now BD and LD are doing the same thing”. 2). The experimenter omitted explaining 
the procedure to children at the beginning of the Imitation and Experimental phases. 
Immediately after the Familiarization Phase, the experimenter placed the small toy at a 
randomly selected location in the model saying, “Look, LD is going to sit right here”. 
She then invited children to place the large toy in the corresponding location in the 
room. Similarly, immediately following the Imitation Placement trial, the experimenter 
hid the small toy inside one of the containers saying, “Look LD is going to hide right
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here.” She then instructed children to wait on the chair while she hid the large toy in the 
analogous place in the room. Finally, children were invited to find the large toy. As in 
Experiment 1, children were reminded on each trial that both toys always do the same 
thing.
In summary, there were three differences between the Control conditions in 
Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiment 1, children received up to four Imitation Placement 
trials, the experimenter provided children with an overview of the procedure prior to the 
Imitation and Experimental Phases and the model was open only at the top. In 
Experiment 2 (as in the DeLoache studies), children received only one Imitation 
Placement trial, the overview at the outset of the Imitation and Experimental Phases was 
omitted and the model was open at the top and also at the front.
Results
Performance was scored and group means were calculated as in Experiment 1. 
The data from the Control condition in Experiment 1 were then compared to the data 
from Experiment 2.
Performance in the two experiments was highly similar. Figure 3.1 depicts the 
mean level of errorless retrievals by Task and Experiment. The group means were 89%, 
(SD = 20.35) and 80% (SD = 24.91) for the Memory Retrievals, and 53% (SD = 35.2) 
and 57% (SD = 38.2) for the Symbolic Retrievals for Experiment 2 and the Control 
Condition in Experiment 1 respectively. As in the Control condition in Experiment 1, 
the group mean on the Symbolic Retrieval task in Experiment 2 (53%) was above 
chance (25%), t(15) = 3.20, p < .01, and performance remained stable across blocks of 
trials, t (15) = -1.73, p > .104. Furthermore, the relatively lower group mean could not 
have been due to a preponderance of very young children in the sample. The difference
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Figure 3.1 Results for the Control Conditions in Experiments 1 and 2.
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between the mean ages of children categorized as “failing” and “passing” was only two 
weeks (38.7 vs. 38.2 months) with the “failing” group being slightly older. Examination 
of the pattern of passing and failing on the Symbolic Retrieval and Memory Retrieval 
tasks revealed that only 1 child failed both tasks, 5 children passed both tasks and 10 
children (63% of the sample) passed the Memory task but failed to transfer that 
knowledge to help guide their search in the room (no child passed the Symbolic Task 
without remembering the location of the original toy).
A 2 (Task; memory retrieval, symbolic Retrieval) x 2 (Experiment; control 
group in experiment 1, experiment 2) x 2 (Sex) x 2 (Hiding Space; model, room) mixed 
ANOVA was carried out on the combined data from the two experiments. The results 
revealed no effect of experiment and no interactions with the experiment variable. The 
only significant effects were an effect of Task, F(l, 38) = 32.60, p < .0001, indicating 
that Memory Retrieval performance was superior to Symbolic Retrieval performance, 
and a Task x Sex x Hiding Space interaction, F(l,38) = 5.38, p < .03. Performance on 
the Memory Retrieval task was uniformly high; the means for boys and girls for the two 
hiding spaces ranged between 76%-94% and a follow-up 2 (Sex) x 2 (Hiding Space; 
model, room) ANOVA revealed no significant effects. As in Experiment 1, an 
analogous ANOVA carried out on the Symbolic Retrieval data also returned no 
significant effects, however, the general direction of the sub-group means suggested that 
boys performed somewhat better when the hiding event occurred in the model (66%) 
compared to the room (48%) and that the reverse pattern held for girls (45% vs. 61% for 
the model and the room). The means for boys and girls in Experiment 1 were 63% and 
47% for the model and 47% and 72% for the room. The analogous means in Experiment 
2 were 69% and 44% for the model with both groups achieving 50% for the room. The 
means from the two experiments are thus highly similar with the exception that girls in
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Experiment 2 did not appear to derive a benefit from witnessing the hiding event in the 
room (but note that even here, the means were in the same general direction).^^ The
Task X Sex x Hiding Space interaction in the mixed ANOVA thus appeared to 
reflect the fact that the pattern of means for the sex by hiding space cells was different 
for the Symbolic and Memory Retrieval tasks.
Discussion
The modifications to the stimuli and procedure in Experiment 2 had no effect on 
performance on the standard task. The results in Experiments 1 and 2 were highly 
similar and (with the exception of the relatively lower group means) generally 
consistent with the results in previous studies. The group mean was above chance, there 
was no evidence of improvement over trials and, while there were no significant effects 
of sex or hiding space in the ANOVAs in either experiment, the pattern of the subgroup 
means, particularly indicating that boys performed best when the hiding event occurred 
in the model, was also similar in the two studies. Note that, in both experiments, 
children performed very well on the Memory Task; only one child failed to meet the 
criterion for “passing” indicating that they accurately encoded and remembered the 
target location on each trial. Furthermore, there was no indication that the relatively 
lower group mean was due to the inclusion of a number of especially young children in 
the sample; the mean ages of children classified as “passing” and “failing” was identical 
in Experiment 1 and the “failing” group was slightly older (by two weeks) in 
Experiment 2. However, whereas in most previous studies the majority of 3.0-year-olds 
readily recognized the relevance of the hiding event in the model for finding the toy in 
the room, the model-room relation remained opaque for a substantial proportion of
Comparisons of the sub-group means from Experiment 2 to chance were not carried 
out due to the limited number of observations per cell (n = 4) and thus the limited power 
and meaningfulness of the one sample t-test.
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children (33% in Experiment 1 and 63% in Experiment 2) in the Control conditions in 
Experiments 1 and 2.
It is worth noting that the level of performance in the current research is 
comparable to performance in studies conducted in other laboratories with children of 
the same age. For example, Dow and Pick (1992), Bence and Presson (1997) and Myers 
and Marzolf (1999) report group means of 65%, 58% and 65% respectively on the 
standard model task. In contrast, the group means in the DeLoache studies have ranged 
between 75%-92%. Although it is difficult to determine the precise source of this 
variability in performance, given that highly similar procedures were used in different 
testing locations one possibility could be differences in the populations from which the 
samples were drawn. For example, regional differences in parenting and early nursery 
care might influence the amount of experience young children have with symbolic 
media such as picture books and videos. DeLoache has suggested that experience with a 
variety of symbols might lead to “symbolic sensitivity” or a general readiness to 
interpret a novel symbol in terms of what it stands for (DeLoache, 1995, page 100). 
Indeed, experience with certain types of symbols has been shown to lead to improved 
performance on more difficult symbolic reasoning tasks (DeLoache, 1991, Experiments 
2 and 3 ; Marzolf & DeLoache, 1994, Experiment 3; Troseth & DeLoache, 1999; 
Experiment la; Troseth & DeLoache, 2000). For now, the notion that sociocultural 
factors might influence early experience with symbolic media, which could in turn 
affect the ability to acquire new symbols, remains an interesting empirical question for 
future research. For present purposes; however, given that the results are based on a
Blades and Cooke (1994b) also found that 3.0-year-olds were highly successful on 
the standard task (M = 88% and 93% for the two experiments, see Table 2.1 in Chapter 
2). However, as the methodology employed differed from that of the other studies, and 
may have contributed to the observed ceiling effect, those findings are not cited here.
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large, representative sample (n = 46 for the combined data sets), that the group mean is 
above chance and comparable to the findings in other laboratories and that the pattern of 
results is generally consistent with that of previous research, the level of performance in 
Experiments 1 and 2 is taken as a valid and reliable indicator of the ability of children in 
the present population to recognize the correspondence between the scale model and the 
actual room.
Experiment 3 : When Spatial Information is Irrelevant Not Misleading 
A second potential challenge for interpreting the results in Experiment 1 
concerns the manipulation in the Object condition. It could be argued that by placing 
corresponding objects in non-corresponding corners in the model and the room (on the 
experimental trials), rather than being absent, spatial information became misleading. 
Searching in the corresponding spatial position, which would indicate some 
understanding of the model as a symbol, would have been scored as incorrect as the toy 
was always hidden with corresponding objects and corresponding objects always 
occupied different spatial positions in the two spaces. Although searching in the 
corresponding spatial position occurred relatively infrequently in the Object condition 
in Experiment 1 (only 12% of the trials), it is possible that some children became 
confused by the misleading spatial information (e.g. if they failed to find the toy in the 
corresponding spatial position on early trials or if they were uncertain about which 
source of information ,object or spatial, to follow) and simply resorted to searching 
randomly. Boys may have been especially susceptible to confijsion arising from 
misleading spatial information as the results in Experiment 1 suggest that they relied 
primarily on the spatial position of the target object to solve the standard task. To 
determine if boys’ poor performance in the Object condition in Experiment 1 was due to 
the presence of misleading spatial information, an additional group of children was
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tested in a version of the model task in which spatial location of the objects in the model 
was irrelevant in the room.
Method
Participants. The participants in Experiment 3 were 8 boys and 8 girls (M = 
38.71 months, range = 35.6-41.3 months) who had no prior experience with the scale 
model task. Equal numbers of boys and girls experienced the hiding event in the model 
and first searched in the room. The remaining children received the reverse order of 
spaces.
Apparatus and Materials. The materials were the same as those used in the 
Object condition in Experiment 1.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in the Object condition in 
Experiment 1 with one exception. Figure 3.2 shows the layout of the experimental 
spaces in the Object condition in Experiment 1 and in Experiment 3. Whereas in the 
Experiment 1 the objects were re-arranged such that corresponding objects occupied 
non-corresponding comers in the model and the room, in Experiment 3, the objects in 
the room were re-arranged in such a way as to leave the corners empty (Empty Corners 
condition). One container was placed in the middle of each side wall and the two 
remaining containers were placed in the center of the back wall. Thus, the spatial 
information was misleading in the Object condition and irrelevant in the Empty Corners 
condition. As in the Object condition, a different configuration was used on each trial 
and the order of configurations was fixed across children. The placement of the 
containers on each trial, from left to right, were: 1) Red, Silver, Green, Gold, 2) Gold, 
Red, Silver, Green, 3) Green, Gold, Red, Silver, 4) Silver, Green, Gold, Red.
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Results
Performance was scored and group means were calculated as in Experiment 1.
The data from the Object condition in Experiment 1 were then compared to the data 
from the Empty Corners condition in Experiment 3.
Figure 3.3 shows the performance of the two groups. The mean percentage of 
Memory Retrievals was 78% and 83% for the Object and Empty Corners groups 
respectively and both groups achieved a mean of 48% on the Symbolic Retrievals (t 
(15) = 2.80, p < .01 for deviation from chance for the Empty Corners condition). As in 
the Object condition, there was no evidence of improvement over blocks of trials , t (15) 
= -1.32, p > .21.
A 2 (Task; memory retrieval, symbolic retrieval) x 2 (Experiment; experiment 1, 
object condition; experiment 3, empty corners condition) x 2 (Sex) x 2 (Hiding Space; 
model, room) mixed ANOVA was carried out on the combined data from the two 
conditions. The results revealed no effect of Experiment and no interactions with the 
experiment variable. The only significant findings were highly significant effects of 
Task, F (1, 38) = 36.33, p < .0001, indicating superior performance on the Memory 
Retrieval task; Sex, F (1,38)= 15.28, p < .0001, favouring girls; and a Task by Sex 
interaction, F (1, 38) = 4.38, p < .05. Post hoc analyses revealed that, as in the Object 
condition in Experiment 1, there was a trend toward superior performance by girls on 
the Memory Task (M = 86% for girls and 71% for boys, t (43) = -1.93, p < .06). The 
means in the Empty Corners condition were 88% for girls and 78% for boys which, 
although not significantly different, t (14) = .78, p > .76, were in the same direction as 
in the Object condition in Experiment 1 (86% vs. 67% respectively). For the Symbolic 
Retrieval task, girls clearly outperformed boys (M = 66% vs. 29% for the combined 
data sets, t ( 43) = - 4.14, p < .0001). Figure 3.4 shows performance by sex in the Object 
and Empty Corners conditions separately. In both conditions, girls’ performance
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Figure 3.3 Results for the Object (Experiment 1) and Empty 
Corners (Experiment 3) Conditions by Task.
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Figure 3.4 Symbolic Retrieval Results for the Object (Experiment 1) and 
Empty Corners (Experiment 2) Conditions by Sex.
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was significantly above chance (Object: M = 59%, t (15) = 5.37, p < .0001; Empty 
Corners: M = 72%, t (7) = 6.36, p < .0001) but boys’ performance was no different from 
chance (Object: M = 31%, t (15) = 1.71, p > .11; Empty Corners: M = 25%). There 
were no significant effects involving the Hiding Space variable in the ANOVA.
Discussion
A highly similar pattern of results obtained whether the spatial information in 
the model was misleading (Object condition) or irrelevant (Empty Corners condition) in 
the room. The group means were identical, there was no evidence of improvement over 
trials and, across conditions, disrupting the symmetry of spatial relations between the 
model and the room had little effect on girls but was highly detrimental to boys’, 
particularly to their ability to find the analogous toy. The misleading spatial information 
in the Object condition in Experiment 1 thus could not account for the great difficulty 
boys experienced when retrieving the analogous toy in the room.
An alternative explanation for the observed sex difference could be that the 
results reflect differences in activity level and the capacity for sustained attention. In the 
Object and Empty Corners conditions, successful retrieval of the toy required close 
attention to the new locations of the objects in the room as the configuration of objects 
was different on every trial. Children who entered the room hurriedly and searched 
impulsively may have failed to notice the new position of the target object or may have 
done so only after carrying out their first search (consequently, they would have been 
scored as incorrect). Boys may have been particularly susceptible to errors of this sort as 
previous research suggests that they are more impulsive (Block, 1983), active (Harper 
& Sanders, 1975) and are more frequently diagnosed with attention-related disorders 
compared to girls (Hynd, Horn, Voeller & Marshall, 1991). The results from a similar 
study by Marzolf and his colleagues (Marzolf et al., 1999), however, do not support this 
account.
69
In that study, as in the Object and Empty Corners conditions, corresponding 
objects occupied non-corresponding spatial positions in the two spaces and the toy was 
always hidden with the corresponding object. However, the arrangement of objects in 
the two spaces was different at the outset of the experiment and the objects in the room 
occupied the same spatial position on every trial. Thus, children could form a 
representation of the layout of the room during the extensive orientation then rely on 
that representation to locate the target object in the room on the experimental trials. In 
contrast, in the Object and Empty Corners conditions the configuration of the objects in 
the two spaces was the same at the outset and during the orientation but differed from 
trial to trial. In these conditions then, children would have to take account of the new 
configuration in the room and update their representation of the locations of the objects 
on each trial. It could be argued, therefore, that the Marzolf et al. (1999) study placed 
fewer demands on children’s attentional resources. The results, however, were clear: 
even with the reduced attentional demands, girls dramatically outperformed boys. The 
means provided were 73% and 42% for girls and boys for the Control and Object 
conditions combined; the sex effect was significant and did not interact with condition 
(see Marzolf et al.. Experiment 2, 1999, page 301). Differences in activity level and the 
capacity to sustain close attention to the task at hand are therefore unlikely to account 
for the difficulty boys experienced when spatial information could not be used to solve 
the task. Together with the findings in the Object and Empty Corners conditions, the 
results from Marzolf et al. (1999) support the claim that whereas girls attend to the 
individual objects, boys may attend more to the spatial location of those objects to solve 
the standard task.
General Discussion of Experiments 1-3 
The results from Experiments 1-3 indicate that, as a group, 3.0-year children rely 
more on object correspondences than on spatial correspondences when using a scale
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model to retrieve a hidden toy in the actual room. In two experiments (Experiments 1 
and 2), children performed relatively well when both object and spatial information 
were available to solve the task, were relatively unaffected by disruptions to spatial 
information (Object condition in Experiment 1 and Empty Corners condition in 
Experiment 3) and performed very poorly when object information was not available 
(Spatial condition in Experiment 1) to solve the task. Although the mean level of 
performance on the standard task was relatively lower than the typical mean found in 
previous experiments, this could not have been due to subtle procedural differences 
between those studies and Experiment 1 as highly similar results obtained in 
Experiment 2 when every effort was made precisely to match the procedures to those 
used by DeLoache and her colleagues. That the results in the Control condition in 
Experiment 1 were effectively replicated in Experiment 2 suggests that the level of 
performance in the present research can be taken as a valid a reliable indicator of the 
ability of 3.0-year-old children in the present population to use a scale model to find a 
hidden toy in a room.
The differences between the means in the five conditions in Experiments 1 to 3 
could not be attributed to differences in the ability to remember the identity of the target 
object vs. its spatial location as, in all conditions and experiments, memory for the 
target was generally good and significantly better than children’s ability to retrieve the 
analogous toy. Nor do the results reflect differences in the ability to learn the different 
strategies required for solving the various versions of the task (i.e. relying on object or 
spatial correspondence, or both) as there was no evidence of improvement over trials in 
any of the conditions or experiments. Therefore, the results indicate differences in how 
children interpreted the model at the outset of the experiment. These findings are 
generally consistent with previous claims that at 3.0 years of age, the identity of the 
objects predominates over their spatial position for solving the model task. Analyzing
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the data from Experiments 1-3 fiirther, however, indicated that this conclusion may 
have been incomplete; the differences between the means in the five conditions were 
subserved by sex-related differences in the way children approached the task.
Whereas girls appeared to relied on object cues, boys relied more on spatial 
information when using a scale model to navigate in the referent space. Whether the 
spatial location of the objects in the model were misleading (Object condition) or 
irrelevant (Empty Corners condition) in the room, girls performed as well as in the 
Control condition, however, boys performance declined sharply and was not 
significantly better than chance. In contrast, when the objects were identical and a 
strictly spatial solution was required (Spatial condition), some boys performed well but 
girls generally performed very poorly. Furthermore, the Object strategy was more 
robust; provided the objects were visually distinctive (Object and Empty Corners 
conditions) girls performed very well whether reasoning from the model to the room or 
vice versa. However, when only spatial information was available (Spatial condition), 
the only children who were at all successful were those boys who reasoned from the 
model to the room or when the task context may have facilitated attention to spatial 
information.
The notion that there may sex differences in the way in which boys and girls 
approached the model task is particularly intriguing as it represents a relatively novel 
finding for this line of research. So why have the majority of previous studies based on 
the scale model paradigm not found significant effects of sex? The answer seems to lie, 
at least in part, in the nature of the experiments. Most studies have used between- 
subjects designs, comparing performance with the standard procedure to performance 
on various other versions of the task. For example, in one study, the performance of a 
group of children who received the standard instructions, in which the physical 
similarity between the model and the room was explicitly pointed out, was compared to
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the performance of a second group of children who received a version of the 
instructions in which explicit comparison of the items in the two spaces was omitted 
(DeLoache, 1989a; see also DeLoache et al, 1999). Consequently, the analyses were 
focussed on differences between the group means or on how well children performed in 
the two conditions. Note, however, that as the objects were always distinctive and 
occupied the same spatial position in the two spaces, the role of object and spatial 
information were conflated; in all conditions, children could use either (or both) types 
of information successfully to retrieve the hidden toy in the room. In contrast, by 
disentangling the roles of object and spatial information in Experiments 1-3, it was 
possible to shed light on children’s strategies, thus shifting the focus to how they are 
solving the task. Consistent with the results of the majority of previous studies, boys 
and girls performed equally well in the two Control conditions in Experiments 1 and 2, 
however, their performance in the experimental conditions (Object and Spatial in 
Experiment 1, Empty Corners in Experiment 3) indicated that they may be predisposed 
to using different means to achieve the same end. As mentioned in the discussion of the 
results in Experiment 3, Marzolf et al. (1999) also reported that girls performed 
significantly better than boys in the Object condition. That similar results obtained in 
studies carried out in different laboratories and geographic locations (America and the 
United Kingdom) suggests that the effect of sex in the present research is not an 
anomalous finding.
Given that the strategy favoured by girls (object correspondence) was more 
robust than that used by boys (spatial correspondence) and the apparent inflexibility in 
the type of strategy used (recall that girls performed poorly in the Spatial condition and 
that boys were markedly unsuccessful in the Object and Empty Corners conditions), one 
might still expect significant effects of sex to arise occasionally, with repeated 
sampling. Detecting sex differences in performance statistically has been hampered by
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the limited sample size used in most previous studies; the typical experiment 
comprising eight to twelve children in each condition, usually with roughly equal 
numbers of boys and girls (see DeLoache, 1989a, Experiments 2-4; DeLoache, 1990a; 
DeLoache, 1991; DeLoache, 2000; DeLoache et al, 1991; DeLoache et al, 1999; Dow 
& Pick, 1992; Marzolf & DeLoache, 1994; Marzolf & DeLoache, 1996; Marzolf, Pacha 
& DeLoache, 1996; Marzolf et al., 1999; Myers & Marzolf, 1999; Troseth & DeLoache, 
1996; Troseth & DeLoache, 1998; Uttal et al, 1995). Consequently, there may have 
been inadequate statistical power to detect any main effects and especially any 
interactions involving sex. Perhaps for this reason, analyses for sex effects have often 
been omitted.
It is noteworthy, however, that in spite of limited sample sizes, significant 
effects of sex have been detected in a number of studies with young children using 
similar mapping tasks. Moreover, the observed effects share a strikingly similar pattern: 
without exception, girls outperformed boys (see Blades & Cooke, 1994; Liben, Moore 
& Goldbeck, 1982; Marzolf & DeLoache, 1994; Marzolf et al, 1999; Troseth & 
DeLoache, 1999). The results from several studies indicating that, at three years of age, 
object information is more important than spatial information for solving the model task 
(Bence & Presson, 1997; Blades & Cooke, 1994; DeLoache, 1991; Marzolf et al, 1999) 
thus appear to reflect the finding that a larger proportion of children (mostly girls in the 
present research) favour the object correspondence strategy over the spatial strategy 
which emerges somewhat later in development.
To the author’s knowledge, the results from Experiments 1-3 represent the 
earliest evidence of a sex difference in strategies for using a spatial symbol to navigate 
in the referent space raising a number of intriguing developmental questions. Do the sex 
differences observed in 3.0-year-olds persist with age? Or do they disappear relatively 
quickly with maturation? What are the cognitive processes that might subserve the
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observed difference in which boys and girls approached the model task? Do they change 
with age? Preliminary investigations into these and related questions are taken up in 
Experiments 4 and 5 which are reported in the following two chapters.
Chapter 4
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Experiment 4: The Role of Age, Sex and Language
Perhaps the most intriguing result to emerge from Experiments 1 to 3 was the 
finding that boys and girls appear to approach the scale model task differently.
Although, as a group, 3.0-year-olds relied primarily on object information, children’s 
strategies appeared to be linked to their sex with girls attending more to the objects and 
boys demonstrating a fledgling ability to interpret the model spatially. Given the relative 
paucity of sex differences in previous research on young children’s understanding of 
maps and models (Marzolf & DeLoache, 1999), these findings may seem, prima facie, 
as no more than an anomalous, experimental artefact. There are at least three reasons, 
however, to consider the possibility of sex differences in young children’s use of scale 
models more carefully.
First, as outlined in the previous chapter, it is compelling that in spite of small 
samples in previous experiments using the standard model task (and thus the limited 
power to detect potential sex effects), where sex differences have arisen, they tended to 
favour girls (Blades & Cooke, 1994; Liben et al., 1982; Marzolf & DeLoache, 1994; 
Marzolf et al, 1999; Troseth & DeLoache, 1999). As previous research converges on 
the finding that, at the group level, the ability to map individual objects emerges 
developmentally earlier than the ability to map spatial relations (Bence & Presson,
1997; Blades and Cooke, 1994; DeLoache, 1990b), the advantage to young girls arising 
in past experiments might be taken as confirmatory evidence that they rely more on the 
identity of the objects than their male peers. Second, the suggestion of a sex difference 
in spatial abilities in the pre-school years is not unique to children’s understanding of 
scale models. Indeed, accumulating evidence indicates a male advantage on a variety of 
spatial tasks including the Mazes subtest of the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale 
of Intelligence (WPPSI, Wechsler, 1967; Fairweather & Butterworth, 1977), mental 
transformation and rotation (Levine, Hutttenlocher, Taylor & Langrock, 1999; Rosser,
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Ensing, Gilder & Lane, 1984) and spatio-temporal memory (Orsini, Schiappa & Grossi, 
1981). The present data are consistent with these findings in that 3.0-year-olds boys, but 
not girls, showed some ability to interpret the model spatially. And third, the nature of 
the observed differences in 3.0-year-olds understanding of scale models is reminiscent 
of findings in the adult spatial reasoning literature. More specifically, the suggestion 
that pre-school girls may attend more to the identity of the objects and boys more to 
their spatial location, bears a striking similarity to claims that whereas adult females 
rely predominantly on proximal features such as landmarks, adult males rely more on 
distal, euclidean or geometric properties (direction, distance etc.) of the environment on 
navigation tasks (e.g. Galea & Kimura, 1993; Miller & Santoni, 1986; Sandstrom, 
Kaufman & Huettel, 1998; Ward, Newcombe & Overton, 1986). Taken together, these 
findings lend weight to the plausibility of the notion that there may be individual 
differences in young children’s interpretation of spatial symbols such as scale models 
and that these differences may be linked to sex.
The important question that arises is whether the apparent predisposition of girls 
and boys to approach the model task differently at three years of age represents a 
window onto an initial difference that disappears with maturation or whether it marks a 
point of divergence that persists with age. Previous findings from research on other 
aspects of spatial reasoning suggest that it might. For example, recent work on sex 
differences in mental rotation, long-believed to emerge only in adolescence (e.g. 
Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974; McGee, 1979), has led researchers to conclude that a male 
advantage exists as early as the pre-school years and persists across the lifespan (e.g. 
Linn & Petersen, 1986; Levine et al, 1999; Voyer, Voyer & Bryden., 1995)."^  ^
Accordingly, in Experiment 4, children aged four and five years were tested in the same 
conditions, using the same procedures as in Experiment 1 and the data were then 
compared with the data fi’om the 3.0-year-olds who participated in Experiment 1. On the
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basis of previous findings (e.g. Bence & Presson, 1997; Blades & Cooke, 1994), it was 
expected that performance in all conditions would improve with age. At issue was 
whether girls and boys would continue to show an advantage in the object and spatial 
versions (respectively) of the task.
But what cognitive processes might underlie the observed difference in how 
male and female preschoolers approached the model task? Taking the lead from 
explanations put forth to account for the differences in the adult spatial reasoning 
literature (e.g. Ward et al, 1986), one possibility might be the familiar claim that young 
girls are precocious for language compared to boys (see Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974). 
Perhaps girls’ attention to the objects reflects a greater tendency to apply a linguistic 
label to the objects in the model e.g. “the red one”, then use that label to guide their 
search in the room. Such a strategy would succeed whether reasoning from the model to 
the room or vice versa (although there could be some benefit of witnessing the hiding 
event in the room; as standing beside the target object during the hiding event may 
underscore children’s attention to the identity of the objects and thus may encourage the 
use of the labeling strategy; see the discussion section in Chapter 1). To explore the 
hypothesis that language might underlie girls’ superior performance in the Object and 
Empty Corners conditions in Experiments 1 and 3, in Experiment 4 children received a 
vocabulary measure (following the scale model task) designed to assess the extent of 
their receptive vocabularies. The rationale here was that if children use language to
Investigating the possibility that the difference observed at three years of age might 
persist into later childhood takes on added importance when one considers that an early 
male advantage in some aspects of spatial reasoning has been linked to male superiority 
in field independence, geometry and arithmetical reasoning in later years (Geary, 1996; 
McGee, 1974). Determining the starting point of a continuous divergence in spatial 
abilities could prove critical for the timing of interventions designed to curtail these 
later emerging secondary effects.
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solve the model task, then lexical ability (an indication of a developing proficiency with 
language), should be correlated with performance when mapping the individual objects 
will lead to task success.
Testing the three age groups also afforded investigating age-related changes in 
the nature of children’s representation of the task. DeLoache and her colleagues 
(DeLoache & Marzolf, 1992) suggest that although children achieve “representational 
insight” or the abrupt realization that the model may be related to the room around their 
third birthday, their understanding is limited to an implicit, unconscious, non- 
verbalizable representation of the task. Thus, even highly successful 3.0-year-olds are 
said to be unable to articulate their understanding of the model room relation. However, 
as no relevant data have been reported, it remains unclear whether this construal of 3.0- 
year-olds’ understanding of the model task is based on the observation that very young 
children do not comment spontaneously on the parallel between the two spaces or if 
children have been questioned specifically about their understanding of the model-room 
relation. Subsequent work has shown that by five years of age children’s representations 
have become explicit, conscious and verbalizable (DeLoache et al., 1999) suggesting a 
shift between three and five years of age in the nature of children’s understanding of 
symbol-referent relations.
To investigate this notion directly, immediately after completion of the model 
task, the experimenter asked children how they knew where to search for the analogous 
toy (Knowledge Question). It was hoped that, where children were able to articulate 
their knowledge, their replies might shed further light on the strategies they employed. 
The knowledge question was administered to all children whether or not they succeeded 
on the model task to determine if some children may be able to take a dual stance to the 
model (i.e. to represent it as an object and also as a symbol) but are somehow unable to 
use that knowledge to guide their search in the room. It could be argued that asking
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“How did you know...?” might have seemed confusing to unsuccessful children, 
however, this would result in a decreased likelihood of answering the question correctly 
and thus would work against the finding that some children may have an explicit 
awareness of the model-room relation but are nonetheless unable to bring that 
knowledge to bear on their behaviour in the room.
Method
Participants
Forty-eight 4.0-year olds (M = 50.6 months, range = 47.2 - 54.8 months) and 48
5.0-year-olds (M = 61.9 months, range = 59.2 - 66.0 months) with no previous 
experience with the model task participated in Experiment 4. Sixteen children (8 boys 
and 8 girls) within each age group were randomly assigned to the Control (4.0-year-olds 
M = 50.9. months, range = 48.1 -53.3 months; 5.0-year-olds M = 62.2 months, range = 
59.6 - 66.0 months). Object (4.0-year-olds M = 50.6 months, range = 47.9 -  53.4 
months; 5.0-year-olds M = 61.5 months, range = 59.2 -  64.8 months)and Spatial (4.0- 
year-olds M = 50.3 months, range = 47.2 - 54.8 months; 5.0-year-olds M = 61.9 months, 
range = 59.5 - 66.0 months) conditions. As in previous experiments, each condition 
comprised equal numbers of boys and girls. In addition, half the children in each 
condition witnessed the hiding event in the model and searched for the analogous toy in 
the room and half received the reverse order of spaces. The data for the 3.0-year-olds 
came from the children who participated in Experiment 1 (N = 91) the last forty-three of 
whom had also received the knowledge question and the receptive vocabulary measure 
(see below).
Apparatus and Materials
The model, room, containers and toys were the same as those used in 
Experiment 1. The vocabulary measure was the British Picture Vocabulary Scale -
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Second Edition (BPVS- II; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Burley, 1997) a widely-used 
measure of receptive vocabulary developed for use with British children.
Procedure
Scale Model Task. The experimenter administered the scale model task first 
using the same procedures as in the Control, Object and Spatial conditions in 
Experiment 1.
Knowledge Question. After completion of the last experimental trial on the 
model task the experimenter asked children “How did you know where to look for 
LD?” (or BD depending on the direction of testing, model to room or vice versa). 
Children were encouraged to provide verbal responses (those who only gestured 
initially were told “use your words to tell me”) and clarifications were sought as needed. 
For example, if children indicated, verbally or by gesturing, the object in the model or 
room that had served as the target on the last trial, the experimenter said, “But LD (or 
BD) was hiding in a different one every time. How did you know where to find him 
each time? ”.
Vocabularv Measure. Administration of the BPVS-II test followed immediately 
after the knowledge question. The test was administered according to the standardized 
instructions (see Dunn et al., 1997); children were required to point to the correct 
picture, in a matrix of four pictures on a page, that corresponded to a word the 
experimenter read aloud. The procedure was administered to a criterial number of errors 
committed within a set of twelve picture-pages (see the BP VS training manual for 
details). Upon completion of the vocabulary measure, children were praised for their 
efforts and escorted back to their classroom. The entire procedure was videotaped.
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Results
Scale Model Task
Performance was scored and mean scores were tabulated as in previous 
experiments. Figure 4.1 shows the results for the Symbolic and Memory Retrieval 
Tasks by Age Group and Condition. For all age groups, compared to when both types of 
information were available to solve the task, performance on the Symbolic Retrieval 
task was more disrupted by the absence of object information (Spatial condition) than 
by the removal of reliable spatial information (Object condition). Furthermore, 
performance on both tasks improved steadily with age although, in general, memory for 
the location of the original toy continued to outstrip the ability successfully to retrieve 
the analogous toy. The group means for the Symbolic Retrieval task in the Control, 
Object and Spatial conditions, respectively, were: 57% (SD = 38.24), 47% (SD = 31.58) 
and 36% (SD = 27.63) for the 3.0-year-olds; 72% (SD = 31.46), 64% (SD = 37.60) and 
58% (SD = 26.95) for the 4.0-year-olds; and 80% (SD = 24.53), 75% (SD = 28.87) and 
61% (SD = 31.58) for the 5.0-year-olds. The analogous means for the Memory 
Retrieval task were: 80% (SD = 24.92), 78% (SD = 28.61) and 70% (SD = 30.27) for 
the 3.0-year-olds; 86% (SD = 22.30), 86% (SD = 27.34) and 60% (SD = 36.37) for the
4.0-year-olds and 92% (SD =19.83), 97% (SD = 12.5) and 77% (SD = 21.35) for the
5.0-year-olds. All of the group means were significantly above chance (25%), p’s < .05. 
A 2 X (Task; symbolic retrieval, memory retrieval) x 3 (Agegroup; 3.0-, 4.0-,
5.0-year-olds) x 3 (Condition; control, object, spatial) x 2 (Sex) x 2 (Hiding Space; 
model, room) ANOVA was carried out on the combined data for the three age groups. 
The results revealed main effects of Condition, F (2, 151) = 8.69, p < .0001, Task, F (1, 
151) = 65.68, p < .0001, and Age Group, F (2, 151) = 10.73, p < .0001, and a Task by 
Age Group interaction, F (2, 151) = 4.98, p < .01, confirming the above interpretation of 
the results presented in Figure 4.1. The effect of Condition on Symbolic Retrieval
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Figure 4.1 Results for Experiment 4 by Task, Age Group and Condition.
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performance was generally in keeping with the pattern that obtained for the 3.0-year- 
olds in Experiment 1; compared to performance in the Control group, performance was 
significantly worse in the Spatial group (p < .0001) but not in the Object group (p >
.70). Unlike Experiment 1, however, the difference between the means in the Object and 
Spatial groups in Experiment 4 reached statistical significance (p < .01, all tests 
Scheffé).
Performance generally improved with age and was significantly better on the 
Memory Retrieval Task, however, the pattern of performance across the three age 
groups was somewhat different for the two tasks. Follow-up analyses revealed that on 
both tasks, 5.0-year-olds performed significantly better than 3.0-year-olds (p < .0001 for 
the Symbolic Retrievals, p < .03 for the Memory Retrievals) and that there were no 
statistically significant differences between 4.0- and 5.0-year-olds (p > .54 for the 
Symbolic Retrievals, p > .12 for the Memory Retrievals). However, whereas there was 
no difference between 3.0- and 4.0-year-olds memory for the location of the original toy 
(p > .95), 4.0-year-olds were somewhat better than 3.0-year-olds at using that 
knowledge to guide their search in the room (a trend that approached significance, p < 
.07; all comparisons Scheffé). The Age Group variable did not interact with any of the 
other variables in the ANOVA.
The main effects of Condition and Task, as well as a main effect of Sex, F (2, 
151) = 8.69, p < .0001, favouring girls, and a three-way Condition, Sex and Hiding 
Space interaction, F (2, 151) = 3.1, p <.05, were subsumed by a significant interaction 
of Task, Condition, Sex and Hiding Space, F (2, 151) = 3,70, p < .03. As in Experiment 
1, to illuminate the nature of the four-way interaction for the combined data from the 
three age groups, the results for each Condition are presented by Sex and Hiding Space 
for the Symbolic Retrieval task in Figure 4.2 and for the Memory Retrieval task in 
Figure 4.3 and each task is discussed in turn.
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Symbolic Retrievals. A series of 2 (Sex) x 2 (Hiding Space) follow-up 
ANOVAs was carried out on the data in each condition. The results revealed no 
significant effects for the Control condition (see Figure 4.2); the top plot in the figure 
shows that boys and girls performed equally well and that their performance did not 
vary significantly with the nature of the hiding space. Indeed, comparing the Sex by 
Hiding Space subgroup means to chance (25% for selecting the correct location out of 
four possible locations) revealed that performance was always significantly above 
chance (all M’s >= 59%, p-values < .001). Recall that in Experiment 1 boys performed 
best when the hiding event occurred in the model while for girls performance was best 
when it occurred in the room. That the same pattern did not obtain when the data from 
the three age groups were combined indicates that the effect of the type of hiding space 
on boys’ and girls’ performance on the standard task attenuated with age.
For the Object condition (middle plot in the figure), there was a significant main 
effect of Sex, F (1, 61) = 4.96, p < .03, favouring girls (M = 68% and 50% for girls and 
boys), and a Sex by Hiding Space interaction, F (1, 61) = 4.84, p < .03; boys performed 
significantly better when the hiding event occurred in the room compared to the model 
(M = 38% and 61% for the model and the room), t (30) = 3.27, p < .05), however, girls 
performed equally well regardless of the nature of the hiding space, (M = 75% for the 
model and 61% for the room), t (30) = -.58, p > .57. Comparing the subgroup means to 
chance confirmed that whereas boys’ performance was above chance for the room, t 
(14) 4.16, p < .001, and not for the model, t (14) = 1.37, p > .19, girls’ performance was 
above chance for both spaces, t (15) = 7.30, p < .0001 and t (15) = 4.55, p < .0001 for 
the model and the room. The finding in Experiment 1 (3.0-year-olds only) that girls 
significantly outperformed boys in the Object condition thus persisted when the data 
were combined across the three age groups. Indeed, the only difference between the 
results for the Object condition in the two experiments was that, whereas in Experiment
1 boys performed very poorly, regardless of the type of hiding space (model or room), 
the results for Experiment 4 suggests an age-related increase in their ability to benefit 
from witnessing the hiding event in the room.
As with the 3.0-year-olds in the Object condition in Experiment 1, instances of 
erroneously searching in the corresponding spatial position were relatively infrequent at 
four and five years of age; only two 4.0-year-old girls committed this type of error, each 
on two of the four trials, and seven 5.0-year-olds (3 girls and 4 boys) did so on only one 
trial. Searching in the corresponding location thus occurred on only 6% and 11% of the 
trials at four and five years of age respectively (the corresponding figure for 3.0-year- 
olds was 12%). As only four of these errors (6% of the trials at age five) were 
committed by boys, their continued inferior performance in the Object condition could 
not be attributed to the misleading spatial information created by placing corresponding 
objects in non-corresponding corners in the model and the room on the experimental 
trials.
A different pattern of improvement obtained in the Spatial condition (bottom 
plot). There was a trend toward a main effect of hiding space, with somewhat better 
performance when the hiding event occurred in the model, F (1, 60) = 2.99, p < .09 (M 
= 54% and 41% for the model and the room), and a Sex by Hiding Space interaction, F 
(1, 60) = 6.72, p < .01. In Contrast to the Object condition, boys performed significantly 
better when the hiding event occurred in the model compared to the room, t (30) = 3.27, 
p < .003 (M = 63% and 31% for the model and the room), while girls’ performance was 
similar for the two hiding spaces, t (30) = .58, p > .57 (M = 45% and 52%). The 
ANOVA results were supported by comparisons of the subgroup means to chance; 
performance was significantly above chance for boys in the model, t (15) = 5.48, p < 
.0001, but not the room, t (15) = .94, p > .36, while girls’ performance was above 
chance for both spaces, t (15) = 3.1, p < .003 and t (15) = 3.06, p < .01 for the model
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and the room. Thus, when only spatial information was available, the benefit to boys of 
witnessing the hiding event in the model that obtained at 3.0-years of age in Experiment 
1 (difference between the means for the model and the room = 47%) also obtained in 
Experiment 4 when the data for 3.0- to 5.0-year-olds were combined (difference 
between the means = 32%). In contrast, girls’ performance did not vary with the nature 
of the hiding space in either experiment (difference between the means = 10% and 7% 
for Experiments 1 and 4 respectively).
As in Experiments 1 to 3 the Symbolic Retrieval data were also analyzed to 
determine whether there was any change in performance over the two blocks of trials 
(formed by tabulating mean performance on Trials 1 and 2 (Block 1) and Trials 3 and 4 
(Block 2)). A 3 (Age Group; 3.0-, 4.0-, 5.0-year-olds) x 3 (Condition; control, object, 
spatial) X 2 (Trial Blocks; 1, 2) ANOVA revealed no effects of Trial Blocks and no 
interactions with the Trial Block variable. The only significant effects were main effects 
of Age Group, F (2, 178) = 11.22, p < .0001, and Condition, F (2, 178) = 4.76, p < .01, 
consistent with the pattern in the ANOVA reported at the outset of the results section.
Memory Retrievals. The Memory Retrieval data were subjected to a set of 2 
(Sex) X 2 (Hiding Space) ANOVAs analogous to those carried out on the Symbolic 
Retrieval data. As is apparent in Figure 4.3, children’s Memory for the location of the 
original toy was very good in all conditions (all M’s >= 61%). Indeed, the only 
significant effect in the ANOVAs occurred in the Object condition where there was a 
trend towards superior performance by girls, F (1, 57) = 3.41, p < .07 (M = 78% and 
91% for boys and girls respectively), in line with the results in Experiment 1. Thus, 
disrupting the symmetry of spatial information between the model and the room 
continued to have some impact on boys’, but not on girls’, memory for the target 
location. Note, however, that as in Experiment 1, boys’ performance in the Object 
condition in Experiment 4 was very good, and significantly better than their
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performance on the Symbolic Retrieval task, (49%), t (28) = -4.108, p < .0001, 
indicating that their relative difficulty at finding the analogous toy is unlikely to be due 
to a decayed memory for the target location.
In sum, the pattern of results for the Symbolic and Memory Retrieval tasks in 
Experiment 4 was generally in keeping with that in Experiment 1 with the differences 
between the two sets of findings primarily reflecting that performance in all three 
conditions generally improved with age. The important finding was that the extent to 
which children relied on object and spatial information was different for boys and girls 
at all ages. Although both boys and girls improved in their ability to solve the object and 
spatial versions of the task between three to five years of age, whereas girls continued to 
rely primarily on the individual objects, boys strategies depended on the contextual 
support of the hiding space (they performed well when the hiding event occurred in the 
model, but not in the room when a spatial solution was required and the reverse effect 
held when the task necessitated mapping the individual objects). As children’s 
responses to the Knowledge Question were also analyzed taking verbal ability into 
account, the results for the receptive vocabulary task are presented next followed by the 
results for the Knowledge Question.
Receptive Vocabularv
Performance on the BPVS-II (1997) was scored according to the accompanying 
scoring manual (see Dunn et al., 1997) to yield raw scores or the total number of words 
children understood. A 3 (Agegroup: 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds) x 3 (Condition: control, 
object, spatial) x 2 (Sex) x 2 (Hiding Space: model, room) ANOVA on children’s raw 
scores revealed a significant effect of Age group, F (2, 121) -  23.85, p < .0001. Post hoc 
analyses indicated that 5.0-year-olds understood significantly more words than 4.0-year- 
olds (p < .0001) who in turn understood significantly more words than 3.0-year-olds (p 
< .03, Scheffé). There were no other significant effects in the ANOVA. Thus within
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each age group, children’s receptive vocabulary scores did not vary with either sex, 
condition or hiding space.
Table 4.1 shows the correlation between BPVS-II raw scores and performance 
on the Symbolic Retrieval task by Age Group and Condition for boys and girls 
separately. Children’s receptive vocabulary scores were significantly, positively 
correlated with performance on the model task for boys at three years of age, r = +.95, p 
< .003, n = 6, and for girls at five years of age, r = +.86, p < .007, n = 8, in the Control 
condition (Spearman correlations). Ninety percent of the variance in 3.0-year-old boys’ 
performance and 74% of the variance in 5.0-year-old girls’ performance was therefore 
accounted for by children’s receptive vocabulary scores. There were no other significant 
correlations for the Control condition and no significant correlations for the Object and 
Spatial conditions at any age.
Knowledge Question
Of the 139 children who received the knowledge question, the data from two 
children, one 3.0-year-old girl and one 5.0-year-old boy, were not available due to 
technical difficulty. Children’s responses to the knowledge question were coded by two 
female assistants who were blind to the hypotheses of the study but familiar with the 
scale model task. To ensure that the coders were also blind to age and sex and to the 
direction of testing (model to room or vice versa), the assistants coded transcriptions of 
children’s responses, including brief descriptions of their accompanying actions, which 
were taken from the videotapes. The transcriptions were coded globally for whether or 
not they indicated any understanding of the model-room relation. More specifically, the 
coders were required to decide whether children’s responses gave any indication of an 
understanding that knowledge of the hiding location in one space (e.g. the model) could 
be used to guide their search for the analogous toy in the other space (e.g. the room). 
One assistant coded all 137 responses and the second assistant coded 38 (28%),
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Table 4.1
Correlations of Receptive Vocabulary Raw Scores and Symbolic Retrieval Performance 
bv Age Group. Condition and Sex
Age Group
3.0-Year-Olds 4.0-Year-Olds 5.0-Year-Olds
Condition Sex
Control girls +0.17 +0.58 +0.86**
n = 8 n = 8 n = 8
boys +0.95*** -0.06 -0.20
n = 6 n = 8 n = 8
Object girls -0.12 +0.05 -0.06
n = 8 n = 8 n = 8
boys +0.36 +0.51 +0.39
n = 5 n = 8 n = 8
Spatial girls -0.19 +0.48 +0.09
n = 8 n = 8 n = 8
boys +0.82 +0.53 +0.56
n = 8 n = 8 n = 8
*** p < .003 and ** p < .007 for Spearman’s rho
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randomly selected from the original set for the purpose of calculating inter-coder 
reliability. There was 95% agreement between the two coders. The two disagreements 
were resolved with discussion. Responses that did not suggest an understanding of the 
model-room relation were further subdivided according to whether children: 1). 
provided an incorrect verbal response or 2). said “I don’t know” or remained silent. 
Examples of transcriptions coded as belonging to each of the three resulting response 
categories— “Correct Response”, “Incorrect Response” or “I don’t Know/No 
Response”— are provided in Table 4.2.
Seventy-four of the 137 transcriptions came from children who “passed” the 
Symbolic Retrieval task (i.e. retrieved the analogous toy on their first attempt on at least 
three of the four trials). Figure 4.4 shows the number of successful 3.0-, 4.0- and 5.0- 
year-olds who provided the three types of responses to the knowledge question. Three 
aspects of the figure warrant mention. The first noteworthy aspect is that there was a 
clear, age-related increase in the number of successful children. The height of the bars 
in the figure indicates that fourteen 3.0-year-olds (33%), twenty-six 4.0-year-olds (54%) 
and thirty-four 5.0-year-olds (72%) met the criterion for success. A chi-square analysis 
on whether or not children succeeded on the task by Age Group was significant, (2) = 
13.37, p <.001; follow-up tests revealed no difference between four and five years of 
age (p > . 14), a trend toward an increase between three and four years of age (p < .06) 
and a significant difference between the three and five years of age (p < .0001, Fischer’s 
Exact). Note, however, that the apparent age-related performance improvement could 
not be attributed to the presence of a few especially competent 4.0- and 5.0-year-olds as 
the results for the analyses by individuals parallel the pattern that emerged from the 
analyses of the group means suggesting that performance was superior for the older age 
groups as a whole.
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Table 4.2
Examples of Children’s Responses to the Knowledge Question 
Coding Category
1. Correct Response
C: Wherever you put wee duck, I found where BD is.
C: I remembered where baby duck was (analogous toy was BD).
C: Because what LD does in her room, BD does as well. They do the same thing.
C: I just, I just thought.
E: So, what did you think?
C: LD (indicating the model) hides in the same place as BD (indicating the room).
2. Incorrect Response
C: Magic.
E: How did you know which one to look in?
C: (no response).
C: Because he was squeaking (note that the toy did not make any noise).
E: But how did you know which one to look in?
C: Because I heard him go quack, quack.
C: ‘Cause you hided him.
E; How did you know which one to look in?
C; ‘Cause I just know. ‘Cause I’m a big girl.
3. “I don’t Know”/No Response
C: I don’t know.
C; (No answer).
E: You found him everytime...
C: (nods yes).
E: How did you know which one to look in?
C: (No answer).
E: Can you tell me?
C: (Nods no).
Children were asked “How did you know where to look for LD?” (or BD depending on 
the direction of testing). Transcriptions shown are of the ensuing verbal exchange 
between the Experimenter (E) and the Child (C).
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□  "Don't Know"/No Response 
H Incorrect Response 
■  Correct Response
(n = 42) (n = 48) (n = 47)
Age Group
Figure 4.4 The Number of Successful Children in Each Age Group Who Provided the 
Three Types of Responses to the Knowledge Question. The n’s in parentheses indicate 
the total number of children (successful and unsuccessful) for whom data for the 
knowledge question were available.
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The second noteworthy aspect of the figure concerns the number of successful 
children who had an explicit and verbalizable awareness of the model-room relation.
The black sections of the bars show that one 3.0-year-old (7%), six 4.0-year-olds (23%) 
and twenty-four 5.0-year-olds (71%) responded correctly to the knowledge question. 
Thus, whether or not children had an explicit, verbalizable awareness of the model- 
room relation increased somewhat between three and four years of age (7% vs. 23% of 
successful children’s responses) and more dramatically between four and five years of 
age (23% vs. 71%). A chi-square analysis crossing the three age groups with whether 
children provided a correct response (the black sections in the bars) or did not 
(the white and grey or “I don’t know/no response” and “incorrect” sections combined) 
confirmed this interpretation; there was a significant effect of Age Group, (2) =
22.23, p < .0001. Whether or not children provided the correct response to the 
knowledge question did not change significantly between three and four years of age (p 
> .39), however, there was a significant increase between four and five years of age (p 
.001) and between three and five years of age (p < .0001, Fischer’s Exact).
Only five 5.0-year-olds (two in the Control condition and three in the Object 
condition) made specific reference to a particular strategy—the Object strategy. These 
responses include: “...I was thinking about that BD will be in the silver one and I can 
look in the silver one.”, “Because I know which colour they were.” and “Because it’s 
the same colour”. Another child responded “Ummm...because it was in the red box and 
then I knew it was in each box.”. To clarify, the experimenter hid LD in one of the 
containers (while the child watched) then asked where she should hide BD in the room. 
The reply was “the same colour”. A similar exchange occurred between the 
experimenter and yet another child who said that the experimenter should hide BD in 
“the red one”, the colour of the target container. The responses of the remaining 
successful children who correctly answered the knowledge question tended to focus on
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the parallel actions of the two toys (see the examples of “correct” responses in Table 
4.3).
Whether or not children answered the knowledge question correctly also varied 
significantly across conditions, (2) = 8.09, p < .02. Seventeen of the 27 (63%) 
successful children in Object condition, 8 of the 30 (27%) successful children in Control 
condition and 6 of the 17 (35%) successful children in the Spatial condition articulated 
their knowledge of the model-room relation. Subsequent analyses showed that 
compared to the Control condition, significantly more successful children answered the 
knowledge question correctly in the Object condition, p < .01, but that the difference 
between the Control and Spatial conditions, and the Object and Spatial conditions, was 
not significant, p > .74 and p > .12 respectively (Fisher’s Exact). Thus, in spite of 
comparable performance, more children were able to verbalize their knowledge of the 
model-room relation in the Object condition than in the Control condition. Across the 
three conditions, twenty successful girls and eleven successful boys answered the 
knowledge question correctly, a difference which was not significant, x^(l) = 2.61,p 
>.11. Analyzing the data within each condition separately revealed no effect of sex in 
either the Control (p >.41), Object (p = 1.0) or Spatial (p = 1.0) conditions.
Recall that whereas successfiil children’s ability to verbalize their awareness of 
the model-room relation did not change significantly between three and fours years of 
age, there was a significant improvement between four and five and also between three 
and five years of age. While it is possible that the apparent increase reflects changes in 
the nature of children’s representation of the task (i.e. from an implicit understanding to 
a more explicit and verbalizable understanding), there are at least two alternative 
explanations for the observed improvement. The third noteworthy aspect of Figure 4.4, 
the black and grey sections of the bars, or the number of children who provided any
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kind of response (correct or incorrect) to the knowledge question, will be used to 
address the first of these possibilities.
The first possibility is that the more mature 5.0-year-olds may simply have been 
more confident and less shy than their younger peers in responding to interrogation by a 
strange, authority figure. More specifically, the desire to please the experimenter, by 
providing the correct response, may have been more likely to prevent uncertain 4.0- 
year-olds than 5.0-year-olds from articulating their understanding of the task. If this 
were true, then successful 5.0-year-olds would be expected to be significantly more 
likely to respond to the experimenter’s questioning at all (correctly or incorrectly) 
compared with their younger peers. To test this notion, a chi-square analysis was carried 
out crossing whether successful children provided any kind of response to the 
knowledge question (the black and grey sections of the bars combined) or remained 
silent or said “I don’t know” (the white sections of the bars) with the three age groups. 
Seven of the 14 successful 3.0-year-olds (50%), six of the 26 successful 4.0-year-olds 
(23%) and three of the 34 successful 5.0-year-olds (9%) remained silent or “said I don’t 
know” to the knowledge question. Although the chi-square result was significant, (2) 
= 9.97, p < .007, follow-up tests showed that whereas the difference between 3.0- and
5.0-year-olds was significant, p < .03, the difference between 3.0- and 4.0-year-olds (p 
> .16) ,and 4.0- and 5.0-year-olds, was not (p > .16 for both comparisons, Scheffé). The 
important finding here is that, while whether or not children responded to the 
experimenter did not vary, the ability to answer the knowledge question correctly 
improved significantly between four and five years of age. Thus, it is unlikely that the 
observed improvement in children’s ability to answer the knowledge question correctly 
was due simply to the attenuating effects of the demand characteristic of interacting 
with the experimenter.
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The second alternative explanation for the improved ability to verbalize the 
model-room relation is that the changes reflect increases in vocabulary size. Were 
younger children less likely to articulate a correct response simply because they had 
more limited vocabularies? This did not appear to be the case as whether or not children 
answered the knowledge question correctly continued to be significantly correlated with 
age group even after taking children’s receptive vocabulary raw scores into account, r = 
+.41, p <0001 (partial correlation).
Finally, it is worth noting that at each age group there were a few children who, 
in spite of experiencing great difficulty on the Symbolic Retrieval task (i.e. they failed 
to meeting the criterion for “passing” the task of searching correctly on their first 
attempt on at least three of the four trials), nonetheless expressed an understanding of 
the correspondence between the experimental spaces and the actions of the two toys. 
This group comprised four 3.0-year-olds (2 boys and 2 girls), eight 4.0-year-olds (5 
boys and 3 girls) and two 5.0-year-olds (both boys) or 10%, 17% and 4% of the entire 
sample of 3.0-, 4.0- and 5.0-year-olds (respectively) for whom knowledge question data 
were available. There were three such children in each of the Control (2 boys and 1 
girls) and Object (1 boy and 2 girls) conditions and eight in the Spatial condition (6 
boys and 2 girls). The very limited sample sizes precluded formal analysis of these data.
Discussion
Experiment 4 was designed to achieve three main goals: 1). to determine 
whether the extent to which boys and girls rely on object and spatial information to 
solve the model task continues to differ during the pre-school years; 2). to investigate 
the possibility that girls’ superior performance in the Object and Empty Corners 
conditions in Experiments 1 and 3 might be subserved by a tendency to label the target 
location and 3). to explore the possibility of an age-related change, during the pre­
school years, in the nature of children’s representation of symbol-referent relations (i.e.
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from an implicit to a more explicit understanding). An overview of the scale model task 
results for the three ages and conditions is presented first before discussing each goal in 
turn.
The Effects of Age and Condition on Performance on the Scale Model Task
Combining the data from Experiments 1 and 4 (i.e. across the three age groups) 
yielded a pattern of results generally in keeping with the pattern that obtained for the
3.0-year-olds in Experiment 1. For both the Symbolic Retrieval and Memory Retrieval 
tasks, children showed a marked improvement between three and five, and a non­
significant improvement between four and five years of age, perhaps due to ceiling 
effects. Three and 4.0-year-olds were equally good at remembering the target location 
in the original space (e.g. the model), however, 4.0-year-olds were somewhat better than 
their younger peers at using that knowledge to find the corresponding toy in the 
analogous space (e.g. the room). Thus, there are important gains in the ability to use a 
spatial symbol such as a scale model to navigate in the referent space during the pre­
school period.
It is important to note that these findings represent the only significant effects of 
age on performance on the scale model task as age did not interact with any of the other 
variables (Condition, Sex or Hiding Space) in the current Experiment. The results 
presented below are therefore discussed in terms of the data combined across the three 
age groups, hereafter referred to as Experiment 4, and compared to the results for the
3.0-year-olds only in Experiment 1.
Comparing performance across the three conditions yielded a highly similar 
pattern of results for the two experiments; compared to when both types of information 
were available (Control condition), performance was more affected by the removal of 
object information (Spatial condition) than by the absence of useful spatial information 
(Object condition) indicating that, at all ages, children relied more on the identity of the
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objects than on their spatial position to find the analogous toy. One difference between 
the results for Experiments 1 and 4 is that, whereas at three years of age performance in 
the two experimental conditions (Object and Spatial) was not significantly different, 
children performed significantly better when only object information was available 
compared to when only spatial information was available for the data combined across 
three to five years of age. This shows that the ability to map individual objects, only 
somewhat more advanced in 3.0-year-olds continues to develop more rapidly than the 
ability to map spatial relations between a scale model and the referent space throughout 
the pre-school period (a pattern consistent with previous results. Blades & Cooke,
1994a; Bence & Presson, 1997).
Note that at all ages, the different levels of performance in the three conditions 
could not be attributed to difficulty encoding or remembering the different types of 
information (object, spatial or both), as children’s memory for the original hiding 
location was always very good and surpassed their ability to find the analogous toy. 
Furthermore, the results could not be explained in terms of differences in the ability to 
learn the various strategies for solving the task as there was no evidence of 
improvement over trials at any age and in any condition.
Goal One: Sex and Children’s Strategies
The results in Experiment 4 suggest that whereas girls continued to outperform 
boys when the task required mapping individual objects, boys advantage when a strictly 
spatial solution was required attenuated with age. Although the pattern of results for 
girls and boys observed in Experiment 1 was not identical to that observed in 
Experiment 4, the differences between the two sets of results appeared to be explainable 
in terms of the expected finding (based on previous results; see Blades & Cooke, 1994; 
Bence & Presson, 1997; DeLoache et al., 1995) that in all three conditions performance
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generally improved with age. The important finding here, however, was that the pattern 
of improvement was different for boys and girls.
The results for girls in Experiment 4 was highly similar to those that obtained in 
Experiment 1; compared to when both types of information were available (Control 
condition), performance was relatively unaffected by disruption to spatial information 
(Object condition) but declined significantly when object information was no longer 
available to solve the task (Spatial condition). The group means for girls aged three to 
five years was 69%, 68% and 49% for the Control, Object and Spatial conditions 
respectively. The corresponding means for girls aged three years only were 60%, 60% 
and 33%. Thus, girls’ performance in all three conditions improved with age. The only 
difference between the results for the 3.0-year-old girls in Experiment 1 and those that 
obtained for the 3.0- to 5.0-year old girls in Experiment 4 is that performance in the 
Spatial condition improved from being no different from chance in the former group to 
being significantly better than chance in the latter group. However, although the ability 
to interpret the model spatially improved with age, spatial information remained 
relatively unimportant to the way in which girls approached the task; provided object 
information was available, their performance remained unaffected by disruption to 
spatial information.
A further interesting finding for girls was that, in general, their performance did 
not vary with the type of hiding space (model or room). Indeed, the only effect of hiding 
space for girls occurred in the Control condition at three years of age (i.e. in Experiment 
1). Recall that their performance was significantly above chance when the hiding event 
occurred in the room but not when it occurred in the model, possibly because standing 
beside the target container in the room may have underscored the type of information— 
object information—already salient to girls. That the effect did not obtain when the data 
for the three age groups were combined suggests that, with age, the effective use of the
^11
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object correspondence strategy was no longer dependent on the supportive context of 
witnessing the hiding event in the room. In the Control and Spatial conditions, girls’ 
performance remained unaffected by the type of hiding space at all ages. The 
developmental pattern for girls’ is therefore clear; the ability to map objects emerges 
earlier than the ability to map spatial relations, however, once acquired, the two abilities 
are sufficiently robust to be equally effective whether reasoning from the model to the 
room or vice versa. These findings raise the possibility that, for girls, the somewhat 
delayed development of the latter ability may be maturational.
A different developmental trajectory obtained for boys. Like girls, boys’ ability 
to use the two types of information improved with age; the means for boys in the 
Control, Object and Spatial conditions (respectively) were 55%, 34% and 39% for the 
for the data from the 3.0-year-olds only and 65%, 50% and 47% for the data from the
3.0- to 5.0-year-olds combined. Unlike girls, however, the means in the two 
experimental conditions remained highly similar in the two experiments indicating that 
boys did not appear to favour a single strategy throughout the pre-school years. More 
striking, however, was the finding that boys’ ability to capitalize on either strategy was 
highly dependent on the type of contextual support afforded by the nature of the hiding 
space.
Recall that in Experiment 1, boys performed best in the Control and Spatial 
conditions (the two conditions in which a spatial strategy would lead to task success) 
when the hiding event occurred in the model— possibly because having an overview of 
the entire space may have helped them to place the target location within the spatial 
context. In contrast, their performance in the Object condition was uniformly poor for 
both hiding spaces. Combining the data across the three age groups revealed that the 
advantage of viewing the entire space during the hiding event in the Spatial condition 
persisted at four and five years of age (boys performance continued to be above chance
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when the hiding event occurred in the model but not in the room). Interestingly, the 
reverse effect held in the Object condition where boys’ performance also improved but 
only when they stood beside the target object when the hiding event occurred in the 
room (their performance was above chance when they observed the hiding event in the 
room but in the model). Boys’ continued difficulty at using the object strategy when the 
hiding event occurred in the model could not be attributed to difficulty encoding or 
remembering the target location as their memory for the location of the original toy was 
very good, significantly surpassed their ability to find the analogous toy and did not 
vary with the nature of the hiding space. Furthermore, their inferior performance in the 
Object condition did not appear to result from the presence of misleading spatial 
information (arising from placing the objects in the model and the room in non­
corresponding corners on the experimental trials) as only four 5.0-year-old boys 
erroneously searched in the corresponding corner, each on only one trial. Given the 
appropriate supportive context then, boys showed some ability to solve the task on the 
basis of either object or spatial information by the end of the pre-school years. That they 
were equally successful when both types of information were available in the Control 
condition, irrespective of the nature of the hiding space, is therefore unsurprising.
In sum, the above findings suggest that although both boys and girls showed 
some ability to solve the model task using either object or spatial information by the end 
of the pre-school years, whereas girls continued to rely predominantly on object 
information, boys strategies were subject to the availability of contextual support. While 
boys did not continue to show an advantage when the task had to be solved spatially, the 
different patterns of improvement that obtained for boys and girls in the three conditions 
suggest that the sex differences observed at three years of age may give rise to an
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enduring sex difference (throughout the preschool years) in the way in which young 
children approach the scale model task. '^^
Goal Two: The Role of Language
With respect to the hypothesis that girls’ superior ability at mapping the 
individual objects between the experimental spaces might be accounted for by the 
tendency to apply linguistic labels to the target objects, the results were inconclusive. At 
least two possibilities for the results regarding the relation between vocabulary size and 
performance on the model task would have suggested that girls’ tendency to focus on 
the objects might be subserved by the labeling strategy. The first possibility is that pre­
school girls may simply have significantly larger vocabularies than their male peers and 
thus be better equipped linguistically to generate and apply labels for the objects in the 
experimental spaces. This was clearly not the case in Experiments 1 and 4, however, as 
boys and girls vocabulary scores were comparable at all ages and did not vary either 
with condition or the nature of the hiding space.
The second possibility is that, even if girls and boys have similar lexical 
capacity, girls may be more likely than boys to co-opt their linguistic skills to solve the 
task at hand. By this view, vocabulary size would be expected to be positively 
correlated with girls’ performance in the Control and Object conditions, the two 
conditions in which the object strategy would lead to task success. As boys were not 
thought to invoke the labeling strategy, no significant correlations would be expected at 
any age and in any condition. This second scenario for the relation between receptive 
vocabulary and performance on the model task also received very little support.
For boys, there were no significant correlations in the Spatial condition as 
expected. This finding is important for interpreting the results in the Control and Object
The broader implications of this difference are taken up in the General Discussion 
chapter at the end of this thesis.
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conditions as it indicates that any significant correlations that might have obtained in 
those conditions would be unlikely merely to reflect the effects of general intellectual 
competence. There were also no significant correlations for boys in the Object condition 
(consistent with the idea that boys did not rely on labeling to solve the task), however, 
in the Control condition, contrary to expectations, a highly significant correlation 
obtained for boys at three years of age. Although for the most part language did not 
appear to be implicated in boys ability to solve any of the versions of model task, it is 
possible that for very young boys in the Control condition it provided an additional 
source of cognitive support. Perhaps boys began their search by looking to the 
corresponding spatial location, then used the label to verify that the object they 
encountered there matched the target object in the room. While this possibility is 
somewhat intriguing, caution is warranted in interpreting this isolated significant 
correlation for boys particularly as the sample in question is very limited (n = 6).
The predictions suggested for girls by the second possibility outlined for the 
relation between language and performance on the model task received even less 
support. The correlations in the Spatial condition were not significant at any age (as 
expected), however, contrary to the predictions there were also no significant 
correlations for girls in the Object condition (at any age). One reason for this finding 
might be that the experimental manipulation (i.e. re-arranging the objects on every 
experimental trial) rendered object information sufficiently salient that the labeling 
strategy became unnecessary. Indeed, the only significant correlation for girls occurred 
for 5.0-year-olds in the Control condition perhaps suggesting that, with age, girls 
become attuned to the added benefit of labeling the target location. As with the results 
for boys, however, extreme care should be taken in interpreting this single significant 
correlation particularly given the very limited sample size (n = 8). The sporadic 
significant correlations that emerged for boys and girls thus provided very little support
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for the notion that while girls and boys may be similarly proficient in language, girls 
may be more prone than boys to using their language skills in problem-solving.
Perhaps the most important finding to obtain for the role of language in solving 
the model task was that the very limited and inconclusive pattern of results raises 
questions about the appropriateness of the linguistic measure employed. As a measure 
of receptive vocabulary the BPVS-II (Dunn et al., 1997) provides only a rough estimate 
of children’s linguistic abilities, and importantly, cannot speak directly to individual 
differences in the tendency to use language as an aid to problem-solving. Furthermore, 
it is likely that the extent of children’s vocabularies would have little bearing on 
whether or not they were capable of labeling the objects in the present experiment as 
even the youngest children are likely to have been adept at generating appropriate labels 
for the differently coloured hiding containers. The BPVS-II may thus have been ill- 
suited to tapping the linguistic capacity in question. Given the limited number of boys 
and girls in each of the conditions in Experiment 4 and concerns about the adequacy of 
the BPVS-II as an indicator of the use of the labeling strategy, the results for the relation 
between language and performance and mapping symbol-referent relations are best 
considered inconclusive. Further research is clearly needed to assess the possibility that 
children may bring their language skills to bear when using a spatial symbol to find a 
toy hidden in the referent space.
Goal Three: Implicit to Explicit Representations
The results from the analyses of successful children’s responses to the 
knowledge question support the notion that young children’s awareness of the model- 
room relation progresses from being implicit and unconscious to more explicit and 
conscious over the pre-school years (DeLoache & Marzolf, 1992). Whether or not 
successful children could articulate their knowledge of the parallel between the two 
spaces did not change significantly between three and four years of age, however, there
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was a significant increase between four and five years of age. Thus, there are important 
advances around the fourth birthday years in conscious access to knowledge about the 
relation between symbol and referent.
The apparent advances between four and five years of age in successful 
children’s ability to verbalize an understanding of the task could not be attributed 
simply to the greater maturity and confidence of the older children to interact with a 
strange, authority figure as 4.0- and 5.0-year-olds were equally likely to respond to the 
experimenter’s question (incorrectly or correctly). Nor did the difficulty the younger 
successful children experienced in articulating their knowledge appear to be due to 
limitations in the size of their vocabularies. Although there were significant gains at 
four and five years of age in children’s receptive vocabulary scores (as measured by the 
BPVS-II), the ability to verbalize the correct response remained significantly correlated 
with performance on the model task even after taking vocabulary into account.
Even when successful children were able to express verbally the relation 
between the scale model and the room, their responses were fairly limited. The large 
majority of successful children’s correct responses tended to focus on the corresponding 
“behaviours” of the two toys with very few children (only five 5.0-year-olds) making 
specific reference to the strategy they employed to reason from the model to the room 
(i.e. whether they attended to the identity of the objects, to the spatial relations between 
the objects or both). In spite of similar levels of performance in the Control and Object 
conditions, more successful children articulated a correct response to the knowledge 
question in the former compared to the latter. However, as whether or not successful 
children responded correctly to the knowledge question did not vary significantly 
between either the Control and Spatial or the Object and Spatial conditions, it remains 
unclear whether the experimental manipulation in the Object condition yielded an 
advantage in conscious access to children’s understanding of the task. Across
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conditions, the ability to verbalize their understanding of the task did not vary for 
successful boys and girls. Relying on a more robust, less context-dependent strategy did 
not yield a more explicit representation of the task for girls.
Finally, it is interesting to note that at all ages there were a few children who, in 
spite of having a clear, verbalizable understanding of the model-room relation, 
nonetheless could not bring that knowledge to bear on their behaviour in the room. This 
group included boys and girls at all ages and in all conditions (but note that the 
relatively small samples precluded formal analyses of these data). These findings 
provided further support for previous claims that the developing ability to co-ordinate 
knowledge and action may play an important role in early symbolization (DeLoache, 
2000; DeLoache et al., 1999; Solomon, 1997; 1999)
Conclusions
In sum, the results in Experiment 4 reveal a sex-related difference in the extent 
to which young children rely on object and spatial information when using a scale 
model to navigate in the referent space that persists throughout the pre-school period. 
Whereas girls consistently rely primarily on the identity of the individual objects, the 
type of information to which boys attend is highly influenced by the task context. The 
results also reveal that children’s representation of the model-room relation progresses 
from an implicit, non-verbalizable awareness at three years of age to a more explicit and 
verbalizable awareness by the age of five. Regarding the possibility that children may 
use language to assist in reasoning from the model to the room, the results from 
Experiment 4 are best regarded as inconclusive; a consequence of the combined effects 
of the insensitivity of the measure employed to assess the extent to which children rely 
on language in problem-solving and of the limitations of interpreting correlations drawn 
from very limited samples. Different methodology was therefore used in Experiment 5
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in an effort to investigate the functional role of language in young children’s 
understanding of scale models more directly.
Chapter 5
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Experiment 5; Does Language Mediate Success on the Scale Model Task?
One of the main results in Experiment 4 was that, throughout the pre-school 
years, object information continues to predominate over spatial information in young 
children’s strategies for using a scale model to navigate in the referent space. An 
important related result was that mapping the individual objects between the two spaces 
persisted as the strategy more strongly favoured by girls compared to boys. In 
Experiment 4 an initial gross attempt was made to explore one potential underlying 
cause for the observed reliance on the object strategy—the use of language. The idea was 
that perhaps children encode the identity of the target object linguistically (e.g. “the red 
one”), then use that linguistic representation to direct their search behaviour in the 
room. Of particular interest was whether or not the finding that girls were especially 
prone to using the object strategy could be related to the familiar claim that girls are 
precocious for language compared to boys (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974). As an initial 
step in exploring this possibility, performance on the model task was correlated with a 
measure of receptive vocabulary (the BPVS-II; Dunn et al., 1997). This tack, however, 
yielded limited results. Small sample sizes and questions over whether a measure of 
lexical capacity might lack the sensitivity required to tap the relation (if any) between 
language and the ability to grasp the relation between a spatial symbol and the referent 
space suggest that the sporadic significant correlations arising in Experiment 4 are, at 
best, interpreted as inconclusive. True, the scant evidence in Experiment 4 may well 
indicate that language is not integral to solving the model task, however, previous 
theoretical and empirical work would suggest that the idea merits further, more 
rigorous, empirical investigation.
The notion that language may play a central role in cognition has a long history 
in developmental psychology. Most prominently, Vygotsky (1962), writing in the 
1930’s, regarded language as a developmental tool essential for the emergence of
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higher cognitive processes. For Vygotsky, the acquisition of language afforded the 
direction of attention and thinking. Thus, language was thought to mediate mental 
processes such as attention, reasoning, problem-solving and the formulation of plans 
(Vygotsky, 1962). Over the years, a wealth of evidence from developmental studies in 
domains including theory of mind (e.g. Astington, 2001; Astington & Jenkins, 1999), 
memory (e.g. Vogel, 1979), judgements of perceptual similarity (Sloutsky & Lo, 1999), 
relational analogy (e.g. Gentner & Lowenstein, 1998, Gentner & Ratterman, 1998; 
Lowenstein & Gentner, 1998) and representational flexibility (Jacques & Zelazo, 2001), 
has accumulated to render this contention convincing. To date, evidence for the role of 
language in young children’s ability to use symbolic representations per se has been 
largely lacking, however, recently, Callaghan (1999a; 1999b) has shown that, when 
required to select the object depicted in a picture from two perceptually-similar, three- 
dimensional choice objects, 2.5- and 3.0-year-old children performed better when they 
knew the labels for the target object compared to when they did not. Thus, there is some 
evidence that language may indeed have a role to play in children’s ability to map the 
object depicted in a representation to the referent object itself. To be sure, the 
methodology employed and the accompanying theorizing on the nature of the functional 
role of language in cognition has varied across, and also within, domains. The main 
point here, however, is that the evidence converges to support the idea that language has 
an important role to play in scaffolding cognitive development in a number of domains 
including early symbolization.
More relevant to the present concern with sex differences and the role of 
language in using a spatial symbol, however, is the suggestion in the spatial reasoning 
literature that sex differences on spatial tasks appear to be explainable, at least in part, 
by a female advantage in language. For example, females, long thought to outperform 
males on measures of verbal IQ (e.g. Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974), and males who score
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more highly on verbal than non-verbal/spatial measures, are more likely than controls to 
apply a verbal strategy to spatial reasoning tasks as diverse as mental rotation problems 
(Pezaris & Casey, 1991), the rod-and-frame test (Shore & Carey, 1984) as well as 
various sub-tests from standardized spatial reasoning batteries (e.g. Cochran & 
Wheatley, 1989). Thus, in lieu of taxing a relatively weaker spatial reasoning capacity, 
verbally competent individuals may interpret spatial tasks in terms of a comparatively 
better developed capacity for language. The idea in the present research was to 
investigate the possibility that the female predisposition to approach spatial tasks 
linguistically may extend to using spatial symbols and that this tendency may take hold 
as early as in the pre-school years.
It is important to note that a shift in focus might occur when spatial tasks are 
represented linguistically. Whereas spatial strategies involve the global or holistic 
processing of stimuli, such as attending to distance and cardinal directions on a map or 
the relations between the items in a scale model, verbal strategies have the consequence 
of decomposing a spatial stimuli into their constituent elements such as landmarks and 
local directions or, in the case of scale models, the individual objects. At an age when 
children have mastered relatively few spatial relational terms (e.g. “left”, “right” etc.) 
compared with descriptive word classes such as nouns and adjectives, a linguistic 
strategy would be even more likely to emphasize the components of a spatial array. 
Thus, it could be that for children who approach the model task verbally (i.e. girls, 
according to the present hypothesis) vocabulary limitations may constrain the type of 
information that can be encoded linguistically, hence the observed tendency to favour 
the object strategy.
Although boys and girls in Experiment 4 performed equally well on the BPVS-II 
(Dunn et al., 1997), as mentioned in the discussion of Experiment 4, preschool girls 
may simply be more prone to invoking their linguistic skills in problem-solving.
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The primary aim in Experiment 5 was to address two main questions: 1). Do 
young children in general use language when mapping the elements of a scale model to 
their counterparts in the room the model stands for? and 2). Can the apparent 
predisposition of girls to rely primarily on the identity of the individual objects on the 
scale model task be explained by a greater tendency (compared to boys) to approach the 
model task linguistically? Accordingly in Experiment 5, methodological changes were 
introduced to the administration of the model task designed specifically to investigate 
the functional role of language directly. As the overarching goal of this thesis was to 
shed light on the nature of children’s understanding of a spatial symbol when they first 
acquire the ability to use it (see the introduction), the target age group in Experiment 5 
was three years of age.
Overview of Experiment 5
The overall design of Experiment 5 was highly similar to that of the experiments 
presented thus far in this thesis; the main difference was that, in addition to the 
availability of object and/or spatial information, the possibility of using the labeling 
strategy was also varied systematically. Identical boxes with pictures affixed to the front 
of each box were used as the hiding containers. Two sets of pictures were created that 
varied in their familiarity and thus the ease with which children could label them. The 
distinctiveness of the boxes, the possibility of labeling them according to the attached 
pictures and the availability of spatial information was achieved by varying the nature 
of the pictures on the boxes and the symmetry of the configuration of boxes in the 
experimental spaces.
Four conditions were created. In the Spatial condition, all of the boxes had 
identical pictures and the objects in the two spaces were arranged in the same way such 
that the task had to be solved spatially. In the Object-Easy condition, the individual 
boxes had different pictures of familiar objects, which children were expected to label
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readily (hence Object-Ea^), however, the configuration of objects in the model and the 
room was different such that children had to attend to the individual objects. Children 
could also label the objects (according to the pictures) to solve the task. However, as it 
was possible for children to succeed in the Object-Easy condition simply by 
perceptually discriminating the pictures on the boxes (i.e. without labeling them), an 
additional object condition was created. As in the Object-Easy condition, the objects in 
the two spaces occupied different locations in the model and the room, however in the 
Object-Difficult condition, instead of pictures of familiar items, the pictures on the 
boxes depicted unfamiliar abstract designs. As it was expected that children would find 
these more difficult to label (hence Oh\QQX-Difficult\ only the object correspondence 
strategy was available to solve the task. Performance in these conditions was compared 
to performance in a Control condition in which each box had a different, familiar (and 
thus easy to label) picture and the configuration of items in the model and the room was 
the same such that all three strategies—spatial, object and labeling—could be used to 
solve the task. The prediction was that if language is important for solving the model 
task, children should do well in the Control and Object-Easy conditions (familiar, easy- 
to-label pictures in both) and relatively poorly in the Object-Difficult (unfamiliar, 
difficult-to-label pictures) and Spatial (identical pictures, labels useless) conditions. If, 
however, perceptual discrimination of the individual objects was sufficient to explain 
the use of the object strategy, then they should do well in the Control condition as well 
as the two object conditions (object information available in all three conditions) and 
relatively poorly in the Spatial condition (no useful object information available).
A secondary aim in Experiment 5 was to explore to the possibility that 
the ability to approach the task spatially might benefit from experience. Perhaps the 
four trials administered in the Spatial condition in Experiments 1 and 4 were insufficient 
for revealing the potential to learn to interpret the model spatially (recall that there was
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no improvement over the two blocks of trials in the Spatial condition in Experiments 1 
and 4). Accordingly, in Experiment 5, the number of trials children received was 
increased by administering the model task a second time, after a short delay. At the 
second time of testing, all of the children participated in the Spatial condition (identical 
boxes bearing identical pictures arranged in the same way in the model and the room).
If increasing the number of trials would lead children eventually to catch on to the need 
to attend to the relations between the objects, then performance might be expected to 
improve from Time 1 to Time 2 for children who participated in the Spatial condition at 
both times of testing. Children were not expected to perform better in the Spatial 
condition at Time 2 after participating in either of the object conditions at Time 1, i.e. to 
be able to switch between the two strategies (object and spatial), however, the data 
would prove useful for establishing whether or not sheer familiarity with the task was 
sufficient to contribute to improved performance at Time 2. Finally, based on previous 
research indicating that performance on more challenging versions of the model task 
improves following experience with an easier version (DeLoache, 1991; Marzolf & 
DeLoache, 1994; Marzolf et al., 1996; Troseth & DeLoache; Uttal et al., 1995), it was 
expected that performance would be most likely to improve for children who 
participated in the Control condition at Time 1 followed by the Spatial condition at 
Time 2.
To ensure that children found the familiar pictures easier to label than the 
abstract designs, after completing the two versions of the model task, all of the children 
were presented with the pictures, individually and in random order, and asked to 
identify the item depicted. Their responses to the two sets of pictures were then 
compared. Finally, all of the children also received the receptive vocabulary measure 
used in Experiment 4 to investigate the reliability of the significant correlations between
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vocabulary size and performance on the model task that emerged for 3.0-year-old boys 
and 5.0-year-old girls in the Control condition in Experiment 4.
Method
Participants
Sixty-four 3.0-year-olds (M = 40.2 months, range = 36.2 - 43.8 months) with no 
previous experience with the model task participated in Experiment 1. Sixteen children 
(8 boys and 8 girls) were randomly assigned to each of four conditions: Control (M = 
41.0 months, range = 38.3 -  43.5 months); Object-Easy (M = 39.2 months, range = 36.2 
-  42.6 months), Object-Difficult (M = 40.6 months, range = 36.9 -  43.8 months) and 
Spatial (M = 40.3 months, range = 36.6 -  42.9 months). The nature of the hiding space 
(model or room) was counterbalanced as before but held constant across the two times 
of testing (see below).
Apparatus and Materials
Scale Model Task. The model, room, hiding toys and the general 
experimental set-up were the same as those used in Experiments 1-4. The model had 
three walls and was open at the top and at the front (as in Experiment 2). The main 
difference between the apparatus used in Experiment 5 and that used in previous 
experiments was in the nature of the hiding containers. Whereas in Experiments 1-4 the 
containers were laminated paper bags sealed with velcro, the containers in Experiment 5 
were four identical, red, corrugated cardboard boxes (large set: 30.5 x 21.8 x 24 cm, 
small set: 8.5 x 6.1 x 5.5cm) each with a flip-up lid and transparent plastic envelopes 
affixed to the front and top. The pictures that were inserted into the envelopes were 
black line drawings that occupied a rectangular area measuring approximately 14.8 x 
15.6 cm and 3.7 x 3.5 cm for the large and small sets respectively. The drawings were 
printed on yellow paper and mounted on red card (large: 29.6 x 21.0 cm, small: 6.7 x 
4.2 cm). Each box had two pictures; one placed in the transparent envelope on the front
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of the box and an identical copy of the same picture placed in the transparent envelope 
on top of the box. This was done to ensure that children could see the pictures on the 
boxes whether they viewed them from the front (as when they entered the room) or 
from above (as when they stood in front the model). The orientation of the pictures on 
the boxes was kept constant across children and conditions.
Table 5.1 shows the three sets of four pictures that were used in Experiment 5.
As only the pictures in the “Easy” and “Difficult” sets were used in the model task, they 
are described here. The third “Distractor ”set of pictures is described below (see the 
section on the Picture Task). The labels “Easy” and “Difficult” refer to the relative ease 
of labeling the items within the two sets of pictures. The pictures in the Easy set (left 
column in the figure) depicted items familiar to young children including a sun, an 
umbrella, a jumper and a pair of scissors and the pictures in the Difficult set (middle 
column in the figure) depicted novel, abstract designs. Thus, it was expected that the 
items in the former would be more likely readily to prime linguistic labels than the 
items in the latter. In order to achieve roughly equal discriminability amongst the 
items within each set of pictures, the Difficult items were constructed such that each 
Difficult picture corresponded (i.e. shared the most salient features; curves, angles, 
component shapes etc.) to one of the pictures in the Easy set (see Table 5.1). For ease of 
reference, the abstract pictures are therefore referred to as Abstract—Sun, Abstract— 
Umbrella, Abstract—Jumper and Abstract—Scissors.
Four conditions that varied in the type of information available, and thus the 
strategies that could be used (object/spatial/labeling) to solve the task, were created by
The particular pictures shown were selected because extensive pilot testing with 3.0- 
year-old children who did not participate in Experiment 5 revealed reliable differences 
in the tendency to label the two types of pictures. Details of the pilot testing are not 
presented, however, as the responses of children who participated in Experiment 5 to 
the two sets of pictures were investigated formally in the Picture Task (see below). The 
relevant data are presented at the outset of the results section.
...I
Table 5.1
The Three Sets of Pictures Used in Experiment 5
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Easy 
(Easy to Label)
Difficult 
(Difficult to Label)
Distractor
“Sun”
“Umbrella”
“Jumper”
“Scissors”
Abstract—Sun
Abstract—Umbrella
Abstract—Jumper
Abstract—Scissors
Lamp
“Bed”
“Television”
Children were expected to label the items in the Easy and Distractor columns either as 
shown or with appropriate synonyms such as “couch” for the sofa and “jersey” for the 
jumper. The labels in the Difficult column are included for reference purposes only.
Only the Easy and Difficult Pictures were used for the scale model task. All three sets of 
pictures were used for the Picture Task.
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varying the type of pictures displayed in the transparent envelopes on the boxes (Easy, 
Difficult or identical) and the symmetry of the configuration of boxes in the model and 
the room (same or different). The layout of the model and the room on the first 
experimental trial in each of the four conditions is shown in Figure 5.1. For ease of 
reference, the strategies available to solve the task in each condition are summarized in 
Table 5.2.
In the Control condition, each box had a different picture depicting a familiar 
object (one of the Easy pictures) and the boxes in the model occupied the same spatial 
position as their counterparts in the room. Thus, the object, spatial and labeling 
strategies could be used (either individually or in combination) to solve the task. The 
same pictures were used in the Object—Easy condition, however, on the experimental 
trials, corresponding boxes occupied non-corresponding spatial positions in the model 
and the room such that only the object and/or labeling strategies would lead to task 
success. The same manipulation was used in the Object-Difficult condition except that 
the Easy pictures were replaced with the Difficult, unfamiliar designs. As children were 
expected to find these relatively difficult to label, only the object strategy (i.e. without 
labeling) would lead to task success. And finally in the Spatial condition, all of the 
boxes had the same pictures such that the task had to be solved spatially. The pictures in 
the Spatial condition were sixteen copies (two on each of the four large and four small 
boxes) of one of the Easy pictures (sun, umbrella, jumper or scissors) with each picture 
being used equally often. Thus, four children who participated in the Spatial condition 
saw pictures of suns, four saw pictures of umbrellas, four saw jumpers and four saw 
scissors. Children who participated in the Spatial condition at both times of testing (see 
below) saw a different Easy picture the second time (e.g. suns at Time 1 and umbrellas 
at Time 2) with each picture used equally often as at the first time of testing.
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Table 5.2
Condition.
Condition Experimental Set-up Possible Strategies
Control pictures of different, familiar objects 
(Easy set)
same spatial arrangement in model and room
object, spatial, labeling
Object-
Easy
pictures of different, familiar objects 
(Easy set)
different spatial arrangement in model and room
object, labeling
Object-
Difficult
pictures of different, unfamiliar designs 
(Difficult set) 
different spatial arrangement in model and room
object
Spatial pictures of identical objects 
same spatial arrangement in model and room
spatial
The strategies listed for the Control and Object-Easy conditions could be used alone or 
in combination.
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Receptive Vocabulary Measure. The vocabulary measure was the BPVS-II 
(Dunn et al, 1997) used in Experiment 4 (see the Method section of Experiment 4 for a 
brief description and the accompanying manual for further details).
Picture Task. The Easy and Difficult pictures used in the scale model task, as 
well as the Distractor pictures (see the far right column in Table 5.1), were used for 
the Picture Task. The Distractor items were constructed in the same way as the large 
pictures in the Easy and Difficult sets (i.e. black line drawings, approximately the same 
size). For the Picture Task, however, all twelve pictures were printed on yellow A4 
paper (21 x 29.7 cm) and inserted into clear plastic covers. Like the Easy set, the 
Distractor set also comprised pictures of objects familiar to young children. The items 
depicted included a sofa, a lamp, a bed and a television. These additional familiar items 
were included to help prevent children from becoming discouraged or bored by the 
challenge of generating labels for the Difficult pictures. That the four distractor items 
were all drawn from the same category—furniture—was not intentional; these pictures 
were selected as pilot testing with an earlier version of the experiment revealed that 3.0- 
year-old children could label them accurately and reliably.
Procedure
Overview. All of the children received the same four tasks presented in the 
same order. The test session began with the administration of the version of the scale 
model task that corresponded to the condition to which children were randomly 
assigned i.e. Control, Object—Easy, Object—Difficult or Spatial (Scale Model Task- 
Time 1). Next, children were taken aside to a child-sized table and chairs where they 
received the vocabulary measure. Children were then taken back to the experimental 
set-up to participate in the Spatial version of the model task (Scale Model Task—Time
2), followed immediately by the Picture Task. The entire session lasted approximately 
35-40 minutes.
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Scale Model Task—Time 1. The procedure for the first administration of the 
scale model task was the same as that for Experiments 1 and 4 with the exception of 
five changes. Three of these changes were improvements to the procedure introduced in 
Experiments 2 and 3 (for details of these changes, see the Methods sections of Chapter
3). The remaining two changes were unique to Experiment 5. Only the five changes to 
the procedure will be described here; the reader is referred to the Methods section of 
Chapter 2 for a detailed description (and summary in Table 2.3) of the general 
procedure used in all the experiments in this thesis (i.e. unless otherwise stated).
The first change concerned the introduction of the hiding containers in the 
model at the start of the Familiarization Phase. Whereas in Experiment 1 the 
experimenter did not label any of the objects, in Experiment 5, she explicitly pointed 
out that the two pictures on the boxes were identical and, where possible, labeled the 
item depicted. Thus, in the Control and Object Easy conditions she said, “This box has a 
picture of (e.g.) aJumper on it here (pointing to the front), and here (pointing to the top 
of the box). Look, these two pictures are the same (indicating the top and front 
pictures).” She then continued, “This box has a different picture on it. It has a picture of 
an (e.g.) umbrella on it here, and here. Look, these two pictures are the same (indicating 
the two pictures).” and so on. In the Object—Difficult condition, she_said, “This box 
has a picture like this on it here, and here” (pointing as before). Look, these two pictures 
are the same. This box has a different picture on it...”. In the Spatial condition she said, 
“This box has a picture of (e.g.) a sun on it here, and here (pointing). Look they’re the 
same (indicating the two pictures).” She then continued, “This box has the same 
pictures on it as the last one. Look, it has a picture of a sun here, and here.” and so on. 
After introducing the fourth box, she said, “So all these boxes have different”, (or “the 
same”), “...pictures on them .” (pointing to the four boxes). The procedure was repeated
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for the boxes in the room. As in all the experiments reported in this thesis, the 
experimenter did not label the pictures on the boxes on the experimental trials. '^^
Changes two and three were the two changes to the procedure introduced in 
Experiment 2. Whereas in Experiments 1 and 4 children received up to four Placement 
Imitation trials, in Experiments 2 and 5, children received only one Placement Imitation 
trial and feedback and assistance in placing the analogous toy correctly was provided if 
their first placement was incorrect. In addition, the experimenter omitted the lengthy 
overviews of the task that preceded the Imitation Placement and Experimental trials in 
Experiments 1 and 4 and proceeded directly to place (for the Placement Imitation 
Phase) or hide (for the Experimental Phase) the original toy. These two changes were 
incorporated into the procedure of Experiment 5 to limit the overall length of the test 
session so that children would not become bored or inattentive before completing all 
four tasks. The results of Experiment 2 showed clearly that introducing these minor 
procedural changes had no effect on children’s ability to find the analogous toy.
The fourth change, introduced in Experiment 3, concerned the configuration of 
items in the model and the room in the two object conditions. So that children would not 
be tempted erroneously to use the spatial strategy in either the Object—Easy or 
Object—Difficult conditions in Experiment 5, the configuration of the objects in the 
room was the same at that used in the Empty Comers condition in Experiment 3. Thus 
on the experimental trials, whereas one object was placed in each of the four corners of 
the model, the objects in the room were configured such that the corners of the room 
remained empty (one object was placed in the middle of each side wall and two objects 
were placed in the centre of the back wall, see Figure 5.1). The configuration of objects 
on the four trials (from left to right) was; 1). Jumper, Scissors, Umbrella, Sun; 2) Sun,
Labeling the hiding locations during the familiarization phase but not during the 
experimental phase is standard procedure in the DeLoache studies (e.g. DeLoache, 
1991; DeLoache et al., 1991, Uttal et al., 1995 etc.).
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Jumper, Scissors, Umbrella; 3). Umbrella, Sun, Jumper, Scissors and 4). Scissors, 
Umbrella, Sun, Jumper for the Object—Easy condition with the analogous 
arrangements used with the corresponding abstract designs in the Object—Difficult 
condition. In this way, the spatial positions of the objects in the model were irrelevant 
for successfully retrieving the analogous toy in the room and children had to rely on the 
object and/or labeling strategies (Object—Easy condition) or only the object strategy 
(Object—Difficult condition) to succeed.
The fifth and final change to the procedure was that, on each trial, immediately 
after children witnessed the hiding of the original toy, the experimenter pointed in the 
direction of the target container and said “Remember, LD (or BD) is hiding right there, 
now I’m going to hide BD (or LD) in the same place in BD’s room (or LD’s room) and 
then you can find him.”. So as not to over-emphasize the identity of the object over its 
spatial position, the experimenter took care never to touch the target object while 
pointing. This was done to encourage children to attend closely to the pictures on the 
boxes.
Vocabularv Measure. The BPVS-II (Dunn et al., 1997) was administered 
according to the standardized instructions summarized in the Methods section of 
Experiment 4.
Scale Model Task—Time 2. During the administration of the vocabulary
measure, an assistant changed the pictures on the boxes in preparation for the upcoming 
Spatial version of the task. Testing at Time 2 began with the experimenter explicitly 
pointing out that the pictures on the boxes had changed. She then repeated the 
introduction of the individual boxes (in the model and also in the room) as carried out 
for the Spatial condition at Time 1. Next, she reminded children that the items in the 
model were the same as their counterparts in the room and demonstrated by holding up 
each miniature box from the model beside one of the large boxes in the room (this was
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also done during the Familiarization Phase at Time 1 as part of the general procedure 
outlined in detail in Chapter 2). There was no Imitation Placement Trial at Time 2.
After reminding children that the two ducks always do the same thing, the experimenter 
proceeded directly to administer four experimental trials (following the same procedure 
used at Time 1) using a different, randomly-selected hiding location on each trial.
Picture Task. The Easy, Difficult and Distractor pictures were used for the 
Picture Task such that all children saw twelve pictures. The Picture Task was 
administered at a child-sized table. The experimenter sat at a right angle and to the left 
of the child and kept the pictures face down in her lap during the instructions. She began 
by saying, “Let’s play a picture game. I’m going to show you some pictures, one at a 
time, and all you have to do is tell me what’s in the picture.”. So that children did not 
feel compelled to provide labels for pictures they did not recognize, she then said, “I 
should warn you that some of my pictures are a bit odd-looking. Even I’m not sure what 
they are. So, if you don’t know what’s in the picture it’s okay to say T don’t know.”.
She then asked children to repeat the phrase “I don’t know” which they did without 
prompting. At the end of the instructions she reminded children, “Remember, if you do 
know what’s in the picture you should tell me right away. But if you don’t know what’s 
in the picture, it’s okay to say, T don’t know’.” The pictures were then presented 
individually, in random order. Each picture was placed upright on the table, in front of 
children, and the experimenter asked, “What’s this?”. If they did not answer the 
question within 10 seconds, the experimenter rephrased the question saying, “Can you 
tell me what’s in the picture?”. Immediately after children responded to the item 
depicted, the experimenter removed the picture, placed it face down on the table, out of 
children’s reach, and introduced the next picture. The orientation of the Easy and 
Difficult pictures in the Picture Task was the same as in the scale model task with the 
orientation of all of the pictures kept constant across children.
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Upon completion of the Picture Task, children were praised for their efforts and 
returned to their classroom. With the exception of the receptive vocabulary measure 
(which proved reliably easy to administer and score accurately in Experiment 4), the 
entire session was videotaped. Children’s performance on the model task (at both test 
times) was scored live and checked against the videotapes for accuracy.
Results
The data from one boy who participated in the Spatial condition at both test 
times was dropped from the analyses due to experimenter error (committed on the 
model task). The analyses are therefore based on the data from the remaining sixty-three 
children. As the central hypotheses in Experiment 5 were based on the assumption that 
children would label the Easy pictures more readily than the Difficult pictures, the 
results of the Picture task are presented first followed by the results for the Scale Model 
and Vocabulary Tasks.
Picture Task
The data from the Picture Task were analyzed in two ways: 1). in terms of the 
labels produced and 2). in terms of the reaction time to provide them. Both measures 
were taken from videotaped recordings of children’s responses to the pictures.
As children could have been more likely, and quicker, to generate labels for the 
pictures they had seen during their participation in the scale model task (at Time 1 and 
also at Time 2), the ideal route to analyzing the data would have been to conduct the 
analyses for the “new” pictures (the ones to which children were not exposed during the 
model task) and the “old” pictures (the ones to which they were exposed) separately. 
Note, however, that as a consequence of the experimental manipulation, the total 
number of pictures to which children were exposed across the two times of 
administering the model task varied widely across the four conditions; children who 
participated in the Control and Object—Easy conditions saw the four Easy pictures at
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Time 1 and one of the Easy pictures again at Time 2, children who participated in the 
Object-Difficult condition saw the four Difficult pictures at Time 1 and one of the Easy 
pictures at Time 2 and those who participated in the Spatial condition saw a different 
one of the Easy pictures at each time of testing. Likewise, the amount of time to which 
children were exposed to the various pictures also varied across conditions. For 
example, children who participated in the Control condition at Time 1 and the Spatial 
condition at Time 2 saw one of the Easy pictures at both times of testing but children 
who participated in the Object—Difficult condition only saw one of the Easy pictures 
and only at Time 2. Tabulating children’s response to the “new” and “old” pictures 
separately therefore resulted in widely uneven sample sizes for the different pictures 
and picture sets. This, combined with the repeated measures design of the picture task, 
rendered statistical analysis of the “new” and “old” pictures separately untenable (too 
many missing data points to carry out the requisite paired comparisons).
To equate the number of responses across the three sets of pictures, and thus 
facilitate comparison of the relative percentage of correct responses across pictures and 
picture sets, the data were considered for all of the pictures (i.e. for the “old” and “new” 
pictures combined, hereafter referred to as the “old and new” pictures) and then 
compared to the data for the “new” pictures only. The results for both dependent 
measures (labels produced and reaction time) were highly similar for the two data sets. 
As the former, but not the latter, data set could be analyzed statistically, children’s 
responses to the “old and new” pictures are presented in the figures and discussed in the 
text (see below) with the corresponding figures for the “new” pictures reported in 
parentheses for the purposes of comparison. The reaction time data are presented for 
both the “old and new” pictures and for the “new” pictures in the appropriate figure (see 
below) with inferential statistics reported for the former and the corresponding means 
reported in parentheses for the latter. As none of the children had seen the Distractor
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pictures prior to the administration of the Picture Task (recall that the Distractor pictures 
were not used for the Scale Model task), the results for the Distractor pictures are 
reported only once along with the results for the “old and new” pictures (when the 
sample sizes were roughly equal for all three picture sets).
Picture Labels. Children’s verbal responses to the pictures were transcribed 
from the videotapes by two research assistants blind to the hypotheses of the study. 
Three children’s (two boys, one girl) responses to the Easy pictures, two children’s 
(both boys) responses to the Difficult pictures and seven children’s (six boys and one 
girl) responses to the Distractor pictures were not available due to technical difficulty 
leaving a total of sixty, sixty-one and fifty-six responses for each of the Easy, Difficult 
and Distractor pictures respectively.
The percentage of children who provided the various responses to the pictures 
are shown in Figure 5.2.1 for the Easy pictures, 5.2.2 for the Distractor pictures and 
5.2.3a and 5.2.3b for the Difficult pictures. The white areas in the pie charts indicate the 
percentage of children who provided the expected responses i.e. they labeled the Easy 
and Distractor pictures correctly and said “I don’t know” to the Difficult pictures. 
Children’s responses to the Easy and Distractor pictures were scored conservatively and 
only the expected labels, along with a few close semantic approximations, were 
considered correct (see the legends accompanying Figures 5.2.1 and 5.2.2). Thus for 
example, the responses “top” and “jersey” but not “shirt” and “dress” were counted as 
correct responses for the jumper and “couch”, “settee”, “chairs” and “seat” but not 
“cushion” counted as correct responses for the sofa.  ^"^
To be sure, children could still succeed with the labeling strategy on the model task if 
they labeled a picture inaccurately, but consistently. However, as it was not possible to 
measure the consistency of children’s responses to the pictures during the model task, 
only labels that were a close semantic approximation the target response, perhaps more 
likely to be used consistently, were treated as correct.
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The results for the Easy and Distractor pictures, the two sets in which all of the 
pictures depicted objects familiar to children, were highly similar with the large 
majority of children providing an acceptable label for the item depicted (see Figures 
5.2.1 and 5.2.2). The range for the Easy pictures was 85-93% (the corresponding figures 
for the “new” pictures were 71% for the sun, because five of the seventeen responses 
were “star”, and 88% for the remaining three easy pictures) and the range for the 
Distractor pictures was 79-96%.^'^ Note that, in general, the alternative responses to the 
Easy and Distractor pictures were thematically related to the target item. For example, 
“moon” and “star” were provided in response to the picture of the sun and “clippers”, 
“knife” and “cutting” were provided in response to the picture of the scissors. Thus, 
most children recognized the item in the picture and only a very few children had 
difficulty retrieving an accurate label from memory. The important point here is that the 
large majority of children readily labeled the Easy and Distractor sets according to the 
item in the picture.
A very different pattern obtained for the Difficult pictures; only half of the 
sample responded correctly (in this case saying, “I don’t know”) with little variation 
across pictures. The percentages ranged from 52.5-54% (see Figures 5.2.3a and 5.2.3b, 
47-51% for the “new” pictures). Furthermore, unlike the Easy and Distractor pictures, 
the alternative responses to the Difficult pictures varied widely. For example, the 
responses for the Abstract—Sun picture included “shoe”, “rocket” and “barbecue” and 
the responses for the Abstract—Scissors picture included “music”, “machine” and
The relatively low percentage of 79% correct occurred for the television. Four 
children (-7%) said “I don’t know” and an additional seven children (-14%) provided a 
range of different labels (see the legend for Figure 5.2.2) perhaps because the design 
used was somewhat outdated, and thus may have been unrecognizable to very young 
children. Ninety-six percent of children’s responses were correct for the remaining 
Distractor items (the sofa, lamp and bed).
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“dishes”. Furthermore, there was very little consensus amongst the alternative labels 
(see the legends in Figures 5.2.3a and 5.2.3b). A maximum of five children (8% of the 
responses) provided the same response to a single alternative item (“face for the 
Abstract—Jumper picture and “bed” for the Abstract—Umbrella picture). The 
idiosyncratic labels and lack of consensus amongst children’s responses to the Difficult 
pictures suggests that, unlike the familiar pictures (the Easy and Distractor sets), the 
Difficult pictures did not readily prime a particular linguistic label
To analyze the data statistically, the number of acceptable labels produced 
was tabulated for each of the three picture sets separately to yield three scores ranging 
between zero and four for each child. These scores were converted to percentages and 
group means were tabulated for each of the three picture sets. The resulting means for 
the Easy, Distractor and Difficult pictures were 89%, 93% and 51% (the corresponding 
means were 82% and 50% for the “new” Easy and Difficult pictures). Comparing the 
group means statistically confirmed the above interpretation of Figures 5.2.1-5.2.3; 
compared to the Difficult pictures, children were more successful at labeling the Easy, 
t(60) = 6.39, p < .0001, and Distractor pictures, t(58) = 7.34, p < .0001, with no 
difference between the two sets of familiar pictures (Easy and Distractor), t(57) — 1.04, 
p > .30 (related samples t-tests for all).
A further interesting finding is that children who provided the alternative labels 
for the unfamiliar, abstract designs appeared to do so for all of the Difficult pictures 
(with minor variation). Children were categorized as non-labelers if they said “I don’t 
know” to at least three of the four unfamiliar pictures, as “labelers” if they provided 
labels for at least three pictures and as “neutral” if they said “I don’t know” twice and 
labeled the remaining two pictures. Out of the 61 children for whom data were 
available, there were 31 non-labelers (51%, 12 boys and 19 girls), 28 labelers (46%, 15 
boys and 13 girls) and only 2 neutral children (3%, both boys). For ease of analysis, the
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two neutral children were randomly assigned, one to the “non-labeler” group and the 
other to the “labeler” group to yield 32 children (52%) in the former and 29 children 
(48%) in the latter. Children’s labeling status did not appear to be influenced by 
previous exposure to the unfamiliar designs during the model task as excluding the 
children in the Object—Difficult condition left 23 children (50%) in each of the 
“labeler” (13 boys and 10 girls) and “non-labeler” (9 boys and 14 girls) categories 
respectively. Boys and girls were equally likely to be classified as “labelers” or non­
labelers”, p > .19 for the analysis for all of the children (n = 61) and also for the analysis 
excluding the children who participated in the Object—Difficult condition (n = 46, 
Fischer’s Exact). Thus, whether or not children had been exposed to the unfamiliar, 
abstract designs during the model task, they generally fell into two camps—those who 
tended to label the Difficult pictures and those who did not. The significance of this 
finding is taken up in the results reported for the model task below.
Reaction Time. A third research assistant, who did not transcribe children’s 
responses to the pictures and was blind to the hypotheses of the study, timed and 
recorded (to the nearest one hundredth of a second) the time elapsed between when 
children first saw the picture i.e. when it was placed on the table in front of them '^^, and 
the beginning of their response using a Timex stopwatch (no model or serial number 
shown on the instrument). The same research assistant timed all of the children’s 
responses.
Mean reaction times were tabulated for each of the three sets of pictures and are 
shown in Figure 5.3. The results are shown in the top plot for the “old and new” pictures 
and in the bottom plot for only the “new” pictures. The mean reaction times for the
 ^  ^A few impatient children attempted to see the upcoming picture while the 
experimenter was in the process of placing it on the table. In these cases, the assistant 
began recording the time to respond from the moment the picture was in sight. Children 
who did this were subsequently asked to remain seated throughout the picture task so 
that the remaining items could be placed on the table for clear viewing.
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Figure 5.3 Reaction Time (in seconds) to Label the "Old and New" Pictures 
(top plot) and the "New" pictures only (bottom plot).
140
Easy, Distractor and Difficult pictures were 1.82, 2.35 and 3.98 seconds respectively for 
the “old and new” pictures (the corresponding times for the “new” pictures were 2.18 
seconds for the Easy pictures and 3.82 seconds for the Difficult pictures). Thus, children 
took almost twice as long to produce a label for the unfamiliar, abstract designs 
compared to either of the two sets of pictures of familiar objects. Statistical analyses of 
the data for the “old and new” pictures revealed a significant effect of picture set, F (2, 
102) = 26.45, p < .0001 (within subjects ANOVA); compared to the Difficult pictures, 
reaction time was significantly longer for both the Easy, t (54) = 6.04, p < .0001, and 
Distractor, t (51) = 4.57, p <0001, pictures. Note that children were somewhat faster to 
respond to the Easy pictures (1.82 seconds) compared to the Distractor pictures (2.35 
seconds), t (51) = 3.07, p < .003 indicating that previous exposure to pictures of familiar 
items during the model task conveyed a slight advantage (.53 seconds) in the time to 
produce labels for those items during the Picture Task (related-samples t-tests for all 
post hoc comparisons).
Comparing the top and bottom plots in Figure 5.3, it is clear that the pattern of 
results for the “new” pictures was highly similar to that for the “old and new” pictures. 
As for the “old and new” pictures, children took longer to respond to the Difficult 
pictures (3.82 seconds) compared to either the Distractor (2.35 seconds, as for the “old 
and new” data reported above) or Easy (2.18 seconds) pictures. Indeed, the only 
difference between the two plots was that there was very little difference in time to 
respond (0.17 seconds) to the Easy and Distractor pictures (i.e. when all of the familiar 
pictures were “new” to children). As mentioned above, the wide variation in the number 
of responses to the three sets of pictures (resulting from variation in the number of 
pictures to which children were exposed during the model task at the two times of 
testing) and a repeated measures design for the Picture Task, precluded inferential 
statistical analyses of the reaction time data for the “new” pictures only. It seems
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reasonable to infer, however, that as the means for the two data sets were highly similar, 
the main finding for the “old and new” pictures, that children took almost twice as long 
to produce a label for the unfamiliar, abstract designs compared to either of the familiar 
sets of pictures, held whether or not children had previous exposure to some of the 
pictures.
In sum, both the results from the labels children produced for the items depicted 
as well as their reaction time to do so converge to suggest that children readily 
recognized and thus were more likely to label the Easy pictures compared to their 
Difficult counterparts. Furthermore, as children responded similarly to the Easy and 
Distractor pictures (in labeling and also in reaction time), but differently to the Difficult 
pictures, the difference between their responses to the Easy and Difficult pictures could 
not have been due to the specific set of familiar pictures included in the Easy set and 
instead appeared to reflect the effects of familiarity (and thus ease of labelability) more 
generally.
Scale Model Task
Time 1. The data for the Symbolic and Memory retrieval tasks were scored as 
in Experiments 1-4. The results by Task and Condition are shown in Figure 5.4. Across 
conditions, memory for the original hiding location was superior to the ability to 
retrieve the analogous toy, although memory performance in the experimental 
conditions was somewhat lower than in the Control condition. The means for the 
Control, Object-Easy, Object-Difficult and Spatial conditions (respectively) were 61% 
(SD = 25.77), 38% (SD = 32.91), 31% (SD = 28.14) and 27% (SD = 22.09) for the 
Symbolic Retrievals and 86% (SD = 20.35), 73% (SD = 30.91), 66% (SD = 32.76) and 
57% fSD = 26.16) for the Memory Retrievals. In keeping with the Symbolic Retrieval 
results from Experiments 1 and 4, children performed best in the Control condition 
(61%) when all three types of information—object, spatial and linguistic—were
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Figure 5.4 Results for the Scale Model Task at Time 1 in Experiment 
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available and were most challenged in the Spatial condition (27%) when the task had to 
be solve spatially. In Experiment 5, however, mean performance in the two Object 
conditions, though between the means for the Control and Spatial conditions, was 
generally low, with little difference between the Object—Easy (38%) and Object— 
Difficult (31%) conditions.
The data were subject to a 2 (Task; symbolic retrieval, memory retrieval) x 4 
(Condition; control, Object—Easy, Object—Difficult, Spatial) x 2 (Sex) x 2 (Hiding 
Space; model, room). The results revealed a main effect of Task, F(l, 47) = 44.1, p < 
.0001, and a trend toward an effect of Hiding Space, F(l, 47) = 3.15, p < .08 which were 
subsumed by a Task by Hiding Space interaction also approaching significance, F(l,
47) = 3.69, p <06. As in previous experiments, children’s memory for the original 
hiding location (M = 71%) surpassed their ability to retrieve the analogous toy (M = 
39%). Performance on the Symbolic Retrieval task did not vary with the nature of the 
hiding space (M’s = 40% for the model and 39% for the room), however, memory for 
the original hiding location was significantly better when the hiding event occurred in 
the room (M = 80%), compared to the model (M = 62%). The ANOVA also revealed a 
main effect of Condition, F(3, 47) = 6.76, p <001; compared to the Control condition, 
children performed significantly worse in the Spatial condition (p < .002) but not in the 
Object—Easy condition (p > .13). These results are similar to that in previous 
experiments (Blades & Cooke, 1994; Bence & Presson, 1997; DeLoache, 1990, 
Experiment 1; Marzolf et al., 1999, Experiment 1; see also Experiments 1-4 of this 
thesis) in suggesting that, provided the objects were visually distinct and could be 
labeled, the availability of object information continued to predominate over the 
availability of useful spatial information for young children’s ability to use a scale 
model to find a hidden toy in the actual room.
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Disentangling the roles of language and perceptual discriminability proved 
somewhat more complex. In addition to the absence of a significant difference between 
the Control and Object—Easy conditions and significantly poorer performance in the 
Spatial condition, the results also revealed significantly poorer performance in the 
Object-Difficult condition, (p < .02 compared to the Control condition, Scheffé). This 
suggests that when spatial information was disrupted, benefits accrued to children for 
whom the pictures on the boxes could readily be encoded linguistically (i.e. in the 
Object—Easy condition). Note, however, that if this were true, then the difference 
between the means for the Object—Easy and Object—Difficult conditions (spatial 
information disrupted in both, pictures on the boxes more readily labeled in the former 
than in the latter) would also be expected to be significantly different—a finding that 
did not obtain, (p > .82 for the comparison between the two object conditions, Scheffé).
One reason for these seemingly conflicting results might be that performance 
was generally poor in all of the experimental conditions. Although the difference 
between the means in the Control and Object—Easy conditions was not significantly 
different, as in Experiment 1, performance in the Object—Easy condition (38%) in 
Experiment 5 was somewhat poorer than in the comparable Object condition in 
Experiment 1 (47%, in which the hiding containers were also perceptually similar and 
could have been labeled e.g. according to their colour). Not only were none of the 
differences between the group means in the experimental conditions significantly 
different (Object—Easy vs. Object—Difficult, p_>.82; Object—Easy vs. Spatial, p_>.40; 
Object—Difficult vs. Spatial, p_>.89; all tests Scheffé), but comparing the group means 
to chance (25% for choosing the correct one of four hiding locations) revealed that 
performance was above chance in the Control condition, t (15) = 5.58, p < .0001, but 
not any of the experimental conditions (Object—Easy, t (15) = 1.52, p > .15; Object— 
Difficult, t (15) = .89, p > .39; Spatial, t (14) = .29, p >.77, one-sample tests). The
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failure to find a significant difference between the two object conditions may thus be a 
consequence of a floor effect occurring in the experimental conditions.
Note, however, that scrutinizing the data more carefully revealed that another 
reason why a difference between the means in the two object conditions failed to obtain 
may be that there were individual differences in the tendency to encode the target object 
linguistically. Recall that it was possible to classify children as “labelers” or “non­
labelers” according to whether or not they labeled at least three of the four Difficult 
pictures on the Picture Task. The result was roughly equal numbers of children in each 
of the “labeler” and “non-labeler” groups (twenty-nine in the former and thirty-two in 
the latter, each comprising roughly equal numbers of boys and girls).
To explore the possibility that the predisposition to generate labels even for the 
unfamiliar pictures might prove advantageous on the model task the data were analyzed 
for the two groups separately. Figure 5.5 shows the Symbolic Retrieval results at Time 
1 for the “Labeler” and “Non-Labeler” groups. A 4 (Condition; control, object—easy, 
object—difficult, spatial) x 2 (label status; “labelers”, “non-labelers”) ANOVA revealed 
a main effect of Condition, F (3, 53) = 5.13, p < .003, consistent with the pattern that 
obtained in the original mixed ANOVA reported above, as well as a trend towards a 
Label Status by Condition interaction, F (3, 53) = 2.43, p < .08. Subsequent analyses 
revealed that children who tended to encode the pictures linguistically significantly 
outperformed their non-labeling peers in the Object—Easy condition (M = 50% vs.
18%, t (13) = 2.15, p < .05) but not in any of the other conditions (M = 57% vs. 64%, t 
(14) = -.51, p > .62 for the Control condition; M = 21% vs. 39%, t (13) = -1.20, p > .25 
for the Object—Difficult condition and M = 25% vs. 29%, t (13) = -.30, p > .77 for the 
Spatial condition). That the Label Status by Condition interaction did not quite reach 
significance is likely a reflection of the limited power of the ANOVA, a consequence of 
the fairly limited number of observations in each of the subgroups (n’s ranging from six
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to nine children). Nonetheless, the data provide some indication that when only object 
information was available to solve the model task, for some children, the possibility of 
encoding the target object linguistically proved beneficial to task success. The apparent 
floor effect that obtained in the Object—Easy condition thus appears to be due to only 
half of the children capitalizing on the availability of the linguistic strategy.
There were no other significant effects in the initial mixed ANOVA reported at 
the outset of the results for the model task at Time 1. Thus, in contrast to previous 
experiments, there was no indication in Experiment 5 that boys and girls approached the 
model task differently at the first time of testing.
Finally, mean performance for each of the two blocks of trials (i.e. the mean of 
trials 1 and 2 and the mean of trials 3 and 4) at Time 1 was tabulated as in previous 
experiments and the data were subjected to a 2 (Trial Blocks; block 1, block 2) x 4 
(Condition; control, object—easy, object—difficult, spatial) ANOVA. The results 
revealed no effect of Trial Blocks and no interaction with the Trial Blocks variable. As 
in Experiments 1-4, there was no evidence of performance across trials.
Time 2. Figure 5.6 shows the results for Time 2, when all of the children 
participated in the Spatial condition, by Task and Condition at Time 1. The means at 
Time 2 for children who had first participated in the Control, Object-Easy, Object- 
Difficult and Spatial conditions at Time 1 (respectively) were 38% (SD = 32.91), 30% 
(SD = 16.38), 34% ( ^  = 22.13) and 22% (EB = 12.68) for the Symbolic Retrievals and 
56% (SD = 28.14), 53% (SD = 22.13), 64% (SD = 31.58) and 38% (SD = 31.15) for the 
Memory Retrievals. As is apparent in the figure, the notion that previous experience 
with the model task might lead to an improved ability to approach the task spatially was 
not supported. The Symbolic Retrieval means for children who participated in the 
Spatial condition at both times of testing were highly similar (M = 27% at Time 1 and
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Figure 5.6 Results for the Scale Model Task at Time 2 in Experiment 5 (all 
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22% at Time 2, t (14) = .66, p > .52 (paired-samples) indicating that extending the 
number of experimental trials did not lead children to catch on to the need to attend to 
the spatial relations between the individual objects. There were also no significant 
differences when Symbolic Retrieval performance at Time 2 (spatial version of the 
task), for children who first participated in the Control, Object—Easy and Object— 
Difficult conditions at Time 1, was compared to performance in the Spatial condition at 
Time 1 (t (29) = 1.07, p > .29 for the Control group, M at Time 2 = 38%; t (29) = .43, p 
> .67 for the Object—Easy group, M at Time 2 = 30%, and t (29) = .97, p > .34 for the 
Object—Difficult group, M at Time 2 = 34%, independent samples t-tests for all. Thus, 
performance in the Spatial condition at Time 2 did not appear to benefit either from 
previous experience with an easier version of the task (participating in the Control 
condition at Time 1) or from experience with the task procedures in general 
(participating in either of the object conditions at Time 1).
Note, however, that the absence of significant effects in the above analyses 
could be due to floor effects on the Symbolic Retrievals occurring for all four groups at 
Time 2. Comparing the group means to chance (25%) revealed that for the Symbolic 
Retrieval task none of the means were significantly above chance: Control, t (15) =
1.52, p > .15; Object— Easy, t (15) = 1,15, p > .27; Object—Difficult, t (15) = 1.70, p > 
.11; Spatial, t (14) = -.98, p > .35. Indeed, memory for the original hiding location, a 
task at which children typically excel, also appeared to suffer at Time 2. Although the 
means for the Memory Retrievals at Time 2 were significantly above chance for all 
children except those who participated in the Spatial condition at both times of testing 
(Control, t (15) = 4.44, p < .0001; Object—Easy, t (15) = 5.08, p < .0001; Object— 
Difficult, t (15) 4.95, p < .0001; Spatial t (14) = 1.66, p > .12), a 2 (Memory Retrievals: 
time 1, time 2) x 4 (Condition at Time 1: control, object—easy, object-difficult, spatial)
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mixed ANOVA revealed that, across conditions, Memory Retrieval performance was 
significantly worse at Time 2 compared to Time 1, F (1, 59) = 16.09, p < .0001.^ ^
The generally depressed mean scores at Time 2 raise questions as to whether children 
simply lacked the cognitive resources, perhaps due to fatigue or boredom, at the end of 
the test session adequately to assess the possibility of improvement on the spatial 
version of the task across the two times of testing.
As at Time 1, to determine if there was any change in performance over the two 
blocks of trials, the data were analyzed by a 2 (Trial Blocks; block 1, block 2) x 4 
(Condition; control, object—easy, object—difficult, spatial) ANOVA. There were no 
significant effects in the ANOVA and thus no evidence of improved performance over 
trials at Time 2.
Receptive Vocabulary Task
The BPVS-II was scored according to the guidelines in the accompanying 
scoring manual (Dunn et al, 1997) to yield raw scores or the total number of words 
children understood. Mean vocabulary scores were then tabulated for each condition 
and the results were subjected to a 4 (Condition; control, object—easy, object— 
difficult, spatial) x 2 (Sex) x 2 (Hiding Space; model, room) ANOVA. That the results 
revealed no significant effects indicates that all of the children who participated in 
Experiment 5 were equated in the extent of their vocabularies.
As in Experiment 4, children’s receptive vocabulary scores were correlated with 
performance on the Symbolic Retrieval task for boys and girls in each of the four 
conditions separately. The results, presented in Table 5.3, show clearly that there were 
no significant effects for either boys or girls in any condition. The finding in
The only other significant effect in the ANOVA was a main effect of Condition,, F 
(3, 59) = 2.95, p < .04. At both times of testing. Memory Retrieval performance was 
superior in the Control condition compared to the Spatial condition (p < .05, all other 
comparisons were non-significant, p’s > .24, Scheffé).
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Table 5.3
Retrieval bv Condition and Sex
Condition
Control Object-Easy Object-Difficult Spatial
Sex
Girls +0.15 +0.04 +0.09 -0.10
n = 8 n = 8 n = 8 n = 8
Boys +0.42 +0.62 +0.50 +0.32
n = 8 n = 8 n = 8 n = 7
All of the correlations (Spearman’s rho) were non-significant.
152
Experiment 4 that at three years of age lexical capacity was correlated with Symbolic 
Retrieval performance for boys in the Control condition thus did not obtain in 
Experiment 5. To assess the sensitivity of the vocabulary measure for tapping the 
tendency to encode object information (i.e. the pictures) linguistically, children’s 
receptive vocabulary scores were also correlated with their label status assigned on the 
basis of their tendency to generate labels even for the unfamiliar. Difficult pictures (see 
the results for the Picture Task). The result was clear—even with the substantial sample 
of sixty-one children, the correlation was not significant, r = - .15, p > .25 (Pearson). 
Analyzing the data for boys and girls separately yielded the same non-significant result 
(r = - .12, p > .53, n = 29 for boys and r = - .17, p > .35, n = 32 for girls). The extent of 
children’s vocabularies thus proved a poor indicator of the tendency to invoke their 
linguistic skills to solve the task at hand.
Discussion
Picture Task
The results from the Picture Task provide strong support for the a priori notion 
that children would find the pictures of familiar objects easier to label than their 
abstract, unfamiliar counterparts. A very high percentage of children accurately labeled 
the Easy (85-93%) and Distractor pictures (79-96%), taking almost half the time it took 
to label the Difficult pictures (1.82 and 2.35 seconds for the Easy and Distractor 
pictures vs. 3.98 for the Difficult pictures). The very few children who were unable to 
produce accurate labels for the familiar pictures nonetheless appeared to recognize the 
object depicted producing labels that were thematically related to the target item such as 
calling the scissors “knife” or “cutting”. This suggests that their responses were driven 
by the item itself. In marked contrast, only half of the children (52.5-54%) labeled the 
Difficult pictures. Moreover, the labels generated varied widely, were highly 
idiosyncratic (i.e. they did not appear to be thematically related) and there was little
153
consensus amongst children for the labels produced (a maximum of only five children 
providing the same label for a given item). Unlike the Easy pictures, children’s 
responses to the Difficult pictures suggest that the unfamiliar, abstract designs did not 
readily prime a particular linguistic label.
To be sure, it is possible that children could still succeed with the labeling 
strategy on the model task even if they used either an inaccurate label for the familiar 
pictures or an idiosyncratic label for the Difficult pictures (as half of them did on the 
Picture Task) provided they used these labels consistently. This latter possibility seems 
particularly unlikely, however, as children did not produce labels for the unfamiliar 
designs automatically, on demand, taking substantially longer to label them compared to 
their Easy counterparts. Furthermore, the association between an ad hoc label and a 
given picture might be expected to be more difficult to remember and thus would be 
less likely to be used consistently and effectively. Even so, the difference in the 
feasibility of using the labeling strategy in the Object—Easy and Object—Difficult 
conditions would still be substantial as only half of the children (at most) who saw the 
Difficult pictures, but almost all of the children who saw the Easy pictures, would have 
benefited from labeling the pictures on the target containers. The predicted differences 
between performance in the two object conditions would therefore still obtain if 
labeling the target objects was important for task success.
It is worth noting that the pattern of results for the labels produced and also for 
the reaction time data held both when considering the responses to all of the pictures 
(the “old and new” pictures) and also when only the responses to pictures to which 
children were not exposed during the model task (the “new” pictures) were taken into 
account. The means for the two sets of data were highly similar, the only difference 
being that the data from the “old and new” pictures, showed that children gained a slight 
advantage in the time to label familiar items on the Picture Task if they had already seen
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them during the model task. Children were half a second faster at labeling the Easy 
pictures (previously seen by at least half of the children) compared to the Distractor 
pictures (new to all of the children) perhaps providing a hint that they had generated 
labels for the Easy items during the administration of the model task. The important 
finding, however, is that even with this slight advantage, children still took significantly 
longer to label the Difficult pictures compared to both the Easy and Distractor ones.
Note as well that as children responded similarly to the Easy and Distractor 
pictures but differently to the Difficult ones, the observed labeling and reaction time 
differences between the Easy and Difficult pictures (the picture sets used on the model 
task) could not be attributed to the particular items depicted in the Easy set. Instead, 
differences in the familiarity of the items depicted in the pictures appeared to result in 
clear differences in the ease with which those items could be labeled. As the nature of 
the pictures on the boxes was the only difference between the two object conditions, any 
differences arising between the means in the two conditions could therefore be taken to 
reflect the effects of the relative ease of using language to solve the task. The important 
point here is that the Picture Task data indicate that the manipulation of varying the 
nature of the pictures on the boxes in the two object conditions was effective for 
disentangling the roles of perceptual discriminability and the use of language in 
reasoning from the model to the room.
Scale Model Task
At the group level, the results for the model task at Time 1 were in keeping with 
those of the studies reported so far in this thesis; children performed best when both 
object and spatial information were available (Control condition), were relatively 
unaffected by the removal of usefiil spatial information (Object—Easy condition) and 
were most challenged when only spatial information was available to solve the task 
(Spatial condition), once again suggesting that the identity of the individual hiding
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locations was of primary importance to children when using a scale model to find a 
hidden toy in the actual room.
The notion that, at three years of age, children may approach the model task by 
labeling the target item in the model and using that label to guide their search in the 
room received support from two types of analyses. The first type of analysis was based 
on the group means in the four conditions. Children performed well in the Control and 
Object—Easy conditions, the two conditions in which the pictures on the containers 
were familiar to children and for which they knew the labels. In contrast, when spatial 
information was disrupted and labeling the pictures on the target container was made 
more difficult (Object -Difficult condition), or the labeling strategy became unfeasible 
(as in the Spatial condition when the pictures on the containers were identical), they 
performed significantly worse. This suggests that the relative ease of labeling the target 
containers played a role in mapping the target item in the model to its counterpart in the 
room. The second type of analysis was suggested by an intriguing finding that arose in 
the analyses of the Picture Task data. Recall that children could be categorized into two 
groups — those who tended to label all of the pictures (even the unfamiliar, Difficult 
ones) and those who labeled the familiar pictures and said they did not know what was 
depicted in the unfamiliar ones. Taking this finding as an indication that half of the 
children were inclined to represent the picture on the target container linguistically, the 
data were then analyzed for the “labelers” and “non-labelers” separately. The intriguing 
finding was that the children identified as “labelers” were significantly more successful 
than their “non-labeler” peers in the Object—Easy condition, but not in the Object— 
Difficult condition (both groups performed well in the Control condition and poorly in 
the Spatial condition). Thus, where the target object could be labeled relatively easily, 
benefits accrued to those children who appeared to approach the model task
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linguistically. These findings indicate that language may indeed contribute to task 
success.
It is noteworthy that the difference between the group means in the Object— 
Easy and Object—Difficult conditions did not reach significance. As the only difference 
between the two conditions was in the ease of labeling the target pictures, one might 
expect that, if (as the above analyses suggest) children did indeed use the labeling 
strategy, then performance in the Object—Easy condition should have been superior to 
performance in the Object—Difficult condition. Further scrutiny of the model task data 
suggests that there are at least two reasons for the seeming contradiction between the 
absence of this finding and the above results suggesting the use of the labeling strategy. 
One reason, of course, is that a difference between the means in the two object 
conditions was likely to be obscured by the fact that only half of the children appeared 
to represent the pictures linguistically. As the analyses of the group means were carried 
out on the data for the “labelers” and “non-labelers” combined, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the difference between the means in the two object conditions did not 
reach statistical significance. A second reason for the absence of a significant difference 
at the group level between the two object conditions is that performance in all three 
experimental conditions was generally poor; not only were there no significant 
differences between the group means, but none of the means for the three experimental 
conditions were significantly different from chance. The apparent floor effects in the 
two object conditions were particularly intriguing given that the results of previous 
studies (e.g. Marzolf et. al, 1999, Experiment 2; DeLoache, 1990b, Experiment 1 and 
Experiments 1-4 of this thesis) have shown consistently that, as a group, children are 
relatively unaffected by disruption to spatial information. In contrast to previous studies, 
when only object information was available to solve the task in Experiment 5, 
performance was relatively poor.
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So why did children find the object strategy more difficult to implement in 
Experiment 5? One possible explanation concerns the nature of the available object 
cues. Whereas in previous studies the object cues were inherent in the individual 
objects, e.g. the containers in Experiments 1-4 varied in colour, size, shape and type of 
handle (see the methods section of Chapter 2) and in the DeLoache studies the objects 
were different items of furniture and thus also varied on multiple dimensions, in 
Experiment 5, the object cues were different pictures placed on identical cardboard 
boxes and thus were only arbitrarily related to the target container. A picture of an 
umbrella, for example, has little to do with the box to which it is attached. It could be 
argued therefore that encoding the object information available in Experiment 5 was 
more cognitively demanding compared to encoding the object information available in 
previous experiments; rather than simply encode the identity of the target objects, 
children were required to encode the relation between the picture (the object cue) and 
the target box. Consequently, in Experiment 5, the identity of the individual objects may 
not have been sufficiently salient to children (a difficulty that might have been 
overcome by those children who generated labels for the pictures on the target 
containers).
Previous research (DeLoache, 1987a) has shown that even on a simple memory 
task in which children must find, after some delay, a toy they saw hidden in one of a 
number of hiding containers, there is an age-related increase in the complexity of object 
cues children can use to succeed. When the hiding locations were highly distinctive 
such as a woven basket or overturned tin can both twenty-one and twenty-seven month 
old children performed well. However, when the cues were photographs of the same 
items used in the former condition affixed to the front of identical boxes, only the older 
children succeeded at finding the hidden toy. As the distinctiveness of the object cues 
was identical in the two conditions, children’s difficulty in the latter condition appeared
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to be due specifically to the need to encode cues only arbitrarily related to the target 
object. As with the model task in Experiment 5, children were better able to capitalize 
on the available object information when the object cues were inherent (former 
condition) compared to when they were only arbitrarily related to the hiding containers 
(latter condition).
Although performance in the Control condition in Experiment 5 (60%, box-plus- 
picture relation to be encoded) was comparable to that in the Control condition in 
Experiments 1 (57%) and 2 (53%, object cues such as colour inherent in the individual 
objects; see chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis), it could be that the availability of spatial 
information helped children to overcome the increased difficulty of encoding the 
identity of the individual objects. This notion is also supported by the results of the 
memory search study described above (DeLoache, 1987a) in that the twenty-seven 
month olds’ ability to find the hidden object by attending to the picture cue on the box 
was highly dependent on the spatial position of the target box; children were highly 
successful when the boxes remained in the same position after the delay but not when 
the boxes were re-arranged such that spatial and object cues were in conflict. The stable 
spatial position of the target container thus appeared to scaffold the ability to cope with 
the increased difficulty of using an arbitrary cue (a picture on the box) to locate the 
hidden toy. Indeed, degrading the salience of the object cues in Experiment 5, though 
unintentional, was perhaps fortuitous for drawing out the interaction between object and 
spatial information on the scale model task. When object information was more difficult 
to encode, and thus less salient to children, the effects of the disruption to spatial 
information became more apparent. Hence the surprisingly poor performance, at the 
group level, of children in the Object—Easy condition.
The increased demands of implementing the object strategy in Experiment 5 also
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appeared to account for the absence of the expected sex effects, favouring girls, in the 
Object—Easy condition (based on the results in Experiments 1, 3 and 4). While it is 
possible that the null effect of sex simply represents a failure to replicate the results of 
earlier studies, this account seems unlikely. Given the well-established finding in 
several previous studies (Bence & Presson, 1997; Blades & Cooke, 1994; DeLoache, 
1990b, Experiment 1; Marzolf et. al, 1999, Experiment 2; and Experiments 1-4 of this 
thesis) that, as a group, 3.0-year-old children rely primarily on the identity of the 
individual objects to reason from the model to the room, then if the observed advantage 
to girls was merely an anomalous artifact of previous experiments, one might expect 
that boys’ performance in the object conditions in Experiment 5 would have been as 
good as that of girls in previous experiments when only object information was 
available. This was clearly not the case— the failure to replicate the expected effect of 
sex in the object conditions in Experiment 5 (based on findings by Marzolf et al., 1999 
and in Experiments 1, 3 and 4 in this thesis) was due to the finding that girls’ 
performance was surprisingly poor. An explanation for the absence of a sex effect 
appealing to the enhanced difficulty of encoding the object information in Experiment 5 
thus seems more tenable here. That boys did not show an advantage in the Spatial 
condition when the hiding event occurred in the model in the present experiment (as in 
Experiments 1 and 4) is likely due to the limited number of boys in the Spatial condition 
(n = 7, three who witnessed the hiding event in the model and four who witnessed the 
hiding event in the room), and thus the limited statistical power to detect the Sex by 
Hiding Space interaction (a relatively minor limitation of the present study in which 
performance in the Spatial condition was not of central concern).
Sex and Language. The suggestion that girls’ superior performance in the 
object conditions that obtained in previous Experiments (Marzolf et al, 1999; 
Experiments 1 and 4 of the present research) might be subserved by a greater tendency
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to bring language to bear on the model task was not supported. Indeed, no sex 
differences emerged in any of the analyses investigating the role of language for solving 
the model task. Boys and girls scored equally well on the vocabulary measure and there 
were no significant correlations in any condition between receptive vocabulary scores 
and performance on the model task for either boys or girls (and thus no replication of 
the significant correlation that arose for 3.0-year-old boys in the Control condition in 
Experiment 4). Furthermore, boys and girls were equally likely to be categorized as 
“labelers” and “non-labelers”, independent of their vocabulary scores, suggesting that 
they were equally likely to encode the picture linguistically and thus to benefit from the 
linguistic strategy in the Object—Easy condition. These findings show clearly that 
girls’ superior performance in the Object and No Comers conditions that obtained in 
Experiments 1 and 3 could not be explained in terms of a greater tendency, compared 
to boys, to approach the model task linguistically.
Two important further findings regarding the role of language in problem­
solving emerged in Experiment 5. The first, is that the extent of children’s receptive 
vocabularies proved a poor indicator as to whether or not they brought their language 
skills to bear on the task at hand; children’s vocabulary scores were unrelated to 
whether or not they tended to encode the pictures linguistically, a result that held for 
boys and also for girls. This finding is particularly important given that it is common 
practice in cognitive developmental research to interpret significant correlations 
between receptive vocabulary scores derived from measures such as the BPVS-II (Dunn 
et al., 1997) and its American counterpart the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT- 
III; Dunn & Dunn, 1997) and performance on other cognitive tasks as indicative of the 
relation between language and the task in question. The finding that children’s receptive 
vocabulary scores did not speak to the likelihood that they would generate labels for the 
pictures suggests that caution is warranted in interpreting such results.
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The second important further finding concerns the intriguing indication in the 
present data that there may be individual differences in the tendency to invoke language 
in problem-solving. In spite of explicit instruction from the experimenter that children 
did not have to provide labels for the unfamiliar pictures fully fifty percent of the 
sample of children tested in Experiment 5 nonetheless seemed compelled to do so, a 
tendency that proved important for predicting the use of language (where feasible) on 
the model task. The suggestion here is that the extent to which children rely on language 
in problem-solving may better be characterized as a matter of cognitive style rather than 
a cognitive universal. Future research is needed to identify the factors that predict 
variation in the tendency to use language in problem-solving and whether or not such 
individual differences interact with task demands.
Experience and Performance in the Spatial Condition . There was also no 
evidence that experience with the model task might help children eventually to catch on 
to the need to attend to the spatial relations between the objects in the experimental 
spaces. None of the means for the four groups of children who participated in the spatial 
version of the task at Time 2 were above chance. Thus, neither extending the number of 
trials in the Spatial condition (from four to eight trials for children who received the 
spatial version of the task at both times of testing), experience with an easier version of 
the task (as for those children who participated in the Control condition at Time 1) nor 
experience with the experimental procedures in general (as for those children who 
participated in the Object—Easy or Object—Difficult conditions at Time 1) led to 
improved performance in the Spatial condition at Time 2 (compared to performance in 
the Spatial condition at Time 1). The failure to find significant carryover effects was 
particularly surprising for children who first participated in the Control condition as 
numerous previous studies (e.g. Marzolf & DeLoache, 1994; Troseth & DeLoache,
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1999) have shown that performance in more challenging versions improves following 
experience with an easier version of the task.
Note, however, that there is ample reason to believe that the failure to find 
carryover effects may have been due to boredom or fatigue arising from a fairly lengthy 
and demanding test session. Not only was performance at floor for all groups on the 
Symbolic Retrievals at Time 2, but children’s memory for the original hiding location, a 
highly robust ability even in very young children, also appeared to wane; Memory 
Retrieval scores were significantly lower at Time 2 compared to Time 1. Furthermore, it 
was the experimenter’s subjective impression that at Time 2 children did not attend as 
closely to the model task as they did at Time 1. The question of whether or not 
performance in the Spatial condition might benefit from experience must thus await 
further investigation.
Summarv and Future Directions
The results in Experiment 5 provide some evidence that at three years of age 
children may use language to map the objects in a scale model to their counterparts in 
the room the model stands for. The interesting finding here was that the use of language 
held for some children but not for others. As there was no evidence that labeling the 
target objects was a strategy more likely to be used by girls compared to boys, sex- 
related differences in the tendency to rely on language did not appear to account for 
girls’ tendency to rely on the object correspondence strategy more than boys in 
Experiments 1-4. And finally, although there was no evidence that the ability to solve 
the task spatially might improve with experience, it is worth noting that floor effects 
(due perhaps to the onset of boredom or fatigue at the end of a lengthy test session) 
precluded adequate testing of this hypothesis.
Although a number of intriguing findings emerged in Experiment 5, the results 
appeared to be somewhat limited, at least in part, by the design of the experiment.
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Three suggestions for improvement that could be incorporated into subsequent follow- 
up studies are thus briefly outlined here. First, although the data for the Picture Task are 
compelling for suggesting that children interpreted the familiar and unfamiliar pictures 
differently, administering the Picture Task to children who had already participated in 
the scale model task, and thus differed in the amount of exposure to the various pictures, 
made it difficult to determine statistically the extent to which children’s responses to the 
pictures had been influenced by this earlier exposure. To adequately assess children’s 
first impressions of the pictures (i.e. whether or not they would label them and their 
reaction time to do so) one solution would be to administer the Picture Task to a group 
of children, comparable to those who participated in Experiment 5, but who have no 
previous experience with the model task and thus no exposure to the Easy and Difficult 
pictures (a solution precluded by limited access to children in the target age group 
during the execution of Experiment 5). Second, to overcome the apparent floor effects 
owing to the increased cognitive demands of the need to encode the box-plus-picture 
relation, slightly older children, who might be better able to represent the available 
object information, could be tested and the ftinctional role of language could then be 
investigated developmentally. And finally third, the administration of the spatial version 
of the task following participation in the various other conditions might best be left to a 
separate test session carried out at a later date to ensure that children are equally 
motivated to attend to the task at both times of testing. Incorporating these changes into 
subsequent studies would provide further insights into the compelling findings arising in 
Experiment 5.
Chapter 6
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General Discussion
The main aim of the research reported in this thesis was to elucidate the nature 
of young children’s understanding of a novel symbol—a scale model. Of particular 
interest was whether at three years of age, the age at which children are first able to use 
a scale model to find a hidden toy in the referent space, children’s appreciation of the 
model-room relation is limited simply to recognizing the correspondence between the 
elements or objects in the two spaces, or whether that appreciation extends to 
understanding that the model as a whole is intended to stand for the room. It has been 
suggested that the task could be solved solely on the basis of matching the miniature 
objects in the model to their larger counterparts in the room, in the absence of attending 
to the spatial relations between the objects, but that appreciating the higher-order 
model-room relation necessitates attending to both types of information (Blades & 
Cooke, 1994; Bence & Presson, 1997; Lillard, 1993; Perner, 1991). Understanding 
children’s strategies on the model task may thus have important implications for 
symbolization and cognitive development more generally.
To address this issue, a series of experiments was carried out to explore the 
extent to which 3.0- to 5.0-year-old children rely on object and spatial information to 
reason from the model to the room. Care was taken to include conditions in which either 
only object, only spatial or both object and spatial information was available to allow 
for the possibility that the two types of information may contribute jointly to task 
success. To facilitate comparison to previous studies, the general, group level, pattern of 
results is discussed first before reviewing the evidence generated by the present research 
suggesting that individual differences may play an important role in the development of 
early symbolization. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the implications
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of the main conclusions arising in the present research for symbolization and cognitive 
development more generally.
Group Results
The present research provides strong evidence that young children rely primarily 
on the correspondence between the individual elements in the model and the room when 
first acquiring the ability to use a scale model to retrieve a hidden toy in the actual 
room. The results of four experiments (Experiments 1 ,3 ,4  and 5) showed that children 
perform as well when distinctive objects occupy the same spatial positions in the 
experimental spaces (Control condition) as when they do not (Object conditions in 
Experiments 1 and 4, Empty Corners condition in Experiment 3 and Object-Familiar 
Condition in Experiment 5). Furthermore, compared to when both object and spatial 
information were available, (Control condition), when all of the objects were identical 
and only a spatial solution would lead to task success (Spatial condition), performance 
was significantly worse (see Experiments 1, 4 and 5). Note that differences in 
performance in the various conditions could not be explained in terms of differences in 
the ability to remember the target location or to learn to attend to the different types of 
information as children’s memory for the target location was always very good and 
there was no evidence of improvement across trials in any of the conditions and 
experiments. That the advantage of the object correspondence strategy was found to 
persist throughout the pre-school period in Experiment 4 underscores the claim that the 
ability to map the objects in the two spaces emerges developmentally earlier than the 
ability to map the spatial relations between objects. These findings are consistent with 
previous results (Bence & Presson, 1997; Blades & Cooke, 1994; DeLoache, 1990, 
Experiment 1; Marzolf et al., 1999, Experiment 1) and thus appear to support the 
contention that at three years of age children do not interpret the model as a whole as a
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symbol for the room (Bence & Presson, 1997; Blades & Cooke, 1994; Lillard, 1993; 
Perner, 1991).
DeLoache and her colleagues have argued against this interpretation citing, for 
example, the finding that children who first received a relatively easy version of the 
model task subsequently succeeded on a more difficult version even when the latter task 
was administered one week later by a different experimenter, using different materials 
and in a different setting (see e.g. Marzolf & DeLoache, 1997). These researchers hold 
that since the only constant across the two times of testing was the task demands—using 
a scale model to find a hidden toy in a room—the transfer effect must reflect a 
“relatively abstract understanding of symbol-referent relations” (Marzolf & DeLoache, 
1997, page 145). An alternative interpretation of these results, however, may be that 
children could simply learn to approach all of the experimenter’s “games” in the same 
way. That is, the easier version of the task may facilitate their learning a rule such as i f  
the small toy is hidden at small x (e.g. the small chair), then search fo r the large toy at 
large X  (e.g. the large chair, see Perner, 1991) which they may then apply to the 
subsequently administered more difficult version of the task at the second time of 
testing. The point is that it is not clear at what level the effect of transfer may be 
operating; experience with the object matching strategy may be sufficient to explain the 
improved performance on the more difficult task. By itself, the observed transfer effect 
does not argue convincingly against the object correspondence hypothesis.
The challenge to claiming that 3.0-year-old children achieve a higher-order 
representation of the model as a symbol for the room seems to lie in the dearth of 
evidence suggesting that they appreciate the model specifically as a spatial symbol. But 
do children completely ignore the spatial relations between the objects on the standard 
task? Or does spatial information play a supporting role in helping them to find the
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analogous toy? A hint that the latter possibility may hold comes from the results in 
Experiment 5.
Recall that in Experiment 5 children performed less well than anticipated in the 
Object-Familiar condition than would be expected based on previous work (e.g. Marzolf 
et al., 1999, Experiment 1) and on the results of Experiments 1 and 4. Unlike those 
experiments in which there was no difference between performance in the Control and 
Object conditions, in Experiment 5, performance was above chance in the Control 
condition (boxes with pictures showing distinctive, familiar objects occupied 
corresponding spatial positions in the two spaces on the experimental trials) but was not 
significantly better than chance in the Object-Familiar condition (boxes with pictures 
showing distinctive, familiar objects occupied non-corresponding spatial positions in 
the two spaces on the experimental trials, the group means were 61% and 38% for the 
Control and Object-Familiar conditions respectively). As mentioned in the discussion of 
Chapter 5, there is reason to believe that children may have found the target objects in 
Experiment 5 more difficult to encode than the objects in Experiments 1-4 (see the 
relevant section for a detailed account of this point). As the boxes in Experiment 5 were 
made distinct by the pictures affixed to them, encoding object information entailed 
representing the box-plus-picture relation. This would have been more cognitively 
demanding than encoding the object information in Experiments 1-4 where the 
distinctive features of the hiding containers were inherent in the objects themselves (e g 
size, shape, colour etc.) such that only the objects would have to be encoded. That 
children succeeded in the Control condition but not in the Object-Familiar condition 
suggests that the availability of reliable spatial information may have helped them to 
cope with the increased demands of encoding more complex object information. This
169
suggests that when both object and spatial information are available (i.e. on the standard 
task) they may act in concert to facilitate reasoning from the model to the room.
This interpretation of the data in Experiment 5 derives support from another 
study in which object information was made less salient to children (Marzolf & 
DeLoache, 1999, Experiment 2). In that study, children were given less instruction as to 
the correspondence between the two sets of objects than they normally receive on the 
standard task. In lieu of explicitly pointing out the correspondence between each 
miniature object and its larger counterpart (standard procedure), the experimenter 
simply pointed out three of the objects in the model and the matching three objects in 
the room (reduced instructions procedure). One consequence of the reduced instructions 
may have been that the correspondence between the objects, or object information, was 
rendered less salient to children. All children received the reduced instructions, 
however, for half of the children the objects in the two spaces occupied the same spatial 
positions (same-arrangement condition) and for the remaining half they occupied non­
corresponding spatial positions (different-arrangement condition). The pattern of results 
paralleled those of Experiment 5; children performed significantly better in the same- 
arrangement condition compared to the different-arrangement condition. As in 
Experiment 5, reliable spatial information appeared to help children to compensate for 
the decreased salience of the object information. These findings suggest that, at least to 
some extent, children do attend to the spatial location of the objects when using a scale 
model to retrieve the hidden toy in the room.
The seeming contradiction between the results of these studies, indicating that
3.0-year-old children do attend to spatial information, and those of the experiments 
showing that children are highly challenged when required explicitly to use only spatial 
information (Bence & Presson, 1997; Blades & Cooke, 1994), may therefore be
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explained in terms of the relative importance given to spatial information for solving the 
model task in the two types of studies. Taking the results from those studies together 
suggests that development may proceed as follows: At three years of age, children rely 
primarily on the identity of the individual objects to solve the standard model task . 
Rather than ignore spatial information, however, they may have an implicit, nascent 
awareness of the symmetry of the spatial relations in the model and the room which 
may in turn serve to scaffold their appreciation of the correspondence between the 
objects—seeing the objects in corresponding spatial positions may facilitate recognizing 
the similarity between the individual objects in the two spaces. Over time, this 
awareness of the spatial correspondence between the two spaces becomes increasingly 
explicit, sufficiently so by four years of age that the task can be solved spatially 
(although note that even 5.0-year-olds’ performance on the spatial version of the task is 
significantly inferior to their performance on the standard task suggesting a persistent 
developmental lag in the ability to approach the task spatially; Blades & Cooke, 1994; 
Bence & Presson, 1997, Experiment 4 of this thesis). Children’s responses to the 
knowledge question certainly make clear that there are rapid gains between three and 
five years of age in the degree of explicitness of their representation of the model-room 
relation. The seemingly different results that obtained for 3.0-year-olds in the two sets 
of studies thus appear to reflect differences in the degree of explicitness with which 
children are required to represent spatial information. Though not essential to success 
on the standard task, spatial information nonetheless influences 3.0-year-olds’ ability to 
reason from the model to the room.
Individual Differences
A novel contribution of the present research to the literature on young children’s 
understanding of scale models is the suggestion that there may be individual differences
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in strategies for solving the task. Two factors that appeared to be linked to individual 
differences were identified—sex and the tendency to use language to assist in finding 
the hidden toy.
Sex The pattern of results emerging in Experiments 1-4 showed that boys and 
girls appear to approach the model task differently. The story was most clear for girls 
whose performance, for the most part, followed the pattern that obtained for the group 
level results. Object information clearly predominates in guiding pre-school aged girls 
to the target container. At three years of age, they performed as well when both object 
and spatial information were available as when only object information was available.
In contrast, when the task had to be solved on the basis of only spatial information, 
performance was very poor (see Experiments 1- 3). Furthermore, the results from 
Experiment 4 revealed that this pattern of performance persisted throughout the pre­
school years. Although by four years of age their performance improved substantially 
when the task had to be solved spatially, performance in the Object and Control 
conditions remained highly similar and superior to performance in the spatial condition. 
The one exception to this pattern in the present research occurred in Experiment 5 
where girls’ performance in the Object-Familiar condition was surprisingly low; 
however, this finding appeared to result from the increased demands of encoding more 
complex object information.
A very different pattern obtained for boys. Although 3.0-year-old boys 
performed as well as girls on the standard task, they were highly challenged in the 
absence of reliable spatial information; their performance in the two object conditions 
was extremely poor (Experiments 1 and 3). Indeed, it was not until at least four years of 
age that boys showed any sign of succeeding solely on the basis of the object matching 
strategy (Experiment 4). Also, in striking contrast to girls, frilly half of the boys (those
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who experienced the hiding event in the model and thus had an overview of the hiding 
space) performed well when the task had to be solved spatially (Experiment 1). The data 
from Experiment 4 revealed that although boys, like girls, showed improvement during 
the pre-school years in the ability to use either object, spatial or both types of 
information to solve the task, their performance when only object or spatial information 
was available in isolation continued to be highly dependent on the task context.
Standing beside the target object during the hiding event (i.e. when the hiding event 
occurred in the room) appeared to facilitate the use of the object correspondence 
strategy while the opportunity to place the target in the spatial context (i.e. when the 
hiding event occurred in the model) may have scaffolded the ability to approach the task 
spatially. The advantage of witnessing the hiding event in the model did not obtain for
3.0-year-old boys in Experiment 5; however, the absence of a significant effect is likely 
due to the limited number of participants in the Spatial condition (a total of only seven 
boys).
The different pattern of results for boys and girls raises the intriguing possibility 
of multiple developmental routes to achieving an explicit, full-blown appreciation of a 
spatial symbol as a representation of the space it is intended to stand for. More 
specifically, these patterns suggest that there could be individual differences in the way 
in which that representation is formed. Girls’ strategy of early reliance on the identity of 
the individual objects, which later comes to take the relations between the objects to 
account, suggests that for some, the development of a mature understanding of a spatial 
representation may be a bottom up affair. That is, some children may first appreciate the 
parallel between the elements of a spatial representation and the objects they represent, 
with their spatial location playing a relatively minor (though not completely absent) role 
at first and eventually becoming progressively explicit. A holistic representation of a
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scale model is thus built up from its constituent parts. The contrasting developmental 
pattern that holds for boys suggests that for others, a fledgling bias to approach the task 
spatially eventually comes to incorporate the identity of the individual objects with the 
development of the two strategies occurring in tandem and remaining closely linked to 
the task context throughout the pre-school years. Thus, for other children a nascent, 
holistic awareness of the symbol may become differentiated with development—a more 
top down approach.
These different developmental routes could have long-term implications for 
spatial reasoning. While benefits may at first accrue to those who find early success 
with the object matching strategy, this experience may lead to favouring that strategy 
and thus neglecting to attend to spatial information even when both types of information 
are available and children could cope with the demands of a spatial approach (i.e. after 
four years of age). Over time, however, a relative lack of experience with attending to 
and using spatial information might lead to difficulties in invoking that ability when a 
strictly spatial solution is required. In contrast, an early bias to attend to the layout of a 
spatial symbol, while initially a disadvantage (perhaps because children are not yet 
neurologically prepared to process that information efficiently) when awareness of the 
individual objects is essential to task success, would lead to more experience with using 
spatial information down the road and ultimately to greater success and confidence on 
spatially demanding tasks. It is interesting to speculate that very early sex differences 
such as those outlined here may be linked to findings of sex differences in navigational 
abilities observed in adulthood (e.g. Galea & Kimura, 1993 ; Ward et al., 1986).
This is not to say that the different routes to achieving an explicit, holistic 
representation of the model are deterministically linked to sex, however, sex may 
predispose individuals to attending to different aspects of a spatial representation when
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first acquired and so set them off on different developmental trajectories. Although, of 
course, other factors such as experience with spatially-oriented toys and activities are 
likely to be critical to the developmental course as well. The main point is to suggest 
that there may be more than one means to achieving the same end. Considered in this 
way, the present findings underscore the utility of investigating the possibility of sex 
differences in cognitive developmental research for shedding light on the developmental 
process more generally (Liben, 2000).
Language Another individual difference highlighted by the present research 
(Experiment 5) is in the use of language to mediate success on the model task. Recall 
that the idea in Experiment 5 was to investigate the possibility that the object mapping 
strategy may rely on the tendency to apply a linguistic label to the picture on the target 
box in the model and to use that label to guide searching in the room. Although the 
results for the group as a whole did not reveal clear use of the labeling strategy, there 
was evidence that some children adopted this approach. Taking children’s performance 
on the Picture Task as an indicator of whether or not they represented the pictures 
linguistically, revealed that benefits accrued on the scale model task to those children 
who used the labeling strategy when only object information was available and the 
pictures on the boxes were familiar to children and could be labeled readily. In the 
Object-Familiar condition, children who tended to label the pictures indiscriminately on 
the Picture Task (i.e. they labeled familiar and unfamiliar pictures alike) significantly 
outperformed those children who labeled only the familiar pictures. It is interesting to 
note that the two groups comprised roughly equal numbers of children with roughly 
equal numbers of boys and girls in each group. This suggests that girls’ predisposition 
to favour the object-mapping strategy was not sub-served by a greater tendency, 
compared to boys, to encode the identity of the objects linguistically. Although the
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labeling strategy was not adopted universally, the use of language to mediate success on 
the model task appears to reflect yet another individual difference in how children 
approached the task.
It is worth noting here that the size of children’s receptive vocabularies was 
unrelated to whether or not they tended to invoke the labeling strategy suggesting that 
acquiring language and using language in problem-solving may develop independently. 
This finding is particularly important as receptive vocabulary measures are typically 
included in cognitive developmental studies, the rationale being that any significant 
relations arising between vocabulary size and performance on other tasks can be taken 
as an indication of the role of language in solving those tasks. That vocabulary size and 
the flmctional use of language on the model task were not found to be related in 
Experiment 5 suggests caution in interpreting the results of studies adopting this 
approach. Researchers interested in the development of the functional role of language 
must take care not to conflate the two aspects of language and to devise ways to assess 
the role of language in problem-solving more directly.
Conclusions
In sum, the present data suggest that although 3.0-year-old children do not yet 
have an explicit understanding of a scale model as spatial per se, they do encode the 
spatial properties of a scale model, at least to some extent. What is achieved at three 
years of age is a rudimentary, implicit representation, one that incorporates both object 
and spatial information, but in which the identity of the objects predominates with the 
spatial relations between objects playing a supporting role. With development, 
children’s representation of the model as a symbol becomes increasingly explicit 
bringing the symmetry of spatial relations to the fore. It is also concluded that individual 
differences (such as sex and the and the use of language in problem-solving) may also
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alter the timing and developmental course of the representation of object and spatial 
information such that there may be multiple developmental routes on the way to 
achieving a full-blown, explicit representation of a scale model as a symbol for the 
space it is intended to represent.
Taking the group level results from present research together with the finding 
that there may be individual differences in the developmental course to developing a 
mature understanding of scale models also raises questions about characterizing the 
emergence of the acquisition of a novel symbol as all-or-none (see e.g. DeLoache, 1987, 
1989a, 1989b; DeLoache & Burns, 1993). The present data suggests a more gradual 
developmental pattern, one in which both object and spatial information may be 
processed early on with changes in the relative contribution of the two types of 
information to success on the task occurring as children’s knowledge gradually becomes 
more explicit. The point is that the developmental process may be finer and more subtle 
than an all-or-none characterization would suggest. The suggestion of a “radical 
conceptual change” of the sort described by Perner (1991) or a “relational shift”, from 
attending to similarity based on objects (and their features) to similarity based on the 
relations between objects, as described by Gentner and her colleagues (Gentner, 1988; 
Gentner & Loewenstein, 1998; Lowenstein & Gentner, 2001) occurring between three 
and four years of age may be more a byproduct of the experimental methodology on 
which they are based than a reflection of the developmental process. As Siegler points 
out, cross sectional studies comparing the performance of children at different ages that 
do not take changes in children’s strategies as well as the potential for individual 
differences in those strategies into account run the risk of giving the erroneous 
impression of development as punctuated by abrupt changes in the nature of children’s
177
thinking. The upshot is effectively to shift the focus away from the process of 
development (Siegler, 1996).
Future research would do well to delineate the various strategies children may 
apply in acquiring novel symbols perhaps beginning with the ages at which the cross- 
sectional data indicate that children are not yet capable of representing the symbol- 
referent relation. Instead of an abrupt emergence between 2.5- and 3.0- years of age in 
the ability to appreciate the significance of a scale model for navigating in the referent 
space (DeLoache, 1987b), it could turn out that even 2.5-year-olds approach the task 
strategically, albeit with unsuccessful strategies, and through this process discover the 
strategy that leads to the problem solution.
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